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ofHybrid Peacebuilding in Asia
“Peacebuilding is a crucial instrument of international conflict resolution.
Due to its significance, Professor Yuji Uesugi edited and published a book
on Hybrid Peacebuilding in Asia in 2020. The book explored a novel
idea called the mid-space bridge-builders. The idea received considerable
attention since the publication of the book. The current book takes the
mid-space bridge-builders idea one step further by introducing specific
case studies. The case studies make a significant contribution to the theory
and practice of international peacebuilding. The book will be of value to
peacebuilding practitioners, researchers, and students.”
—S. I. Keethaponcalan, Salisbury University, Maryland, USA
“This important collection adds further weight and nuance to the growing
body of scholarship that has recently emerged on the development of
hybrid political orders and on hybrid peace frameworks in complex,
contextual political conflicts. It also consolidates work on Asian contri-
butions to peacebuilding. The chapters offer innovative theorising on
hybridity, as well as an interesting range of cases and examples. In the
context of Asian contributions to peacebuilding, focussing on China
and Japan, and in the contexts of Cambodia and Mindanao, the book
outlines how political differences are externally and internally mediated
and incorporated into hybrid frameworks for peacebuilding. These are
deeply affected by bottom-up demands for reform. The book suggests
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that regional and contextual lessons in these examples indicate that “mid-
space actors” tend to accumulate the pluralist capacities necessary to
facilitate more legitimate forms of peacebuilding.”
—Oliver Richmond, Research Professor of IR, Peace and Conflict Studies,
The University of Manchester, UK
“This book makes two important contributions to the literature on
hybridity and peacebuilding. First, it brings Asian perspectives to bear on
theoretical debates at the cutting-edge of peacebuilding theory. Second,
it examines case studies of peacebuilding conducted by Asian actors that
have largely been overlooked by Western analyses. Based on these contri-
butions, Uesugi and his contributors open pathways for further analyses of
“Eastphalian hybrid peacebuilding” as an alternative to dominant Western
perspectives.”
—Joanne Wallis, Professor of International Security, University of
Adelaide, Australia
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction: Operationalisation of Hybrid
Peacebuilding in Asia
Yuji Uesugi
Overview of the Book
This study expands on the recent discussion presented in Hybrid Peace-
building in Asia (Uesugi 2020) which examined complex processes of
negotiated and/or mediated hybridisation shaped through interactions
among myriad of stakeholders including local, national, regional and
international actors. While the focus of this study is related closely to
the key arguments presented in the aforementioned study, it constitutes a
stand-alone academic work seeking to revitalise the reappraised discussion
on hybridity and peacebuilding led by Mac Ginty and Richmond (2016)
from a distinctive angle of Asia.
The study does this in three ways. The first approach explores,
both conceptually and empirically, the roles of both inside and outside
peacebuilders in the process of hybridisation, which can be formed
through an interplay between actors operating in the ‘mid-space’ or space
between contending parties, between national and sub-national levels,
Y. Uesugi (B)
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and between insiders and outsiders (Uesugi 2020). The second approach
adopts theoretical insights gained from the existing studies on ‘com-
plexity’ and ‘identity’ as well as critical perspectives gained from the
feminist approach to the notion of ‘hybridity’ as a step towards trans-
forming it from a descriptive lens to a more analytical one so that it can
better inform the practice of peacebuilding. The third approach enriches
our understanding of the role of ‘mid-space gatekeepers’, who hold a key
to contesting, adopting and adapting norms brought from outside, by
drawing upon identity theories emphasising the significance of the process
of ‘othering’ (Berreby 2008). By focusing on contextually unique mid-
space actors in Asia, such as Buddhist monks and hybridised civil society
organisations, it unpacks our presumed understanding about potential
peacebuilders. The combined insights of the three approaches indicate
that to operationalise hybrid peacebuilding theory, the analysis should
not be limited to actors or agencies of peacebuilding but it should include
their ‘intersectionality’ as underlying assumptions of complexity and iden-
tity stress the importance of relational aspects in a hybrid encounter. It
is difficult to appreciate the process of hybridisation without grasping
relationships which are fluid like a cascade.
To complement the abovementioned theoretical discussion, this study
presents four empirical case studies from Asia; the first two offer insider’s
perspectives—Cambodia and Mindanao, the southern Philippines—and
the other two provide outsider’s perspectives from China and Japan.
These Asian peacebuilders operate in ‘statecentricity’, in which national
security is prioritised over realising human-centred governance (Howe
2018). It is no doubt that the rise of China as a global power is beginning
to shape the rules in many areas and fields. Foreign direct investments,
trade, development assistance, and peacekeeping are among few that
China’s influence is no longer negligible. Peacebuilding is no exception.
Growing interests in the literature on the rise of China indicate that its
anticipated impact on the existing norms and practices of peacebuilding
could shake the foundation of the Western dominance (Lanteigne and
Hirono 2012; Lee 2020).
In the context of Asia, feminist’s demand for safeguarding the needs
and interests of most marginalised in a peace process, and for reconcep-
tualising the masculine structures of domination are more likely to be
neglected in the discourse of hybrid peacebuilding. Non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) often act as spearheads for implementing femi-
nist’s perspectives. Under the supremacy of ‘statecentricity’, the four
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cases in Asia—Cambodia and Mindanao as insiders and China and Japan
as outsides—have revealed different styles of NGO’s engagement in
peacebuilding. While focusing explicitly on Asia, many of the arguments
presented in this book are relevant to a general discussion surrounding
the field of peacebuilding, and thus they can advance our understanding
of hybrid peacebuilding both in theory and practice in Asia and beyond.
Roles of Outsiders in Hybrid
Peacebuilding in Asia
This study aims to offer a better understanding of the process of hybridi-
sation in Asian peacebuilding by looking into activities taking place
sometimes strategically but often spontaneously without any coordina-
tion nor orchestration among stakeholders. This objective is pursued
by focusing on undertakings in the ‘mid-space’. Lately, a perspective
that subscribes to the notion of ‘local turn’ (Mac Ginty and Richmond
2013; de Coning 2013; Randazzo 2016; Lee 2020) or ‘local owner-
ship’ (Donais 2012; Lee and Özerdem 2015; Lee 2019) is dominant
in both theory and practice of peacebuilding. Building upon this trend,
this study explores how outsiders can engage effectively in the process of
hybridisation; how they can tap into local actors and resources effectively
without jeopardising local ownership or causing critical rejection by local
stakeholders, both of which would damage ‘locally grounded legitimacy’
(Clements and Uesugi 2020) of peacebuilding intervention and thus its
sustainability.
According to Bargués-Pedreny and Randazzo (2018: 1543),
“hybridity requires acknowledging that peacebuilders can do little to
shape the course of events.” If local ownership/empowerment is a key to
successfully bringing sustainable peace, it is ethically as well as practically
not recommendable for outside interveners to operate with a fixed set
of worldviews projected through a liberal peace paradigm. For outsiders,
the question is how to address the dilemmas of hybridity or “how to
maintain local political frameworks necessary for autonomy, while both
reforming and working with existing power structures and identity”
(Richmond 2015: 54). Thus, the major puzzle examined in this study is
related to this dilemma revolving around the quest for local ownership
(ibid.: 61): Which forms of ownership, at which level and which local
interests should be seen as representative of an ‘authentic’ and sustainably
peaceful polity? Authentic for whom? What ensues when discrepancies
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in this understanding occur? If the principle of local ownership is to be
respected, the answer would be as follows: authenticity or local legitimacy
should be negotiated and defined by local actors themselves rather than
by external actors. This premise deprives the international peacebuilding
planners of their power to control the process of hybridisation, which
could lead to the emergence of negative forms of peace or illiberal peace
(Simangan 2018). Temptation on the part of outside interveners to
maintain their influence upon the process and outcome of hybridisation
is criticised as a neo-colonial mindset (Richmond 2015: 64). If altruistic
external interveners have to let go of their responsibility in helping
to establish what Wallensteen (2015) calls ‘quality peace’ or post-war
conditions that make peace sustainable, however, do they enjoy both
local and international legitimacy? Are they supposed to be responsible
for what is created on the ground in the aftermath of their intervention
(Howe et al. 2020)?
These questions bring us back to the dilemma of hybridity. One way
for outsiders to circumvent the dilemma is to pursue what Richmond
(2015: 60) calls ‘positive hybrid forms of peace’ that does not include
a compromise on the potential emancipatory and empathetic nature of
peace. This implies that there is a role and responsibility on the side of
external actors to support the genesis of positive forms of hybrid peace.
This study argues that ‘locally grounded legitimacy’ is a key to rescue
hybrid peacebuilding from the dilemma. The pursuit of empowering solu-
tions embedded in plurality and relationality is a way forward to achieve
‘quality peace’. The real question is: how can altruistic external inter-
veners be connected to the national elite and grassroots stakeholders so
that emerging hybrid peace would be based on the ‘locally grounded
legitimacy’?
To answer this, functions of mid-space actors are highlighted and
investigated in this study. In Asian peacebuilding, outside peacebuilders
are often powerless in the face of protected sovereignty as Asian states
have sufficient power to exclude or circumvent the external intrusion and
usurpation of their national sovereignty (Keethaponcalan 2020). Under
such circumstances, outside intervention aiming to bring about changes
at the level of grassroots communities seems not feasible. This is why it
is essential for outside peacebuilders to establish trust and develop rela-
tionships with local mid-space gatekeepers who have access to both the
top/national level and the bottom/grassroots level (Uesugi 2020).
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Engagements and interactions in the mid-space are empirically
explored in the subsequent case study chapters, in which peacebuilding
efforts by China and Japan that do not fit into the Western proto-
type of liberal peacebuilding are observed. The presence of non-Western
donors such as China, Japan, India, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and
Singapore has posed an additional complication to Asian peacebuilding
ventures in the Philippines, Cambodia, Myanmar, Thailand, Sri Lanka,
Nepal and Afghanistan. Having been the victims of Western colonisa-
tion and occupation by themselves, they do not necessarily operate in
the same way as Western donors nor are they constrained morally by
‘universal’ norms and ‘international’ standards defined by the West. This
may have unprecedented practical implications for peacebuilding in Asia
where non-Western donors such as China are beginning to exert their
influence on the practice of peacebuilding and development in the region
(Takagi et al. 2019). In this study, therefore, peacebuilding efforts of two
major non-Western actors, China and Japan, in several Asian contexts such
as Myanmar, Afghanistan, Timor-Leste and Mindanao are reviewed to
outline distinctive features of their peacebuilding styles, which so far have
not given a high priority to liberal values on recalcitrant local commu-
nities (Ghimire 2019: 3), thus effectively avoiding the pitfalls of liberal
peacebuilding.
From a Descriptive Lens to an Analytical Tool
In addition to examining the basic assumptions of hybrid peacebuilding
theory, this study embarks on a difficult endeavour to operationalise such
theory, advancing the practical utility of ‘hybridity’ beyond its descriptive
power. Existing discussion on hybrid peacebuilding describes the process
of hybridisation and possible outcomes of such a process to be a mixture
of ‘international’ and ‘local’ values. This binary framing of reality has been
criticised as will be illustrated in Chapter 2. The variations of interna-
tional norms and the diversity in historical contexts, cultures, and political
landscapes in each setting have suggested that such a binary worldview
cripple us to overlook the important dynamism and complexity on the
ground. In Chapter 3, complex theory is introduced as an alternative to
the binary presumption, offering a more holistic view of the world where
a myriad of actors operating in the mid-space are trying to influence the
process and shape or reshape the outcome of hybridisation. The process of
hybridisation is complex, and its outcome is dependent on unpredictable
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interactions of multiple actors and factors, and thus, a simplistic and static
epistemology is problematic. There are hundreds, if not thousands, of
different unexpected paths, networks, and nodes that may exist or emerge
in the intermediary mid-space.
The introduction of such complexities, however, seems to undermine
the goal of operationalising hybrid peacebuilding theory, as it means to
transform the theory into a more practitioner friendly and analytically
robust tool. Randazzo (2016: 1360) identifies a possible dilemma of oper-
ationalising hybrid peacebuilding by saying that when hybridity is used
as a tool to uncover unscripted and hidden practices of the everyday, it
operates to make the invisible and blurry visible. This, she goes on and
argues, runs contrary to the complexity perspective about the process that
acknowledges the untraceable links that produce blurred hybrid identi-
ties (ibid.). How can such a dilemma be circumvented? Knowing this
dilemma, how hybrid peacebuilding theory can better inform the practice
of peacebuilding? Is there a way to comprehend dynamic and complex
realities in a conceptually manageable manner? What needs to be done
to increase the explanatory power of hybrid peacebuilding theory so that
external interveners can prepare and equip themselves for more effective
assistance?
Finding answers to these difficult but important questions is attempted
in Chapter 4 where a typology of mid-space actors is discussed as a
step towards operationalising hybrid peacebuilding theory. To solve these
puzzles, this study borrows key insights from relevant discourses of
relationality, complexity, identity and feminism, and discusses their impli-
cations for the operationalisation of hybrid peacebuilding. The typology
presented in Chapter 4 helps reflective practitioners to analyse and engage
with mid-space actors more effectively. Questions remain unanswered,
however, as to how external interveners can design a proper interven-
tion and anticipate their possible impact on the process in the midst of
complex exchanges and constantly-changing surroundings. On this point,
this study illustrates the utility of relational and systemic approaches, and
proposes an alternative to binary, linear and static views of the process of
hybridisation. The alternative framework aims to enhance the awareness
of external peacebuilders about the local terrain of the relational land-
scape in which they intervene, and to serve as a set of analytical guidelines
to prepare external peacebuilders for supporting efforts of insider-partial
mediators to bridge gaps in conflict-affected societies.
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Key Arguments
The abovementioned theoretical undertakings are complemented by
empirical analyses that demonstrate the efficacy of an upgraded hybrid
lens. As a prelude to the empirical chapters in this volume, the following
highlights the underlying hinges between the following four auxiliary
concepts for operationalising the thematic of hybridity and the premises of
four case studies of Asian peacebuilding: (1) relationality, (2) complexity,
(3) identity, and (4) feminism. Why they are considered pivotal for
operationalising hybrid peacebuilding is elaborated below.
Relationality
Lederach (2005) advocated the need of a Copernican shift from ‘know-
how’ to ‘know-who’ in the pursuit of peacebuilding. Building upon
his actor-oriented approach, Uesugi (2020) argued that mid-space gate-
keepers play key roles in bridging cleavages that exist in society. Uesugi
and Kagawa (2020) introduced the concept of ‘transformative relation-
ships’ as a key indicator for assessing the traits of mid-space gatekeepers
who could serve effectively as bridge-builders. This book reiterates this
perspective and advances an argument that the nature and magnitude
of multidimensional relationships that mid-space actors can cultivate in a
given setting is one of the most significant factors explaining the process
and outcome of hybrid peacebuilding. As the process of hybridisation is
characterised as a journey of constant negotiation and mediation among
different stakeholders, an outcome—yet not a terminal—of such a process
would be shaped through unregulated and spontaneous interactions
among them.
To increase our ability to grasp the dynamic and interactive nature of
hybridisation, this study takes two qualitatively different but closely inter-
twined approaches. The first approach examines power relations among
different actors within a complex system. This approach is based on the
assumption that any peacebuilding intervention will instigate multiple
chain reactions which are unpredictable, and thus denying a simple linear
causal attribution to hybrid peacebuilding. At the same time, it assumes
that a sound visualisation of power relations among key gatekeepers in
the mid-space helps external peacebuilders to navigate in such uncharted
waters in the hinterland. The second approach focuses on the identity of
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mid-space actors involved in a peace process. It is based on the assump-
tion that while chain reactions triggered by a series of peacebuilding
undertakings in complex systems are hard to predict and control, gate-
keepers employ their ‘transformative relationships’ to bridge existing and
emerging gaps in a conflict-affected society so that peacebuilding efforts
can bring about ‘quality peace’.
Chapter 5 demonstrates that ‘transformative relationships’ of mid-
space actors are shaped by their ‘identity’ vis-à-vis others involved, and
the environment in which they operate. Thus the success and failure of
bridge-building by particular mid-space actors can be explained partially
by their relational identity, i.e., how they see others and how others see
them in a given context. Since it is difficult to forecast what sort of chain
reactions a certain intervention on a particular relationship can cause,
international peacebuilding planners cannot pre-design the course of
intervention to induce positive changes in gatekeepers’ identity and their
perceived identity in a given setting. At the same time, if they presuppose
and prepare for the practical necessity of adapting and adjusting constantly
to dynamic situations, they may have a better chance of supporting local
mid-space actors to nurture their ‘transformative relationships’ and use
them to bridge cleavages in a society. To operate under this premise,
outsiders have to be ready to abandon the fixed cookie-cutter blue-
print approach merely focusing on a mechanical cause-and-effect analysis
applying typical logical frameworks for project formulation. This is one of
prescriptive insights that this study presents.
Complexity
Building upon the perspective of relationality, this study reflects on the
momentum that exists in the literature, and applies complexity theory to
peacebuilding. Brusset et al. (2016: 2) argue that “Complexity may bring
new ideas, methods, and tools to peacebuilding practice”. According to
them, complexity allows us to comprehend how complex systems function
and incorporate new realities into our methods, so that we can exert influ-
ence more effectively and carefully on such complex systems (ibid.: 3). By
applying complexity theory to the security sector reform, a particular field
of peacebuilding, Ansorg and Gordon (2019: 2) examined the multitude
of different actors within and beyond the state, and identified complex
patterns of co-operation and contestation within reform initiatives. They
concluded that the multiplicity of norms and actors complicated efforts to
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build peace (ibid.). Drawing from the discourse on complexity, they illus-
trated how proliferation of and contestation between actors, and between
their normative positions, may question assumptions of ‘success’ and
‘failure’ of international intervention (ibid.: 5).
In Chapter 3, it is argued that the theory of complexity offers a
perspective helpful for grasping the dynamic process of hybridisation, one
of which is the significance of intersectionality or the nodes of relation-
ships. Uesugi (2020) introduced the notion of a ‘dialogue platform’ to
highlight such intersectionality and examined the roles and functions of
mid-space intermediaries who operate as a node, or bridge, which run
across different cleavages. This study offers additional insights in the
process of hybridisation by employing an innovative approach proposed
by de Coning (2018: 317) called ‘adaptive peacebuilding’ in an effort
to operationalise hybrid peacebuilding theory. The insight gained from
‘adaptive peacebuilding’ is that interplays between international peace-
builders and local stakeholders are iterative processes of mutual learning
and adaptation. This premise implies that outsiders have to commit them-
selves to a long-term engagement in peacebuilding endeavours and be
ready to abandon results-based budgeting in which budget formula-
tion is guided by predefined short-term and measurable objectives set
by outside interveners to be accountable to their donors, which has
prevented international peacebuilders from investing in time-consuming
but critical relationship-building with mid-space actors in the hinterland.
This is another prescriptive insight presented in this study.
Identity
What increases the complexity of hybrid peacebuilding is the inclusion
of a wide variety of actors who work together to achieve positive peace,
suitable and beneficial to all those affected by it. This predisposes hybrid
peacebuilding to lay explicit focus on the concept of identity which is
intrenched in mid-space gatekeepers partial to the peace process. This
study assumes that the path of a peace process is determined, at least
in part, by identity factors. This is because in dealing with the complex
social reality, people employ ‘cognitive fames’ to examine, categorise and
make sense of the situations and their experiences. Frames define our
perceptions, understandings and views of reality, by so doing, they help
us systematise our experience and provide normative prescriptions for
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possible actions (Korostelina and Uesugi 2019). It is important to under-
line that a frame defines not only our ways of interpretation of specific
situations but also it decides what particular issues, incidents or conditions
receive our attention. Hence, being a social boundary maker, mid-space
gatekeepers have the power to set the frames that act as a device to draw
borders around what is and is not important (Gardner 2003).
Identity frames include ideas about who they are, what characteris-
tics they share with their group(s) and how they should relate to others
(Ibid.). When people view themselves as a part of a larger group, position,
institution, or set of values, they behave in ways that protect the markers
of this specific identity (ibid.). Gatekeepers who are the guardians of the
sense of self (beliefs, values and group affiliations) provide such markers
of shared identity or ‘identity frames’ to their constituencies. Because
gatekeepers possess power to impose the shared identity frames on their
followers, it makes sense for outside interveners to work with them. In
theory, outsiders can expect that gatekeepers exercise their influence to
reframe their perceived reality on the ground, and marshal collective
support from the grassroots community members for the planned inter-
vention. Because ‘identity’ is what ties gatekeepers to their followers, it
is important for outside interveners to appreciate how gatekeepers’ iden-
tity affects their preferences, priorities, behaviours and decisions, as their
identity and group affiliation influence on how they view and respond to
a given situation (ibid.).
A challenge in practice, however, is that gatekeepers are in an inher-
ently difficult position to change their identity as their primary task is
to defend their social boundaries. It is true that identity is changeable
and under certain circumstances gatekeepers have shifted their domi-
nant identity to serve as bridge-builders. When gatekeepers’ identities are
threatened or challenged through intervention, they respond normally in
ways that reinforce their allegiance to their group affiliations. Although
Richmond (2008: 457) argues that hybrid peacebuilding is valued as a
realm of complex interconnectedness where multiple actors and networks
exist, interact and overlay, “without necessarily resulting in the domina-
tion of one core identity or idea”, the case study of Cambodian Buddhist
monks presented in Chapter 5 demonstrates that under certain condi-
tions it has been proven otherwise. The Cambodian ‘peace’ monks, whose
attributes as gatekeepers stem from their clerical status shared among
the affiliated lay followers, revealed that their transformative relationships
worked in a horizontal direction but failed in vertical bridge-building.
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While serving as the very source of local and international legitimacy,
their primary identity as monks rooted in religious faith and their
secondary identity as peace activists limited their flexibility in serving as
a vertical bridge-builder whose tasks sometimes compelled them to over-
step established Buddhist doctrines and to confront with the authoritarian
regime.
As pointed out in Chapter 4 and examined in Chapter 5, identity
can serve as both a connector and a divider. Especially in conflict situ-
ations, the ‘us versus them’ frame or the in-group/out-group mindset
becomes cognitively prevailing. Under such a psychological condition,
while identity serves as a connector that consolidates the shared foun-
dation of an in-group, it has the tendency to act as a divider, deepening
the gap between ‘us and them’. In theory, gatekeepers have the potential
to become a bridge-builder, but in reality it is very difficult for them to
uphold the spirit of inclusivity as their primary role as boundary keepers
forces them to draw a line between them and their adversaries. The iden-
tity of gatekeepers can work against what hybrid peacebuilding advocates
for: blurring identity boundaries and fostering interconnectedness and
plurality (Randazzo 2016: 1356). Nevertheless, gatekeepers can become
bridge-builders in a conducive environment in which they maintain firm
grips on their followers by framing their expectations and addressing and
their needs.
Given the fluid and complex nature of identity that influences the
processes and outcomes of hybridisation, identity frames can turn into
either tools or obstacles for gatekeepers depending on the circumstance.
It is therefore argued in this study that identity is a key factor that affects
the condition for gatekeepers to reach beyond their in-group and conduct
bridge-building across social boundaries. Gatekeepers may commit them-
selves to either bridge-building or spoiling, depending on the context in
which their overriding identity is perceived and defined. Outside inter-
venors should not be surprised at the act of spoiling committed by
gatekeepers nor should they be disguised by a superficial and static iden-
tity of gatekeepers as it is variable. Upon facing spoiling repercussions
on the peace process, outside interveners might have to reconsider and
adjust their approach, rather than trying to dissuade gatekeepers from
spoiling. As Chapter 4 suggests the act of spoiling can be regarded as an
opportunity for outside interveners to meet the requirements for being
granted a locally grounded legitimacy. This assumption guides outside
peacebuilders to a more inclusive and adaptive practice of peacebuilding,
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urging them to extend their reach to a wide range of mid-space actors.
Upon intervention, peacebuilders have to be aware of their epistemo-
logical prejudice (including cultural, linguistic and professional ones) as
well as their predisposed habit of labelling stakeholders and being selec-
tive about whom they work with. Their stakeholder mapping and analysis
must reflect the dynamic and complex nature of the reality, paying special
attention to the power of identity. This is the third prescriptive insight
presented in this study.
Feminist’s Perspective
When focusing on relational and actor-based approaches to peace-
building, hybrid peacebuilding theory offers a useful lens and a practical
tool. However, hybrid peacebuilding approaches tend to focus on influen-
tial players both at local and international levels in negotiating, mediating,
defining and refining the emerging hybrid order and peace, and they
tend to neglect other actors who have very limited influence upon the
peace process. By criticising conventional approaches, feminists underline
the importance of including marginalised and minority groups as well as
moving away from lingering colonial attitudes in the peace process. As
highlighted in Chapter 2, feminists argue strongly for the establishment
of a positive peace and the eradication of those illiberal structural factors
which could endure into the post-conflict orders and hierarchies.
In Chapter 5, a special attention is paid to Cambodian ‘peace’ monks
who constitute a minority group in the Buddhist clerical community (in
terms of not following the mainstream, state-centric Buddhist’s teaching),
and their effectiveness as bridge-builders is assessed by the function
that their paramount identity played. On the issue of representation
for marginalised groups of people, pitfalls or dangers of hybrid peace-
building are identified in the structure of multi-track peacebuilding. A
sub-national minority who lives along with a national-level minority is
often not included in the peace process as traditional approaches to
peacemaking have focused on incumbent-insurgency confrontation at the
national level (Wilson 2020). Indigenous Peoples in Mindanao are a case
in point, which is covered in Chapter 6. Being non-Muslim sub-national
minority residents in Mindanao caught in the midst of war of national
liberation fought by a national-level minority of Muslims called Moros
against the government of the Philippines, Indigenous Peoples were
often marginalised in the ‘Bangsamoro’ peace process. Likewise, women,
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youth and poor are often not included in traditional peace processes. By
unpacking the concept of civil society and analysing empirically the roles
and functions played by civil society organisations in Mindanao, Chapter 6
sheds light on the conventionally silenced group of people, and discusses
that civil society organisations served as a vehicle promoting Indigenous
People’s participation and women empowerment. It demonstrates that
perspectives of Indigenous People were included in the peace process by
utilising civil society organisations as a platform and employing relevant
international trends and norms to legitimise their views.
Eastphalian Hybrid Peacebuilding
This study is a response to emerging interests in peacebuilding actors
in Asia and the impact their practice has on the existing liberal order,
which is built upon the Western values and practices. In other words, it
contributes to a debate about whether ‘Eastphalian’ orders (Kim 2009)
are emerging as alternative narratives on hybrid peacebuilding by exam-
ining approaches taken by two dominant regional powers in Asia, China
and Japan, in Chapters 7 and 8 respectively. Following the footsteps estab-
lished by the companion volume, Hybrid Peacebuilding in Asia (Uesugi
2020), knowledge gaps in the discourse on hybrid peacebuilding are
bridged in this study by providing case studies of Asian-led peacebuilding.
A key added-value of this study, therefore, is to share empirical anal-
yses of the peacebuilding practice in Asia so far overlooked by the
Western scholarship on peacebuilding, in which Asian contexts are treated
as subjects of peacebuilding intervention such as Cambodia, Myanmar,
Mindanao, Nepal, Timor-Leste, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Aceh
(Indonesia) to name but a few (Uesugi 2014). In contrast, this study
sheds light on Asian peacebuilders and examines their efforts on the
ground, exploring their potential as a ‘hybrid peacebuilding facilitator’
(Uesugi 2018). In English language literature, Japanese approaches to
peacebuilding have been covered mainly by Japanese (Tatsumi 2016;
Tatsumi and Kennedy 2017) and scholars from Asia such as Lam (2009)
from Singapore. Attention paid to Chinese approaches to peacebuilding
is a relatively recent phenomena as many of the academic work on China
focuses on China’s peacekeeping (Lanteigne and Hirono 2012) or the
Belt and Road Initiative, a notable exception is the report of the Safer-
world entitled China and conflict-affected states (Campbell et al. 2012).
Thus, this book contributes to filling the gap in the existing literature.
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Another added value of this study is that, through empirical studies
of the Chinese and Japanese peacebuilding efforts, it offers a way to
improve current models of peacebuilding. The findings of these case
studies suggest that their approaches, while sharing many similarities,
have distinctive features between them and between them and liberal
peacebuilding approaches. Both China and Japan prefer to operate
under the Westphalian principles of respecting sovereignty and avoiding
forceful military intervention. At the same time, however, they both
have attempted innovative undertakings that deserve more than a pacing
notice in the literature and practice of hybrid peacebuilding, which will
be elaborated in Chapters 7 and 8.
Structure of the Book
This book has five components. This introductory chapter and the subse-
quent literature review chapter serve as a backgrounder to this study. The
second part encompasses two conceptual chapters laying the theoretical
foundations of this study by introducing concepts such as complexity,
adaptive peacebuilding, mid-space actors and gatekeepers. The following
two chapters constitute the third component that offers both theoret-
ical discussion and empirical analysis focusing Cambodia and Mindanao,
providing insider’s perspective on hybrid peacebuilding. The next section,
which includes two empirical chapters focusing on peacebuilding efforts
of China and Japan as outsiders, outlines the main features of these
approaches from an angle of hybrid peacebuilding. Finally, the concluding
chapter synthesises the key findings and arguments. Before closing this
introductory chapter, a set of previews of the subsequent chapters are
provided as follows.
Chapter 2: A Brief Sketch of Hybrid Peacebuilding by Uesugi, Deeke-
ling and Ingstedt connects hybrid calls and relevant criticisms to the
development of peacebuilding debates at large. It briefly presents onto-
logical aspects of peacebuilding, as they may be found both in academia
and practice. It also explains core arguments in favour of adopting hybrid
peacebuilding, and shows how the concept of hybridity has been criti-
cised in the discourse of peacebuilding both within its own circles and
by others. Showcasing the various sides of peacebuilding, and hybridity
specifically, this literature review chapter sets the stage for a new set of
discussions in the subsequent chapters.
1 INTRODUCTION: OPERATIONALISATION OF HYBRID … 15
Chapter 3: Hybridity, Adaptive Peacebuilding and Complexity by de
Coning and McDonald-Colbert makes the case for the inclusion of a
complexity ontology and an adaptive methodology into the hybrid peace-
building debate. International peacebuilders can assist and facilitate the
voluntary emergence of self-sustainable and resilient social institutions
through the peace process, but if they interfere too much, they would
undermine the self-organising processes necessary to sustain resilient
social institutions. Based on this premise, this chapter introduces ‘adap-
tive peacebuilding’ to address the dilemma of hybrid peacebuilding, by
so doing it contributes to operationalising hybrid peacebuilding theory.
It provides a conceptual guidelines with an adaptive methodology where
peacebuilders engage actively in a process to sustain peace and resolve
conflicts by employing an iterative process of learning and adaptation. It
argues that a complexity informed approach to hybrid peacebuilding can
safeguard, stimulate, facilitate and create the space for societies to develop
resilient capacities for self-organisation.
Chapter 4: Bridging Gaps: From a Descriptive to a Practical Mid-Space
Actor Typology? by Deekeling and Simangan puts forward an argument
that the concept of hybridity sheds light on the complexity of conflict
settings. Hybridity as a lens helps to analyse the participation of all actors
involved and entangled in a social network of normative and political
power, while avoiding theoretical binaries that oversimplify the process
of post-conflict peacebuilding. The chapter stresses that what lacks is a
practical application of hybridity in peacebuilding that engages actively
with bottom/local or grassroots, top/national and international actors
through mediation in the mid-space to create sustainable peace. Given
this practical shortcoming of hybridity, a conceptual review of mid-
space actors as gatekeepers and their capacities to enable dialogue among
opposing parties are presented. It offers an analytical frame for inves-
tigating the encounters between insider-partial mediators and outside
peacebuilders in and around the mid-space, which is applied to the
subsequent empirical chapters.
Chapter 5: The Power of Identity in Hybrid Peacebuilding: Buddhist
Monks in Post-Conflict Cambodia by Umeyama and Brehm connects the
concept of identity to mid-space actors involved in hybrid peacebuilding.
The power of identity draws attention to the process of framing and
othering as important factors contributing to successful bridge-building
across diverse actors during hybrid peacebuilding. This chapter focuses on
the role of identity of Buddhist monks in Cambodia, and examines how
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and why they both succeeded and failed in their roles as bridge-builders.
It is argued that identity frames and networks of mid-space actors predis-
pose them to excel in particular fields and fail in others. Through the
case study of Cambodian ‘peace’ monks, it demonstrates that the concept
of identity serves as an useful indicator for explaining why and how a
mid-space actor may transform from being a bridge-builder into a spoiler
during the peacebuilding process.
Chapter 6: Frictional Binaries: Hybridity, Civil Society, and Liberal-
Local Peacebuilding in Mindanao by Manaysay and Espesor argues that
the concept of hybrid peacebuilding has highlighted the need to empower
local civil society groups. Using examples from Mindanao, this chapter
contends that the debates on liberal-local hybridity can most mean-
ingfully gain from asking questions not only about the processes of
internationalisation and localisation, but also about the ways in which
hybrid mechanisms are able to produce more or less stable outcomes. By
turning into the agency of civil society actors, it suggests that the concept
of hybridity, which is often represented using dichotomised categories
such as ‘liberal-international’ and ‘illiberal-local’, tends to oversimplify
the conceptual intricacies and dynamic processes between top-down and
bottom-up approaches. The analysis in the chapter illustrates the manner
civil society actors are able to negotiate their complexities within the fric-
tional binaries of liberal ideas, institutions and resources vis-à-vis local
practices, power relations and norms.
Chapter 7: Rise of China’s Developmental Peace: Prospects for Asian
Hybrid Peacebuilding by Wong and Li claims that without a clear peace-
building policy at home, China does not take a systematic and unified
approach to peacebuilding, although its ‘developmental peace’ has many
traits that resemble the pursuit of hybrid and adaptive peacebuilding
undertaken to compensate for the shortcomings of liberal peacebuilding.
This chapter demonstrates how China has approached to conflict-affected
societies in Asia, especially their mid-space actors, and how the Belt and
Road Initiative has been employed to generate a synergy with ‘develop-
mental peace’ by providing economic incentives to gatekeepers such as
armed ethnic groups in Myanmar and the Taliban in Afghanistan. While
the chapter identifies the shortcomings of China’s approach, it maintains
that China’s ‘developmental peace’ can be regarded as a form of hybrid
peacebuilding with ‘Chinese characteristics’ and be an alternative to liberal
peacebuilding.
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Chapter 8: Japan’s Peacebuilding and Mid-Space Actors: A Bridge
between the West and the Rest by Uesugi and Deekeling examines
Japan’s peacebuilding assistance in conflict-affected societies in Asia, and
assesses Japan’s potential to emerge as a hybrid peacebuilding facilitator.
By reviewing Japan’s flagship projects in Timor-Leste, Myanmar and
Mindanao, the chapter shows that Japan holds the ability to establish
trust-relationships with top/national leaders of the aid-recipient countries
through apolitical, non-intrusive and long-term approaches that Japanese
actors display. It demonstrates that how Japanese actors have developed
relationships with mid-space actors in conflict-affected societies where
and when access of other donors were denied. While the chapter iden-
tifies several shortcomings of the Japanese approach such as the limited
inclusion of stakeholders and unequal distribution of peace dividend, it
concludes that Japan can emerge as a hybrid peacebuilding facilitator if
these shortcomings are addressed.
Chapter 9: Conclusion by Uesugi, Deekeling, Umeyama and
McDonald-Colbert summarises the findings of the previous chapters and
presents the harnessing arguments among them. The goal is to evaluate
whether or not the existing gap between hybrid peacebuilding theory
and its operationalisation has been successfully closed. It reiterates the
key points of the study by using a complexity-informed framework and
revisiting the mid-space actor typology that is proposed as a link between
the analytical framework and the practical application. It concludes that
mid-space actors could provide a viable focal point in encouraging the
establishment of self-resilient social institutions from within without
dictating the content of such emergencies.
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CHAPTER 2
A Brief Sketch of Hybrid Peacebuilding
Yuji Uesugi, Anna Deekeling, and Anton Ingstedt
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to outline the existing literature on peace-
building and identify the gaps in different peacebuilding theories. The
central emphasis is placed on hybrid peacebuilding theory, which serves
as an overarching theoretical underpinning of this study. With an aim of
operationalising hybrid peacebuilding theory this chapter assesses various
critique and offers ways to overcome these gaps.
While much has been written on the various ontological dimensions
of peacebuilding, this study seeks to highlight elements of one specific
strand of theory and practice: the notion of hybridity. Conventional
Y. Uesugi (B) · A. Deekeling





Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva,
Switzerland
e-mail: anton@ingstedt.se
© The Author(s) 2021
Y. Uesugi et al. (eds.), Operationalisation of Hybrid Peacebuilding
in Asia, Security, Development and Human Rights in East Asia,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-67758-9_2
21
22 Y. UESUGI ET AL.
approaches to peacebuilding have focused on the liberal practice of state-
building, under which liberal institutions are constructed (de Leon and
Tager 2016). In stark contrast, hybrid peacebuilding approaches focus on
the dynamic mechanisms of interactions and relationships (Uesugi 2020).
Mac Ginty and Sanghera (2012: 3) describe hybridity as “composite
forms of practice, norms and thinking that emerge from the introduction
of different groups, worldviews and activity”. They call for a two-fold
understanding of post-conflict settings: one as a historical construction
and the other as a living creature that is constantly shaped by dynamic
interactions by different factors and actors.
Before outlining the key features of hybrid peacebuilding theory,
conventional understandings of peacebuilding theory and practice are
briefly discussed, which is followed by a digest of key approaches rele-
vant to hybrid peacebuilding such as ‘local turn’, ‘hybridity’ and ‘feminist
perspectives’. Subsequently, a brief outline of hybrid peacebuilding theory
and practice is offered by introducing existing critiques and indicating
ways to refute these criticisms.
Theory and Practice of Peacebuilding
Before diving into the discussion on hybrid peacebuilding, it is crucial
to understand the general debates surrounding peacebuilding in order
to fully grasp the characteristics and traits of hybrid approaches. Some
attempted to summarise the essentials of peacebuilding including Chetail
and Jütersonke (2015) who have conducted a comprehensive review of
the existing literature on peacebuilding, and Keethaponcalan (2020) who
has made a concise review of the literature focusing on the situation
in Asia. Rigual (2018), on the other hand, has offered re-thinking of
the ontologies of peacebuilding. The following does not aim to reca-
pitulate these previous accounts and instead seeks to provide excerpts
of some commonly discussed dimensions of peacebuilding to serve as
a backgrounder for the later discussion on hybrid peacebuilding in this
study.
The United Nations (UN) (2009: 1) describes peacebuilding as activity
to set space for opportunities of creating “basic security, deliver peace
dividends, shore up and build confidence in the political process, and
strengthen core national capacity to lead peacebuilding efforts thereby
beginning to lay the foundations for sustainable development”. The
proclaimed focus lies in strengthening national ownership during or in the
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immediate aftermath of a conflict. Another useful definition is provided by
Interpeace (2015: 2), which defines peacebuilding as “local and national
capacities for peace (values and attitudes; social processes and relation-
ships; political and social institutions) necessary to incrementally and
effectively overcome the dynamics of conflict that lead to polarisation,
violence and destruction”.
Rigual (2018) presented a summary of trends in peacebuilding by cate-
gorising its theory and practice into various discourses, of which four
are particularly prominent: (1) economic, (2) liberal, (3) critical, and (4)
feminist peacebuilding. Among them, critical peacebuilding continues to
attract the largest audience in academia and the main strand of discus-
sion on hybrid peacebuilding falls into this classification. While this study
follows the steps of critical peacebuilding, it also seeks to harness the other
peacebuilding approaches, acknowledging their unique contribution to
the academic field of peacebuilding (Wallis et al. 2018; Keethaponcalan
2020).
Economic peacebuilding prescribes the promotion of fiscal, labour
and market reforms as a means to realise international peace. The
assumption is that conflicts arise in economically stressed situations,
meaning that outsiders should promote development through providing
loans, donations and investments to address economic grievances. This
approach is known as the Washington Consensus that advocates structural
adjustment programmes (Marangos 2009). Both Chinese peacebuilding
endeavours, introduced in Chapter 7, and Japanese peacebuilding endeav-
ours, introduced in Chapter 8, have adopted this approach, focusing on
providing development and investment to countries experiencing poverty
or economic stagnation as these approaches operate on the premise that
economic disparities and grievances cause conflict (Abb 2018).
Contrastingly, liberal peacebuilding assumes that political grievances
and democratic immaturity constitute the greatest cause of conflict. This
approach was widely adopted in early peacebuilding attempts made by
the UN in Kosovo and Timor-Leste, among other post-conflict settings
(Paris 1997). As liberal peacebuilding heavily depends on the creation
and expansion of liberal institutions to bring sustainable peace, its main
tool for peacebuilding revolved around various democratisation measures.
Democratisation through the construction of state institutions and polit-
ical decentralisation are considered key to both reacting to and preventing
eruptions of violence. This approach, however, evidenced shortcom-
ings in both appropriate planning and execution. It was criticised for
24 Y. UESUGI ET AL.
imprinting Western liberal norms in conflict-affected societies in a quasi-
imperialist manner, which left behind rather unstable political structures
and economic development (Nadarajah and Rampton 2015).
Because liberal peacebuilding achieved few sustained outcomes, a crit-
ical view on the utility of liberal peacebuilding emerged, leading to the
rise of critical peacebuilding (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2009). Critical
peacebuilding has mainstreamed the ‘local turn’, based on the assumption
that “inclusion and participation can overcome the colonial/imperialistic
shape of liberal peacebuilding and strengthen peacebuilding initiatives”
(Rigual 2018: 159).
Likewise, feminist peacebuilding argues for the inclusion of various
actors in peace processes, especially those previously hidden or silenced
such as women or other marginalised groups (Hudson 2000). With an
aim to shed light on structural causes of conflict, it engages critically
with militarisation as well as masculinist conceptions and institutional-
isations of states and societies to understand why violent rather than
pacific behaviour is chosen as a means to deal with the situation (Rigual
2018: 159). Feminist activists have advocated for structural transforma-
tion, demilitarisation, gender equality, social justice, inclusive participa-
tion, and the reshaping of capitalism to be included in peacebuilding
endeavours, through consultative and bottom-up designs, and through
gender-sensitive budgeting (ibid. 2018; Coomaraswamy 2015).
From Local Turn to Hybrid Peacebuilding
Local Turn
With the mainstreaming of critical peacebuilding in academia a funda-
mental shift in what is addressed through peacebuilding had occurred.
The trend is moving away from technocratic programmatic activities with
a clear blueprint for goals and outcomes, and steers toward political
undertakings in conflict-affected societies that have a direct impact on
the everyday experience of actors on the ground (de Coning 2018).
The framework of peacebuilding endeavours must in this light reflect the
understanding of reality held by actors in the setting, which are rooted
in the specific historic context of power relations, norms and expecta-
tions (ibid.). A narrow definition of peace and a skewed understanding of
how peace can be built, which are based on Western images of ‘justice’
and ‘legitimacy’, would not work in a different social context, considering
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that people may have varied expectations about peace and their interpre-
tation of what constitutes the world may be quite different from those of
Western donors (Richmond and Frank 2009).
Such a critical view against the conventional Western-centric
approaches to peacebuilding has led to the emergence of the ‘local turn’,
which seeks to avoid the pitfalls of an imposed peace. Critical scholars
such as Donais (2008, 2018) and Mac Ginty and Richmond (2013)
explored ways to place the ‘local’ at the centre of peacebuilding endeav-
ours. Although locals have been marginalised in liberal peacebuilding,
critical scholars shed light on locals who live in and experience the very
context, and they themselves are the constituting elements (Richmond
2014).
Hybridity
Building on the local turn, Mac Ginty and Sanghera (2012) stressed the
relevance of the local context in relation to the contribution that interna-
tional actors can make in the field of peacebuilding. Hybridity as a social
process of emergence can be witnessed in both fragile social settings and
seemingly consolidated settings. Each social, cultural, and political struc-
ture is a result of prior hybridisation and thus a pure point of departure
does not exist (Belloni 2012: 23). This assumption was revisited by Kent
et al. (2018: 1), who pointed out that hybridity has been employed as
a conceptual tool in a wide range of academic disciplines including the
biological sciences, social sciences and even literature and literary criti-
cism. In social science, hybridity is defined as the outcome of interactions
amongst hegemonic practices, and as the attempt to decolonise peoples,
territories and knowledge (Richmond 2014). Hybridity became promi-
nent in the discourses of identity, culture, economic and power relations,
and political systems (Kent et al. 2018).
Hybridity emerges from local resistance and frictions between ‘inside’
and ‘outside’ normative frameworks (Björkdahl and Höglund 2013).
Neither local nor international actors are free from context, yet their
experiences can benefit each other and create an opportunity for the
emergence of new and more resilient social structures that can strengthen
conflict-affected communities. This is why local resistance should not be
seen as an obstacle, but rather as a potential as locals carry a more refined
view of the context, which can better inform and improve the practice of
peacebuilding assistance by outside interveners. Besides, in both theory
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and practice, it is usually difficult to distinguish where the ‘local’ stops
and the ‘international’ begins (Richmond 2014).
Hybridity is perceived as an opportunity for engagement between local
and international knowledge, thereby utilising international capacities to
appreciate the specific context found in the everydayness of individuals
who live in the epicentre. Mac Ginty and Richmond (2013: 764) took a
step to overcome the dichotomy of local versus international and analysed
the concept of hybridity from a pluralist point of view and defined peace
as hybrid, multiple and often agonistic.
The process of mixing, interpreting and adapting is where the core
argument of hybridity lies. Communication among actors and institutions
in a conflict-affected society is highly dynamic and diverse, and therefore,
constant reconsideration and reassessment of the given circumstances
and interactions amongst various factors and actors are necessary (Mac
Ginty and Sanghera 2012). Consequently, it becomes vital to include as
many stakeholders as possible to ensure an inclusive and comprehensive
peacebuilding approach that benefits all spheres of society (ibid.).
Thus, hybrid peacebuilding seeks to address the lack of attention to
the local context, and the failure of liberal peacebuilding in a situation
where the aid-recipient state is strong enough to deny intrusive outside
intervention for statebuilding. The proponents of hybrid peacebuilding
are against the conventional approaches to peacebuilding through which
liberal state institutions have been merely imposed upon without paying
sufficient attention to the local context. Keethaponcalan (2020), for
example, pointed out the mismatch between Western-liberal norms and
the Asian context. Since the social structures of the West and those of
Asia are not identical, each has been shaped through a unique mix of
tradition, culture, religion, family structure and social behaviour. Caution
must be exercised to avoid colonialist, racist and sexist legacies that may
still linger in foreign politics when considering the role of international
peacebuilding (Wallis 2012; Ismail 2008). Thus, hybrid approaches can
help outsiders to recognise the strategies of locals who resist both overt
and subtle forms of colonisation and domination (Richmond 2014).
The danger of divorcing liberal ideas from hybrid peacebuilding is that
certain values can be left behind as they may be unnoticed or unconceived
by local actors due to different cognitive frameworks and worldviews
they hold. It would be beneficial to move away from labelling ‘demo-
cratic peace’ and ‘liberal peacebuilding’ as Western concepts, and adopt
contextually diverse concepts of governance, democracy, market economy,
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human rights and sovereignty that are decolonised from the restraints
of Western domination. Keethaponcalan (2020) argues that democracy,
human rights, and good governance should not be disregarded simply
as Western values as they are considered ‘universal’. By introducing the
hybrid lens, anthropological variations of these values are allowed to
co-exist, which effectively make them truly ‘universal’. By eliminating
Western-centric ‘colonial arrogance’ and allowing non-Western expecta-
tions to shape these values, hybrid peacebuilding can lead a formation
of universal values, thereby transforming the approach of Western inter-
vention to fruitful emancipatory peacebuilding interplay. Hybridisation,
therefore, constitutes a way to incorporate the values that liberal peace-
building proposes with locally grounded legitimacy (Clements and Uesugi
2020). While aiming to empower local actors to define and shape the
values, hybrid peacebuilding creates room for improving the real-life
implementation of structures and concepts that do not easily align with
Western-liberal equivalents.
Feminist Perspectives
Feminist perspectives underscore the importance of including the voices
of those who are traditionally marginalised in society (Hudson 2000).
This approach resonates with core values of hybrid peacebuilding as it,
too, gives primacy to mainstreaming equal participation in peacebuilding
while guaranteeing the specific needs of women and girls are included
in peace dialogues and subsequent political processes. In practice, femi-
nist perspectives are often implemented through gender mainstreaming
programmes, and its argument for equal participation of ‘women’ resem-
bles hybrid peacebuilding’s calls for inclusion of ‘locals’.
While both feminist and hybrid peacebuilding approaches underline
the significance of diversifying the actors incorporated in the peace
process, one additional perspective that the feminist approach brings is its
distinctive conceptualisation of violence. It seeks to improve the concepts
developed by Galtung (1969, 1990) on the categorisations of violence
and the prerequisites for positive peace. It argues that war and other forms
of fighting are intertwined, as they constitute a network of expressions
of violence. Cockburn (2004: 43) proposes that “gender links violence
at different points on a scale reaching from the personal to the interna-
tional”. This thinking is highlighted by the fact that women experience
violence in different ways than men both during times of war and peace
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(Rigual 2018). For example, men often make up the majority of homi-
cide victims, while women tend to be the main victims of intimate partner
homicide (Geneva Declaration 2015). Feminist perspectives that advocate
for including a plethora of voices can expand the analytical horizons of
hybrid peacebuilding. The consciousness for varying experiences can be
extended to not only women but also other marginalised and indigenous
groups as discussed in the case studies of insider perspectives of hybrid
peacebuilding in Chapters 5 and 6 of this volume.
Thus, feminist perspectives can widen the scope of hybrid peace-
building. They can make hybrid peacebuilding more empathetic to
societal harm and responsive to the need for inclusion of neglected
perspectives. Feminist peacebuilding insists on developing a critical under-
standing of how societal norms affect violent behaviour, especially by
re-shaping militarised norms and stereotypes in society. For example,
masculinity norms affect the roots of violence, such norms serve as a
hotbed for forceful actions (Stiehm 2000). Revealing how norms and
stereotypes contribute to violence makes it possible to examine crit-
ically how a particular form of deeply embedded violence has been
constructed in a given society. While feminist scholarship is at the fore-
front of shedding light on structural violence, hybrid peacebuilding
theory has incorporated feminist’s perspectives into the major discourse
of the supremacy of the ethnographic approach to peacebuilding (Millar
2014a).
Hybrid peacebuilding underlines the significance of mid-space actors
who can bridge existing cleavages in a society. Likewise, from the stand-
point of feminist peacebuilding, it becomes crucial to identify means of
finding and interacting with these mid-space actors who act as interme-
diaries to bring perspectives of underrepresented groups of people at the
grassroots to the peace process. This task encompasses a preferably full
understanding of the time (past, present and future) and space that can
be enhanced by considering a wide range of perspectives, which is the
essence of hybrid peacebuilding.
Critique of Hybrid Peacebuilding
Pitfalls of Binaries
Hybrid peacebuilding has gained academic prominence by criticising
liberal peacebuilding and attempting to reconfigure the dichotomic
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conceptualisation between ‘liberal’ and ‘illiberal’ or ‘Western’ and ‘non-
Western’ as such binaries tend to oversimplify the given context and
overlook its complexity (Peterson 2012). Ironically, hybrid peacebuilding
theory has been criticised for falling into this very pitfall. The emphasis
on the mixture of two components—traditional/modern, liberal/illiberal,
local/international to name but a few—is the most distinctive feature of
hybrid peacebuilding that separates it from liberal peacebuilding (ibid.).
Although these binary frameworks aid researchers to shape their cogni-
tion of conflict situations, the reality is more than just a mere sum of
two contesting concepts. Many advocates of hybrid peacebuilding theory
attach importance to the multifaceted, fluid and dynamic nature of peace-
building settings. This method, however, caused a misperception among
heretics that proponents of hybrid peacebuilding theory were trapped in
a pitfall of dichotomies.
As hybrid peacebuilding often receives criticisms on its flood of binary
conceptions, feminist approaches could also fall into the trap of binary
conceptions of gender, which has been constructed within the frame-
work of Western norms and values. The concept of gender should avoid
being seen as promoting a binary (Mohanty 1988). An idiosyncratic
nature of the concept of gender should be embraced and a historical
and cultural diversity of the concept be accepted. Conventional gender
discourses have succeeded in mainstreaming the Western perspective of
gender in the practice of the UN, but they have not succeeded in estab-
lishing the plurality and fluidity of gender. What postcolonial feminist
criticism implies is that hybrid peacebuilding should expand its analyt-
ical horizons and incorporate perspectives of underrepresented groups in
political, economic, social, religious, cultural, and gender hierarchies. To
reflect on the perspectives of postcolonial feminism, the concept of iden-
tity is explored as an analytical lens to supplement the hybridity lens in
Chapter 5.
Kent et al. (2018) provided a broad discussion on the problem of
overemphasising binaries of certain concepts that need to be stirred just
right to achieve the perfect blend of a normative framework that would
savour everyone’s taste buds sufficiently. Jackson and Albrecht (2018: 41)
point out the underlying assumption that there is a direct causal link
between programming and results on the ground that can be planned and
predicted. To avoid this pitfall, de Coning (2013, 2016, 2018) suggests
looking at conflict-affected societies as complex systems that have the
ability to self-organise and emerge to a manifold of outcomes, which
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would constitute an institution-building approach that would make social
engineering obsolete. This point is revisited in Chapter 3.
Challenges of Operationalisation
A desire to operationalise hybrid peacebuilding theory exists among
reflective practitioners of peacebuilding. Attempts to transform the analyt-
ical lens to practical tools may entail the risk of merely imposing outsider’s
view on what is the optimal ‘blend’ of international and local norms
(Millar 2014b). If one insists on operationalising the theory, he or she
may end up with falling into the trap of the notorious cookie-cutter
approach of liberal peacebuilding. Thus, reflective practitioners advocate
for the utility of hybridity to create locally grounded, legitimate structures
of values and institutions (Clements et al. 2007). Filling this gap in critical
peacebuilding literature is the main focus of this study, which is revisited
in Chapter 4.
Wallis et al. (2018) identified the risk of ‘romanticising the local’
and downplaying significant power differentials at the local level that are
based on gender, age, ethnic or other similar divisions. Paffenholz (2015)
echoes such concerns saying that hybridity is presented as a hegemonic
and power-free space, and the power of local elites within hybrid struc-
tures is overlooked. This means that underlying power structures affect
peacebuilding endeavours between the elite and the grassroot actors, as
well as they impact on local settings and actors in key social positions
who can control access to information, resources and perception about
the needs of stakeholders involved in conflict. On the other hand, Millar
(2014b) warns not to overestimate the influence that outside interven-
tion might bring to the dynamic of hybridisation. Richmond (2014: 52)
extends this point by saying that hybridity needs to be seen in the context
of institutional and power-political struggles, adding different spheres of
dynamics, as hybridity “represents the contingent and complex nature
of the politics of peacemaking and the dynamics of power, agency and
identity it involves”.
The term ‘hybridity’ itself has also become the target of criticism.
Millar (2014b), for example, maintained that excessive conceptualisation
of what ‘hybridity’ encompasses could compromise the needed space for
social emergence on the ground, and turn to an outcome-focused, rather
than a process-oriented framework. It is important to look at not only
the outcomes of hybrid emergence, but also at its process. Hybridity
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should not be seen as a result of a linear process that can generate a
predictable outcome, but should be regarded as a by-product of inter-
actions among different spheres of a society that hold the capacity to
create a mutual understanding of peace and peacebuilding (ibid.). This
notion then actively engages with basic structures that are found on the
ground rather than downgrading what already exists and establishing an
entirely new scaffold. To question the assumption of a linier progression,
this study introduces the complexity approach, which focuses on intersec-
tionality and dynamic relationships of stakeholders in conflict as discussed
in Chapter 3.
Conclusion
To set the scene for the following chapters, this chapter provided a brief
review of some of the relevant literatures surrounding hybrid peace-
building, and discussed its merits for a sustained, locally grounded and
inclusive establishment of peace. Four discourses of peacebuilding—
economic, liberal, critical and feminist—were presented to illuminate the
main feature of hybrid peacebuilding and to serve as the foundation
for the subsequent discussions in which a spectrum of theoretical and
empirical studies is offered.
The above literature review stresses that hybrid peacebuilding does
not see peacebuilding processes in binary terms. Instead, it assumes that
these processes are complex, multifaceted, dynamic and interactive. While
binary frameworks are fixed in static dichotomies, the hybridity lens
provides open perspectives, which are flexible and adaptive. Operational-
ising hybrid peacebuilding means to consider and adapt such features of
hybridity. This increases the potential of hybrid peacebuilding for moving
beyond merely bringing economic development, political stability and
functioning institutions. Based on such premises, the following chap-
ters investigate how tools for peacebuilding can be applied in practice
to produce an inclusive process in which experiences and needs of those
who have been marginalised and neglected are reflected.
As illustrated in the above literature review, feminist perspectives can
shed light on the role of mid-space actors who serve as insider-partial
mediators representing the interests of silenced people in conflict-affected
communities. To operationalise hybrid peacebuilding theory successfully,
rigorous efforts must be made by outsiders to embrace the adaptive
interplay of encounters with mid-space actors. The range of case studies
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provided in this volume shows that hybrid peacebuilding may stem from
the critical peacebuilding literature, but holds the potential to combine
and learn from various perspectives of peacebuilding as the virtue of
hybridity is to harness multiple elements. Hybridity is aiming to promote
inclusion of different voices, views and realities rooted in all spheres
of society. Thus, the operationalisation of hybrid peacebuilding should
aim for the same: to promote inclusive thinking that can elicit fruitful
contributions from various perspectives.
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Introduction
This chapter introduces Complexity and Adaptive Peacebuilding and
considers how it contributes to the contemporary hybridity debate.
Following a brief introduction to Complexity theory, this chapter explores
the utility of a complex systems perspective to expand our understanding
of hybrid peacebuilding. Adaptive peacebuilding is then introduced as
an approach that can help hybrid peacebuilding cope with the uncer-
tainty dilemma that is a characteristic of complex social systems, as well
as manage the relational dimension of hybrid peacebuilding through a
collaborative approach. This chapter thus seeks to explore what hybridity
theorists may gain from a complex systems approach to peacebuilding
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and begin to build bridges between complexity, adaptive peacebuilding
and hybrid peacebuilding.
Peacebuilding is about influencing the behaviour of social systems that
have been affected by violent conflict. Insights from complexity science
about how best to influence the behaviour of complex systems, how
such systems respond to pressure, and how to avoid unintended conse-
quences (Aoi et al. 2007), should thus be valuable for those involved
in understanding and undertaking peacebuilding (Ramalingam and Jones
2008). In the context of this chapter, ‘peacebuilding’ refers to all actions
undertaken by both the international and local actors that work towards
resolving a particular conflict and sustaining the peace in a given social
system. Peacebuilding is thus not understood only as something done
by international or local organisations that have peacebuilding as their
mandate, objective or profession, but as something done by all actors
that work towards peace.
Concepts like peacebuilding convey the assumption that actors, such
as a United Nations (UN) agency or peacebuilding NGO, possess the
knowledge and capability to ‘build’ peace in the same way an engineer
builds a bridge. Social systems are, however, unlike a bridge or a machine
where its parts have a specified and pre-designed role in the functioning
of the whole, operating under a single pre-determined method to achieve
that purpose (Morin 2005). When a machine becomes stressed it breaks
down and requires repair. Some people working in international conflict
resolution approach peacebuilding with a similar mindset; as if it is a
tool designed to fix societies affected by conflict (Ghani and Lockhart
2008). However, the insights gained from studies in social complexity,
and especially from the processes of emergence and self-organisation,
inform us that complex social systems must fix themselves if they are to
be self-sustainable (Luhmann 1990).
This does not mean that there is no role for international or external
actors. To the contrary, local systems are often trapped in a path depen-
dent conflict cycle that are resilient against change, and they may need
external assistance to open-up other possibilities. This is the role that
hybrid peacebuilding attempts to fulfil. However, external fixes will not
stick if they have not been internalised, and it is thus the internal adapta-
tion process that is the critical element for self-sustainability (de Coning
2016). External intervention may at times be necessary, but it is not suffi-
cient on its own. It is the internal system’s own adaptations, and its own
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integration of new attitudes, knowledge and behaviour into its own social
institutions, that result in self-sustainable peace.
Hybridity theory has been developed as a bridge that can facilitate the
merger between the internal and the external worlds in the peacebuilding
context. Over time, peacebuilding as an enterprise has trudged towards
standardisation and uniformity, becoming mired in a formulaic and inflex-
ible methodology (Mac Ginty 2008). This ‘flat-packed’ peacebuilding has
seen a surge of scholarly criticism in recent years, and one of the by-
products of this debate has been the emergence of hybridity as a concern
for peacebuilding theorists. Hybridity is designed as the antithesis to
the rigidity and standardisation of ‘flat-packed’ peacebuilding. Embedded
within the methodology of hybridity theory is an acceptance of the
inherent complexity of peacebuilding operations. Hybridity, as an onto-
logical position, can be defined as an observance of the dynamic inter-
change between all relevant actors in the field (Richmond and Mitchell
2012). This dynamic interchange expresses causal and relational mecha-
nisms that are out of the purview of the principally top-down ‘flat-packed’
methods and highlights the complex multi-directional realities of the
peacebuilding arena. As put by Uesugi, “hybridity is a mandala which
enlightens us about the ‘relational’ dimension of peacebuilding” (2020:
3).
Complexity
Complexity refers to a specific type of complex system, such as a society,
that has the ability to adapt, and that demonstrates emergent proper-
ties, including self-organising behaviour. Such systems emerge, and are
maintained, as a result of the dynamic and non-linear interactions of its
elements, based on the information available to them locally, as a result of
their interaction with their environment, as well as from the modulated
feedback they receive from the other elements in the system (de Coning
2016: 168; Cilliers 1998: 3).
Social systems are empirically complex (Byrne 1998). This means they
demonstrate adaptability and display emergent properties, including self-
organising behaviour (Kaufmann 2013). As social systems are highly
dynamic, non-linear, and emergent, it is not possible to find general laws
or rules that will help us predict with certainty how a particular society
or community will behave (Cilliers 2002). It is not possible to under-
take a project and satisfactorily predict the outcome. Nor is it possible
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to use a project design that performed well elsewhere, for instance the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, expecting that
it will have the same effect in another context. This uncertainty is an
intrinsic quality of complex systems, not a result of imperfect knowledge
or inadequate analysis, planning, or implementation. This recognition has
significant implications for the way peacebuilding is thought about and
undertaken.
Complex organisations, in this sense, should not be conceived of as
functionally uniform input-output machines whose processes can be easily
observed, identified and manipulated, but rather should be conceived of
as fields, in the Bourdieusian sense (Bourdieu 1977), in which the interac-
tions of actors and the onset of events is facilitated. Due to the expansive
diversity of fields through which complexity has developed, a truly synthe-
sised theory or methodology of complexity does not exist (Chu et al.
2003; Preiser et al. 2018). However, complexity has been constructed
into somewhat of an interdisciplinary umbrella term, allowing for a
sketching of the general features of complex systems, including a consoli-
dation of conventional concepts, themes and terminology (Alhadeff-Jones
2013; Preiser et al. 2018).
Complexity and Hybrid Peacebuilding
Preiser et al. (2018: n.p.) have distilled complexity into a few charac-
teristics that provide a “conceptual typology” based on “an ontological
reading… to discern general patterns and underlying causal explanations”.
Four are particularly relevant for hybrid peacebuilding: relationality;
dynamism; radical openness and contextuality, and adaptivity. These
concepts will be used as a “heuristic framework” (ibid.) that will allow us
to discuss complexity theory’s relation to hybridity. Relationality entails
that the elements in a complex system are flexible and dynamic. For hybrid
peacebuilding, this means that research should not focus on actors, but
rather on their connections and interactions, and how this changes the
peacebuilding environment. Further, these relations are non-linear and
dynamic and thus produce emergent properties, meaning that no matter
how precisely a conflict is understood at the micro-level, a concurrent
macro-level analysis is always necessary. This is exacerbated by complex
systems having permeable and indefinite boundaries, so that the system
itself interacts both endo- and exogenously. This radical openness entails
contextuality in complex systems, where system behaviour is dependent
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on its relational interactions in both the local and environmental context.
Hybrid peacebuilding must acknowledge therefore that the local context
is never isolated from exogenous effects. As elements in a complex system
interact with both other elements and their wider environment, they
effectively ‘learn’, changing their behaviour to produce optimal outcomes.
While this adaptivity may be a source of difficulty when it comes to peace-
building interventions, it also provides a site of creativity that can help to
iteratively improve interventions as they progress. Hybrid peacebuilding
should therefore seek to include local populations at all opportunities.
The proceeding discussion shall systematically approach complexity and
its efficacy for hybridity research by addressing each principle of the “con-
ceptual typology” (ibid.) in turn and discussing its relation to hybrid
peacebuilding, further defining key concepts as they are introduced.
Relationality
Relations, here, refers to the interactions between constituent compo-
nents of the system. The process of giving, receiving, exchanging, influ-
encing or otherwise making contact with other elements is the driving
force behind what makes a system complex. Relations between elements
therefore take precedence over the elements themselves. Taking insights
from relational theory, the ontology of complexity thus conceives of the
essential elements in a complex system not as the ‘things’ themselves,
but rather as the processes (Rosen 1991). As such, complex systems “are
defined more by the interactions among their constituent components
than by the components themselves” (Preiser et al 2018: n.p.). A corol-
lary of this therefore is that an analysis of systemic change or evolution
is crucial to an analysis of complex systems. By analysing the relations
between components in a complex system, what is being analysed is how
this system adapts and fluctuates over time.
Hybridity goes to great lengths to explain the multifaceted aspects of
peacebuilding and emphasises the importance of including a wide and
heterogeneous array of actors into the process (Mac Ginty and Rich-
mond 2013). Complexity helps to emphasise the notion that these actors
do not exist independently from one another, by putting the spotlight
onto the interaction between these actors (over and above the nature
of the actors themselves). In fact, it is the relations between them that
define their role in the system. In a complex system, elements are co-
constitutive (by way of their adaptivity to feedback), and thereby rely on
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the dynamics of the system for the formation of their identity. As hybridity
acknowledges the extensive variation and interconnection of actors in the
peacebuilding field, complexity emphasises this variation and interconnec-
tion as an essential part of the system. Hybridity can help to delineate who
actors are and how they behave in the peacebuilding context. Complexity
helps to understand how these actors fit into a wider network and how
this network systemically functions. Where hybridity highlights which
actors are imperative to peace processes, complexity demonstrates the
position of these actors within the wider process and how this impacts
their identities, as well as the structure and operation of the process as a
whole.
However, whereas Mac Ginty and Richmond (2016) cast doubt over
the entire enterprise of instrumentalising hybridity, the contention of this
chapter is that complexity can help to ‘bridge the gap’ between hybridity-
as-theory and hybridity-as-practice. Relationality is one of the preeminent
ways in which this can be achieved. For Uesugi (2020: 9), peacebuilding
is “a continuous process of negotiation, mediation, arrangement, adap-
tation, adjustment, coordination, cooperation and contestation amongst
divergent stakeholders in a society over their conflicting interests, values
and needs”. In line with a complexity ontology, this process is the superla-
tive concern in peacebuilding. This moves away from the atomistic,
a-temporal and actor-focused approach of contemporary peacebuilding
theory, whereby pre-eminence is put on the who rather than the how
of peacebuilding. It is imperative, therefore, to over-rely on who the
actors in a system are (institutions, groups, individuals etc.), but how they
connect and interact, and how these interactions shape the evolution of
the system. This can allow us to codify (to a degree) to what extent, and
according to what mechanism, information flows between them.
In Chapter 4 of this volume, Deekeling and Simangan discuss the
operationalisation of hybridity through a ‘mid-space actor typology’. This
typology consists of a classification of various roles and functions that can
be played by intermediary actors, referred to generally as ‘gatekeepers’, in
the peace process. These ‘gatekeepers’ safeguard the communities they are
a part of and oversee the avenues of communication between them. These
gatekeepers could either serve as bridge-builders or spoilers to the peace
process, depending on the context. For Deekeling and Simangan, the
preeminent role of the peacebuilding community is thus the identification
and management of these ‘gatekeepers’ so that they stay on-track with
the aims of the peacebuilding efforts, and serve to bolster, extend and
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fortify the peace process instead of hamper or detach it. This may be done
via capacity building or the coordination of interaction and knowledge
transfer between communities.
As hybridity has served to highlight the variety of actors in the
field, Deekeling and Simangan seek to operationalise this variety, util-
ising those actor’s unique traits, abilities and connections to enhance
the peacebuilding programme. This endeavour fits well with the lessons
gleaned from complexity. The complexity literature emphasises the impor-
tance of peacebuilding’s relational aspects. With regards to hybridity, this
entails that we identify how actors interact with one another, in what
manner these interactions take place, and what commodities are trans-
ferred through these interactions. The mid-space actor typology goes
some way toward codifying these relationships; it allows us to begin
to clarify what kind of relationships are active in the peace process
and the manner in which they are interconnected. It is important to
emphasise how definitionally relational the ‘mid-space actor typology’ is.
The typology is a utilisation of the relationships between actors in the
system—not a description of the actors themselves. Via their position
in the ‘mid-space’ gatekeepers shape and manage the relations between
elements. As acknowledged by Deekeling and Simangan, it is impor-
tant not to over-rely on an actor-focused typology. Whereas these actors
are defined relationally, and the typology itself operates on relational
grounds, the application of this typology can lead to an overbearance on
the importance of specific actors in that peace process. While this brings
dangers that could hamper system resilience (i.e. through entrenched and
over-connected actors turning ‘spoiler’ and having a needlessly signifi-
cant impact on system functionality) the main issue with regards to the
implementation of a complex peacebuilding theory is an ontological one.
A crucial corollary of the relationality of complex systems is systemic
change and evolution. Any analysis of a complex system must have at its
heart an appreciation of that system’s development over time. Focus or
reliance on specific actors leads us toward a rigid and static analysis of the
system. Not only may their functions and roles differ, but the very nature
of the actors themselves may evolve. Because the elements in a complex
system are constituted relationally, their existence is contextual, flexible
and dynamic. With complex systems, we must focus on “the process of
becoming, rather than static states of being” (Preiser et al. 2018: n.p.).
Traditional approaches to peacebuilding focus on how key actors influ-
ence the direction of the system (i.e. more or less peaceful). A complexity
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lens complements this kind of analysis by emphasising the importance of
changes over time; both at the individual and systemic level, which will
be discussed in the following section.
Dynamism
A defining attribute of a complex system is its inherent dynamism and
perpetual volatility. This dynamism stems from the self-organising capaci-
ties of complex systems, which in turn stem from the generative capacity
of relational interaction amongst their elements (Heylighen 2001). Self-
organisation, in this context, refers to the ability of a complex system,
like a society, to organise, maintain and sustain itself without an external
or internal managing agent (Mitchell 2009: 13). In this sense, self-
organisation refers to “the spontaneous creation of a globally coherent
pattern out of the local interactions between initially independent compo-
nents” (Heylighen 2001: 275). Self-organisation facilitates and modulates
the flow and processing of feedback information, for instance through
developing shared understandings, participatory decision-making and
monitoring mechanisms. Whereas complicated systems—for example an
advanced aircraft or super-computer—can be comprehensively described
and understood through an observation and analysis of their compo-
nents and how they work together to produce a specific effect, a system
that is complex cannot be understood via an analysis of its constituent
elements (Cilliers 1998). In contrast to linear complicated systems, a
complex system output is more than just the sum of inputs (Willy et al.
2003). Non-linearity in relational mechanisms in complex systems means
that small, localised disturbances can evolve into critical states that impact
the entire system (Bak 1999). As such, the system will have properties,
and exhibit behaviours or mechanisms that cannot be analysed or traced
through an analysis of its elements (Willy et al. 2003). If an alien were
to observe humans they may observe men, women and children, and
some of their relationships, but they will not be able to easily identify
the invisible emergent and self-organising cultural processes that organise
them into families, clans and societies. These properties, behaviours and
mechanisms are known in the complexity literature as emergence.
Total-system outputs stem from the non-linear interaction processes
of adaptive and dynamic elements, and so they are the result of complex
causalities; small causes can have large effects, and large effects can have
small causes, all originating from disparate sites (Cilliers 1998). As such,
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interventions in a system often produce unforeseen consequences and
create new problems (Preiser et al. 2018). Complex interactions thus
occur where an organisation or system can change or adapt seemingly
spontaneously or automatically (Stacey 1992). Whereas a complicated
system can be understood holistically and engaged with or manipulated so
as to produce some predictable outcome, a complex system is definitively
different (Poli 2013). Designing, building and launching a rocket into
space is highly complicated, but once it is mastered, the same process
can be repeated with a reasonable chance of success. In fact, the most
frequently used rocket to send people and goods into space is the Soviet
Soyuz rocket, which has a core design that has been in use since 1967
(European Space Agency 2019). In contrast, non-linearity plays a critical
role in the emergence and self-regulation of complex adaptive systems
(Cilliers 1998: 3). Even if a particular process helped to generate a
peaceful outcome in one society, such as the Commission for Recep-
tion, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste, it cannot be repeated in
another context with any reasonable expectation that it will have the same
outcome. In fact, it cannot even be repeated in Timor-Leste with any
expectation that it will have the same outcome. Irreproducibility, then,
is a function of dynamic process in complex systems and their emergent
properties.
Mac Ginty and Richmond (2016: 224) describe “the concept of
hybridity [as amounting] to a rejection of conflict scientism, or the notion
that conflicts can be ‘understood’ if only we have enough data and the
correct formula”. Instead, hybridity aims to incorporate the complexity
of local realities, allow space for the inclusion of variable perspectives, and
recognise the legitimacy of disparate sites of agency. Hybridity accepts that
a conflict, and thus any intervention in it, cannot be totally planned and
organised from outside. Conflicts, from a Complexity ontology, are thus
unknowable in the sense that such knowledge can lead to predicting how
a conflict will behave in future. Any methodological tool of engagement
must therefore be careful not to over-state its analytical capabilities. The
schema of Deekeling and Simangan’s typology, though implicit rather
than explicit, is the categorisation and organisation of the conflict ‘field’
through the designation of the relevant parties and their interlinkages
and relations. Because gatekeepers are inherently relational, they implic-
itly depend on the existence of a particular (though potentially flexible)
networked system structure. Hypothetically, the typology would allow for
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a ‘mapping’ exercise, where participating gatekeepers are plotted in refer-
ence to one another by some observational cartographer. However, the
dynamic nature of complex systems necessitates that even the most inti-
mate and precise composition of elements of a conflict cannot lead to a
holistic understanding of it at a grand scale. There must be a multi-level
analysis, then. The typology can greatly benefit the micro-level analysis of
system elements and their relations. But this examination must be made
alongside, and indeed separate from, a macro-level analysis of the system
at a grand scale. To complement the micro-analysis of the typology, we
should attempt to understand the dynamics of the conflict at a more
global scale. We can emphasise the typology, and of mid-space bridge-
builders, as a method for or point of engagement with the system, but
we must further assure to operate with an appreciation of the wider state
of the system.
Radical Openness and Contextuality
Radical openness is the notion that complex systems are definitively
borderless, and any boundaries drawn only serve as a pragmatic choice for
studying the system at hand (Chu et al. 2003). As societies are radically
open complex systems it is always problematic to draw precise bound-
aries between distinctions such as local/international or internal/external
(Cilliers 2001). Complexity informs us that in complex systems, including
social systems, change processes are emergent from within a given system
and evolutionary in nature. This system adapts to its environment and
its own emergent behaviour through a continuous process of induc-
tive adaptation, regulated by its own self-organising processes. Local or
internal in this context thus refers to those processes that are emergent
from this internal experience, whilst external refers to the environment
with which the elements in the system in question are interacting with
(Bargués-Pedreny 2015: 122). In the peacebuilding context, a local
system describes a society or community that is affected by conflict.
External or international actors refer to outsiders that are engaging with
the local system. It is understood that all complex systems are open
systems and are thus influenced by their environment, and that in this
context it is not possible to isolate a local conflict system, without taking
into account the various regional and global influences that have shaped
and that continue to influence that society. Manaysay and Espesor in
Chapter 6 of this volume discuss how, via external actors, international
3 HYBRIDITY, ADAPTIVE PEACEBUILDING … 47
norms and practices interact with local-level civil society in Mindanao,
the Philippines, blurring their boundaries. Still, there is analytical value,
from a complex systems perspective, to draw a distinction, to the degree
possible, between what can be perceived as Mindanao society and what
can be perceived as external actors, even when it is understood that these
are very open and fluid categories. As acknowledged by Manaysay and
Espesor, when the essential ingredient is self-organised, locally emergent
social institutions, then there is value in trying to identify and support
those local institutional processes.
Boundaries in a complex system are thus “permeable and allow for
communication… between a system and its surroundings” (Preiser et al.
2018: n.p.). The stark permeability of boundaries in complex systems
is denoted by radical openness, as interaction and commodity-sharing
between elements can happen both endo- and exogenously. Subsequently,
boundary definition can be particularly difficult when it comes to complex
systems—it is not always possible to know which elements are ‘in’ the
system—or ‘out’. This is further complicated by Cillier’s description of
system boundary definition as being largely a function of the perspective
of the observer (Cilliers 2001). Each system is a Bourdieusian ‘field’ that
structures or brackets the interactions of a variety of elements—yet these
systems are themselves part of a larger ‘field’.
A corollary of the openness of a system is system contextuality. Contex-
tuality in this case refers to the impact of the situational or environmental
context on the actions of the elements. Elements within a complex system
are impacted by occurrences outside the system as much as those within
(ibid.). As such, there are two modes of interaction that serve to delineate
the “patterns of organization” (Preiser et al. 2018: n.p.) that struc-
ture communication mechanisms between elements in a complex system.
These are dynamic interactions within the system (between the elements
and each other), and without (between the elements and the outside
environment). This double-layering of interactional contexts, coupled
with the ability of the elements to adapt their strategies, entails a large
amount of contextuality. This is illustrated in Chapter 5 of this volume,
where Umeyama and Brehm discuss the fluctuating identities of Cambo-
dian monks as they interact with both their local context, and the wider
international peace process.
Boege et al. (2009: 15) discuss how a course of “positive mutual
accommodation” characterises the peacebuilding process, whereby “there
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are no clear-cut boundaries between the realm of the exogenous ‘mod-
ern’ and the endogenous ‘customary’ instead processes of assimilation,
articulation, transformation, and/or adoption are at the interface of
the global/exogenous and local/indigenous”. Hybridity theory thereby
references the embeddedness of systems within one another; where a
“messy local socio-political context” (ibid.) blurs system boundaries. Mac
Ginty and Richmond (2016: 220) further acknowledge that “hybridity is
a condition that occurs, in large part, contextually”. As the state of the
wider environment ebbs and flows, and influences on the system to fluc-
tuate, the nature of the hybrid context is in constant flux. Hybridity then,
is “a constant process of negotiation as multiple sources of power in a
society compete, coalesce, seep into each other and engage in mimicry,
domination or accommodation” (ibid.). We cannot, therefore, create a
simple orrery of our conflicting society; there must be both implicit and
explicit reference to the wider cosmos.
Adaptivity
The contextuality of interactions in complex systems is exacerbated by
complex system elements being definitionally adaptive. The elements that
make up the system, people and institutions in society, adapt based on
the feedback they receive from their interactions relationally with each
other and with their wider environment. They act with intent, and others
around them, or their environment reacts. In Complexity this reaction
is referred to as feedback. Based on their interpretation of the feedback
received, the element changes their behaviour the next time they act in
order to improve their gain or to avoid losses. This change of behaviour
based on feedback is called adaptation. The elements effectively ‘learn’
from their continuous interactions with each other and their system which
actions have the optimal effect. As a society we use adaptation to collec-
tively learn what kind of behaviour we should and should not accept to
sustain our peace. Systemic evolution is therefore a large part of what
characterises a complex system, and adaptation and feedback help to
explain how complex system evolve. This evolution develops locally, in
piecemeal portions of the system, and progresses bit-by-bit from adaptive
interaction at the elemental level and may eventually result in large-scale
systemic fluctuations. Of course, as large-scale changes in system proper-
ties fluctuate, this affects the contextual environment in which small-scale
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elements operate and interact, creating a somewhat cyclical process of
change.
Over time, these cyclical processes of adaptive interaction shape into
“patterns of organization” (Preiser et al. 2018: n.p.) in sections of
a system, which loosely govern the structure of interaction between
elements. Patterns of organisation are thus formed and maintained
through the self-organisational activities of system elements. These
patterns further inter-link with other system areas, generating the adap-
tive capacities of a complex system (Morin 1999; Levin 2005; Fox-Keller
2008). While not necessarily entailing path dependency, these patterns
do suggest some form of road-mapping and structuring of the system’s
potential trajectories. This therefore hints at the potential for studying the
system and its mechanisms of change and evolution. Adaptivity fuels self-
organisation, which in complex systems like a society thus both explains
how it maintains its order, hierarchies, and organisation, as well as how
it, at the same time, is continuously evolving.
Hybridity theorists acknowledge the power of local actors and environ-
ments to subvert and reassemble the structures of liberal peacebuilding
(Richmond and Franks 2007; Mac Ginty 2008), developing these struc-
tures into “alternative versions of peace” (Mac Ginty 2008: 159). These
acts of subversion are instances of adaptation. Hybrid peacebuilding
aims to incorporate the “frictions” (Lowenhaupt Tsing 2004) between
the machinations of the liberal peace and local imaginaries of gover-
nance into the larger hybrid peacebuilding project. The result is a sort
of “institutional bricolage” (Cleaver et al. 2013: 168), whereby local
epistemologies of peace and governance import and redefine exogenous
liberal peace structures. This may initially appear to present a challenge
for the would-be peacebuilding practitioner. This “cacophony of think-
ing” (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013) fogs the ability of peacebuilders
to implement a structured approach to peace. The “sheer heterogeneity
of the sources of localised thinking and expression means that there is
no neat framework of ideas” that peacebuilders can linearly or simply
realise (ibid.). However, this variety of perspectives and approaches can
serve as a point of resilience and inventiveness, as the inherent capacity
for self-development and self-organisation in complex systems allow for
the cultivation and operationalisation of learning and adaptive processes
that may generate a different process than what initially envisaged by the
peacebuilder, but that may still lead to the same overall outcomes. The
added advantage of this process is that the outcome will now be the result
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of an indigenous process. This increases the likelihood that the process
will be perceived as home grown, have social institutions that feel an
ownership towards it, understand the history and processes that generated
it, and therefore necessary to sustain it.
Complexity helps to explain why top-down, imposed or borrowed
peacebuilding models of social transformation is doomed to fail. Even
a complex social system like a society that has been weakened by violent
conflict typically has enough resilience to resist externally imposed solu-
tions. Peacebuilders who stimulate and facilitate adaptive processes of a
society and encourage the society, subtly with negative and positive feed-
back, to develop or strengthen the institutions it needs to sustain peace,
is likely to be more effective. Boege et al. (2009: 14) emphasise the
need to “[take] into account the strengths of the societies in question,
acknowledging their resilience, encouraging indigenous creative responses
to the problems, and strengthening their own capacities for endurance”.
Mac Ginty and Richmond (2013: 780) concur, celebrating that while the
“cacophony of thinking” is “messy… it has the capacity to be vibrant and
relevant to the communities from which it emerges”.
We have explained how relations between elements are the impera-
tive concern for hybrid peacebuilding from a Complexity ontology. What
adaptivity entails is that these relations change and evolve over time as
system elements practice iterative learning through feedback processes
both with other elements and their local environment. To accommo-
date this fluidity in identity and function on the part of system elements,
the typology itself must therefore be fluid and flexible. But more than
simply allowing for adaptivity and accommodating it within the wider
functioning of the system, the typology should be structured or utilised
so as to actively encourage adaptivity. Owing to the positionality of the
elements, and their capacity for engagement and learning—and there-
fore, importantly, creativity—adaptivity in the hybrid context can lead
to innovative problem-solving. The typology instrumentalised by Deeke-
ling and Simangan in Chapter 4 utilises ‘transformative relationships’
as a tool for identifying, shaping and relational progression. Adaptivity
is accepted, and indeed encouraged, in the interaction between system
agents. The aim however is to ensure that the right kind of relations are
taking place between elements. This suggests a new role for would-be
peacebuilders, as more of a process facilitator than a direct intervener
in the peacebuilding process; stimulating self-organisation in positive
directions and influencing the interactions themselves so that they may
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produce positive outcomes—where positive is understood as in support
of self-sustainable peace. The next section will address one such process
facilitation approach, Adaptive Peacebuilding.
Adaptive Peacebulding
Adaptive Peacebuilding is an approach to peacebuilding aimed at influ-
encing complex social systems where hybrid peacebuilders, together with
the communities and people affected by the conflict, actively engage in a
structured process to sustain peace and resolve conflicts by employing an
iterative process of learning and adaptation (de Coning 2018).
In Adaptive Peacebuilding, the core activity of hybrid peacebuilding is
process facilitation. The aim of peacebuilding is to stimulate the processes
in a society that will lead to strengthening the resilience of those social
institutions that manage internal and external stressors and shocks, and in
so doing prevent violent conflict and sustain peace. If a society is fragile,
it means that the formal and informal social institutions that govern its
politics, security, justice and economy lack resilience. Resilience refers here
to the capacity of social institutions “to absorb and adapt in order to
sustain an acceptable level of function, structure and identity under stress”
(Dahlberg 2015: 545).
Adaptive capacity is defined as the capacity to thrive in an environment
characterised by change (Joseph 2018: 14). In the conflict resolution
context, it refers to the ability of a society to adjust to disruptive change,
to take advantage of opportunities, and to respond to consequences
(Engle 2011: 648). As established earlier, local self-organisation is a pre-
requisite for sustainable peace and the societies and communities that are
intended to benefit from a hybrid peacebuilding intervention thus need
to be fully involved and engaged in the initiative.
The specific arrangements will differ from context to context, but
the principle should be that no decisions are taken about a particular
peace process without sufficient participation of the affected commu-
nity or society. Sufficiency here implies that the community should be
engaged in such a way that the diversity and variety of their interests,
needs, and concerns inform every step of the adaptation cycle. Adaptive
Peacebuilding can therefore not be free or distinct from the dynamics
of politics or power. The process is not technical or abstract. It is a
process that engages with all aspects and elements of societal change that
is needed for self-sustainable peace to emerge, such as reconciliation or
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transitional justice, and it lends itself to a relational approach that seeks
to account for how power is distributed through and within relationships
(Day and Hunt 2020). Whilst actors and their interrelations can influ-
ence complex social systems by facilitating and stimulating the processes
that enable resilience and inclusiveness to emerge, the prominent role of
self-organisation in complex system dynamics suggest that it is important
the affected societies and communities have the space and agency to drive
their own process (Burns 2007). This is why local adaptation processes are
ultimately the critical element for inclusive political settlements to become
self-sustainable.
Adaptive Peacebuilding thus requires a commitment to engage in a
structured learning process together with the society or community that
has been affected by conflict. This commitment comes at a cost, in terms
of investing in the capabilities necessary to enable and facilitate such a
collective learning process, in taking the time to engage with communi-
ties and other stakeholders, in giving them the space for self-organisation
to emerge and consolidate, and in making the effort to develop new
innovative systems for learning together with communities as the process
unfolds.
The Adaptive Process: Variation, Selection and Iteration
Complex systems cope with challenges posed by changes in their environ-
ment by co-evolving together with their environment in a never-ending
process of adaptation (Barber 2011). This iterative adaptive process
utilises experimentation and feedback to generate knowledge about its
environment. This is essentially the way natural selection works in the
evolution of complex systems. The two key factors are variation and selec-
tion. There needs to be variation, i.e. multiple parallel interventions, and
there needs to be a selection process that replicates and adapts effective
interventions and discontinues those that do not have the desired effect.
The analysis-planning-implementation-evaluation project cycle is already
well established in the development and peacebuilding context. However,
these communities of practice are not good at generating sufficient varia-
tion. They are also notoriously bad at selection based on effect, and they
are especially poor at identifying and abandoning underperforming initia-
tives (Rosén and Haldrup 2013). To remedy these shortcomings Adaptive
Peacebuilding utilise a structured iterative adaptation methodology to
help generate institutional learning.
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This adaptive methodology builds on the work of Andrews et al.
(2017), who have pioneered the problem-driven iterative adaptation
(PDIA) approach as an alternative to the linear causal logic of the log-
frame in development planning and evaluation. This adaptive approach
consists of iterative cycles of learning, starting with analysis and assess-
ment. Based on the analysis, multiple possible options for influencing a
social system are generated. When the selected options are developed into
actual campaigns or programmes, their design must be explicit about the
theory of change each will employ so that their effects can be assessed. A
theory of change should be clear about how it intends to contribute to
change in the behaviour of the social system it intends to influence, i.e.
how a series of activities are anticipated to generate a particular outcome
(Valters et al. 2016).
A selected number of these intervention options are then implemented
and closely monitored, with a view to identifying and processing the
feedback generated by the system in response to each intervention. The
feedback is then analysed, after which those responsible for the interven-
tion, together with the affected communities and key stakeholders, decide
which initiatives to discontinue, which to continue, and, in addition, what
adaptations to introduce for those that will be continued. The ineffectual
ones, or those that have generated negative effects, need to be aban-
doned or adapted. Those that appear to have the desired effects should
be continued and can be expanded or scaled-up, but in a variety of ways,
so that there is a continuous process of experimentation with a range of
options, coupled with a continuous process of selection and refinement.
It is thus important that this process is repeated in regular relatively short
cycles. The traditional annual or multi-year planning cycles are too slow
for coping with highly dynamic social change processes, and most peace-
building initiatives will have to employ adaptive planning and assessment
cycles that repeat 3 or 4 times a year.
Some form of inductive adaptation is already taking place in most
peacebuilding initiatives, but what Adaptive Peacebuilding offers is a clear
approach or methodological process that can help to enhance and insti-
tutionalise the rigor and effects of the adaptations that are already taking
place, or stimulate the uptake of adaptive thinking in others where this
type of approach to planning and assessment is new.
Adaptive Peacebuilding are scalable at all levels; the same basic method
can be applied to individual programmes, to projects, to regional or
national-level campaigns, or multi-year strategic frameworks or compacts.
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From a complexity perspective, the feedback generated by various inter-
ventions at different levels should be shared and modulated as widely as
possible throughout the system, so that as broad a spectrum of initia-
tives as possible can self-adjust and co-evolve based on the information
generated in the process.
Conclusion
In this chapter we explored the potential connectivity between Hybrid
Peacebuilding, Complexity and Adaptive Peacebuilding. We have heuris-
tically employed four foundational characteristics of complex systems to
build bridges between the lessons learned from Complexity theory, and
the ideas proffered in the hybridity debate. Complexity emphasises the
inherency of relationality in complex systems. From an analytical perspec-
tive, the relations between the elements are more important than the
elements themselves. The “process of becoming, rather than static states
of being” (Preiser et al. 2018: n.p.) must be the preeminent focus in
a complex peacebuilding ontology. As far as the instrumentalisation of
hybridity is concerned, this aspect of complex systems urges the would-
be peacebuilder to take care not to entrench any rigidity in the method of
engagement. Their characteristic dynamism means that it is impossible to
holistically understand the workings of complex systems through an anal-
ysis of their constituent elements, no matter how comprehensive it may
be. As such, we should not allow hybridity’s focus on the importance
of the local, or any typology’s concentration on the interactions between
individual actors, to obscure the necessity of also investing in system-wide
analysis. Any micro-level study must be accompanied by a contempo-
raneous macro-level one, as non-linearity in the interactions of system
elements generate whole-system outputs that may be unpredictable and
immeasurable at the atomistic level.
The importance of context for complex systems should encourage
peacebuilders to appreciate the effects of the wider systemic environment
for system functionality and take pains not to instantiate false and unfitting
system boundaries. This “process of becoming” (ibid.) implies the neces-
sary centrality of systemic dynamism. So, any methodology or typology
must remain open and flexible to allow for the systemic evolution that
comes part-and-parcel with the constant interaction of definitionally adap-
tive complex system elements. However, this adaptivity can serve as a
point of strength for complex systems. Their capacity for iterant learning
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means that complex system elements are imbued with a nature of inge-
nuity and creativity in responding to feedback processes. Translated into
the hybrid context, this entails the ability of actors to make use of local
knowledge, or a combination of local-global knowledge, to problem-solve
and imaginatively enhance system progression.
However, ‘system progression’ is a purposefully outcome-neutral term;
it can lead either to a measure of societal bonding, or to further bifur-
cation and an increase in conflict tension. So, what this entails for
peacebuilders is the possibility of an existential re-working. As imma-
nently adaptive and inherently relational systems are unable to be coerced,
peacebuilders may have to consider themselves more as process facilita-
tors who encourage those interactions that should contribute to peace.
Through iterative adaptation, whilst discouraging those that may promote
violent or coercive means, peacebuilders are to contribute to nurturing
and guiding the system progression, whilst at the same time learning from
and being guided by the system, in the direction of peace and stability.
This is where Adaptive Peacebuilding comes in. It offers a specific
process that peacebuilders can employ to cope with Complexity. It offers
a specific methodology for collaboration among peacebuilders, including
local and international peacebuilders. And it offers a specific approach
aimed at nudging societal change processes towards sustaining peace,
without interfering so much that it ends up causing harm by inadver-
tently disrupting the very feedback loops critical for self-organisation to
emerge and to be sustained.
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CHAPTER 4
Bridging Gaps: From aDescriptive
to a Practical Mid-Space Actor Typology?
Anna Deekeling and Dahlia Simangan
Introduction
Critiques of top-down approaches to peacebuilding propose that mid-
space actors are more effective agents in fostering connections and
dialogue between bottom/local or grassroots and presumably disen-
gaged top/national and international actors. A recent work that advo-
cates such a proposition is a volume edited by Yuji Uesugi entitled
Hybrid Peacebuilding in Asia, which aims to “fill the gap…between
local stakeholders and outside intervenors” and elevate the notion of
hybridity in peacebuilding from an analytical lens to a useful tool for
post-conflict reconciliation processes (Uesugi and Kagawa 2020: 42).
The book employs an actor-based typology to conceptualise “mid-space
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local bridge-builders” that might become active advocates for dialogue-
building and peace negotiations (Uesugi 2020: 2–3). Mid-space local
bridge-builders or gatekeepers can “move across different cleavages in
society to facilitate dialogue among competing stakeholders” (Uesugi and
Kagawa 2020: 38). They are enabled by their unique social position to
safeguard communities and channels of communication between them
and other actors. Hence, they can become ‘bridge-builders’ who facilitate
dialogue and peacebuilding or ‘spoilers’ who block passages of communi-
cation, undermining the peacebuilding process. While the book presents
a conceptual basis for understanding the bridge- and dialogue-building
roles of mid-space actors according to their specific settings, the archi-
tecture of the mid-space or the network of social and power relations
within it is left under-examined. It also raises many questions about how
this architecture shapes the opportunities and perspectives of mid-space
actors, which can ultimately determine their motivations and actions.
Although the concept of mid-space actors adds a constructive approach
to substantiating the functions of hybridity as a lens, this chapter argues
that it falls short of advancing hybridity from an analytical lens toward a
peacebuilding tool.
The objective of this chapter is three-fold. First, it aims to critique the
typology of mid-space local bridge-builders by combining various theoret-
ical approaches pertinent to hybrid peacebuilding, specifically attempts to
locate mid-space actors and their capacity to engage positively in conflict
resolution. To overcome the barrier between theoretical and practical
approaches, a combination of hybrid peacebuilding theory (including the
knowledge outside intervenors have obtained from applying hybridity as
an analytical lens) and the typology of mid-space local bridge-builders
(including the meaningful engagement between outside intervention and
local bridge-builders) is proposed in this chapter. Hence, this chapter
explores how hybridity can be operated as a theoretical concept to analyse
mid-space actors as well as being a practical tool to support them in their
dialogue-building endeavours.
Secondly, the concept of bridge-builders is developed by locating mid-
space actors and their corresponding positionalities in the peace process.
Several positionalities are identified in this chapter in terms of tapping
into resources of formal and informal power, sharing a cultural back-
ground and thus means of social understanding within their community,
and exercising skills toward transformative relationships, locally grounded
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legitimacy, and access to information. Relatedly, ways for outside inter-
venors and mediators to engage the bridge-building skills of mid-space
actors, rather than reinforcing a hubristic approach to peacebuilding, will
be explored. Such engagement is likely to promote the emancipatory
potential of peacebuilding through genuine dialogue and active partici-
pation by local actors. Proposing this type of engagement rests on the
assumption that bridge-building skills are inextricably tied to the actors
involved and defined by their social relations and, hence, are not trans-
ferable to or easily manufactured by outside actors. Furthermore, these
skills inform the mid-space actors’ capacities to perform specific roles or
functions within their society. This chapter, thus, interrogates whether
these capacities can be enhanced by, and engaged with, broadening the
possibilities for mid-space actors to positively shape peace negotiations.
Thirdly, this chapter attempts to advance the descriptive function of
hybridity towards a more pragmatic approach to peacebuilding. Such
an attempt entails propositions for several practical applications of the
concept of hybrid peacebuilding that might be useful for outsiders when
assisting with local conflict resolution. It is argued that this pragmatic
approach has the potential to enable the agency of mid-space actors
by relying on their context-specific knowledge on the one hand and
proposing a way to engage with mid-space actors on the other hand.
This chapter presents an outlook on how outside actors could engage
meaningfully with mid-space actors.
Overall, this chapter explores the engagement of outsider intervenors
with bridge-builders during a peace process. To do this the following
discussion reviews the key concepts and definitions relevant to the concep-
tualisation and construction of a mid-space actor typology. Then, a
critical analysis of this actor-based typology is presented, followed by
identifying context-specific ways for outsiders to engage with mid-space
actors by enabling their bridge-building capacity, without tarnishing local
legitimacy and undermining access to crucial information. The chapter
concludes by summarising the main arguments for advancing hybridity
beyond an analytical lens and towards a practical tool for peacebuilding.
Defining the Mid-Space
This section scopes how scholars have previously defined the mid-space
by examining connections and differences between these definitions. The
investigation of the mid-space and the actors within it is not a novel
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approach to peace and conflict studies. Paul Wehr and John Paul Lederach
(1991) earlier highlighted the potential of insider-partial mediators to
connect conflicting parties effectively by using insider-specific knowledge
obtained through their involvement as local actors. They used the term
“middle-range” (similar to mid-space), where actors are able to cross
between the top and bottom levels of society by creating a network
of relationships and dialogue channels (Wehr and Lederach 1991: 87–
88). Actors who can use these channels (similarly to bridge-builders)
are likely to expand their social web and connect various stakeholders.
The mid-space thus holds the capacity to function as a transition zone,
where information can be shared and relationships between different
actors can be formed. On this basis Lederach (1997) later constructed a
layered triangle model consisting of grassroots, middle, and elite sections
in societies for understanding the interplay of actors in conflict resolu-
tion and post-conflict reconciliation processes. These ideas were advanced
in the works of several academics (e.g., Newman and Richmond 2006;
Mac Ginty 2010; Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013; Svensson and Lind-
gren 2013) articulating how inside-out mediation can facilitate dialogue
among various stakeholders positioned in the top, middle, and bottom
levels of society.
The concept of the mid-space encompasses the space in which the top,
elite levels have the opportunity to interact with the bottom, grassroots
or local level. Building on the work of Hancock and Mitchell (2018),
Uesugi and Kagawa (2020) argue that the existing gap between top-
level focused peacemaking and ground-level based peacebuilding could
be overcome by local bridge-builders through dialogue-building, using
the mid-space as a “transit zone” (Mitchell 2018). This transit zone
consists of various spheres of societies in which the top/national and
bottom/local levels interplay via a “vertical gap” (signifying an intra-
community communication flow) and a “horizontal gap” (denoting
inter-community communication) (Uesugi and Kagawa 2020: 38–39).
In addition, the concept of the “diagonal gap” was introduced, which
emerges in the space between the local community and international
community, with the latter infiltrating the former by intervening in the
conflict (ibid.: 38–40). It is not uncommon for these external, interna-
tional interventions to ignore the local context, often creating debilitating
circumstances or frictions in which local efforts are diminished over time
(Millar 2014: 501–503; Uesugi and Kagawa 2020: 40–41).
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The idea of the mid-space stems from the critiques regarding liberal
peacebuilding. It is suggested that liberal peacebuilding places too much
emphasis on a top-down approach rooted in the ideas of institutionalism
(Mac Ginty and Sanghera 2012: 3–8). Furthermore, it fails to recog-
nise local agency and power structures as well as the social, political,
and historical contexts in which peacebuilding takes place. Conversely, the
grassroots-based approach takes a more ‘local turn’ and seeks to include
more culturally sensitive and locally relevant methods of conflict reso-
lution and peacebuilding (Mitchell 2018: 1–2). Hybridity, as a concept
in peacebuilding, highlights the interplay between the local and the
international and acknowledges hybrid peacebuilding outcomes (i.e., a
combination of liberal and illiberal practices and outcomes) (Mac Ginty
2008). As defined in Chapter 1 and elaborated in Chapters 2 and 3,
hybrid peacebuilding is considered in this study as an approach between
liberal peacebuilding and the local turn, combining the ‘best of both
worlds’ in terms of peace formation. As underlined in Chapter 2 the main
selling point of hybrid peacebuilding is its ability to understand conflicts
in their complexity. Applying the concept of complexity necessitates an
examination of the historical and cultural background of a conflict, as
well as the inclusion of all actors involved, while paying special atten-
tion to their power relations and interactions (Mac Ginty and Sanghera
2012: 3–8). As illustrated in Chapter 3, hybrid peacebuilding views the
interaction of actors and institutions in a conflict-affected society as highly
dynamic and diverse, calling for constant reconfiguration of peacebuilding
processes.
Perhaps the most important question following the definition of the
mid-space is about the actors who work in this space. As the most
appealing aspect of the mid-space is that it provides an environment in
which communication and information are shared, the question of who
facilitates these occurrences is pertinent. The authors of Hybrid Peace-
building in Asia argue for the existence of “mid-space actors” (Uesugi
2020: 2–3), who serve as intermediaries, being enabled by their unique
social positions, resources, and transformative relationships to connect the
various levels of peace formation. Consequently, they become the gate-
keepers of their communities. Gatekeepers are often local leaders, or at
times institutions, with high levels of local legitimacy while possessing
the capacity to connect the top/national levels with the bottom/local
levels, thus being able to travel among different adversaries (Uesugi and
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Kagawa 2020: 45). The classifications of these mid-space actors and their
respective roles are critically examined in the following section.
A Mid-Space Actor Typology
Mid-space actors are individuals, institutions, or representatives of insti-
tutions involved in peacebuilding. They can be religious leaders, clan
chiefs, security officers, or official representatives of organisations. Mid-
space actors can be classified according to their relational networks, as
Chapter 3 demonstrates. Through their roles as gatekeepers (i.e., safe-
guarding communities and channels of communication between them
and other actors) they can become either bridge-builders or spoilers.
Gatekeepers are shaped based on their social history and background in
connection to the underlying power relations that enable or block their
bridge-building potential in peacebuilding processes.
Due to their unique positionalities in the mid-space, gatekeepers have
the capacity to connect themselves with multiple communities and broker
information and dialogue among them (Uesugi and Kagawa 2020: 50–
51, 54–55). Their positionalities allow them access to information and
to obtain the needed legitimacy to engage with actors outside of their
direct sphere of influence (Svensson and Lindgren 2013: 699–700). Gate-
keepers can navigate in various directions, cross spheres and levels of
interactions, and establish long-term relationships or bridges between
stakeholders (Wehr and Lederach 1991: 85–98). Gatekeepers hold hori-
zontal, vertical, and diagonal capacities that theoretically allow them to
close gaps and establish dialogue platforms, if they are willing to do
so—an aspect that will be discussed below (Uesugi and Kagawa 2020:
47–49). Gatekeepers can exercise various roles in conflict mediation based
on their insider-partial perspective, which can be seen from different
angles. For example, Chapter 3 examines their roles from a relationship-
based angle. Chapter 5, on the other hand, discusses the identity of these
actors based on their co-constitutive and contextual perspectives, which
are influential in shaping the perceptions and attitudes of their respec-
tive local communities (Jackson and Albrecht 2018). These perspectives
are dynamic, shaped by social interactions, and thus can be considered
‘hybrid’ in themselves.
Attitudes, behaviours, and situations are also crucial factors that could
turn a gatekeeper to either a bridge-builder or a spoiler (Kagawa 2020:
10, 14). In theory, both bridge-builders and spoilers incorporate the same
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abilities that put them in the position of a gatekeeper—a unique social
position that enables them not only to engage with the local and the
top/national but possibly also the international sphere. They also have
vertical, horizontal, and diagonal capabilities (Uesugi and Kagawa 2020:
42) that allow them to cross existing gaps between conflicting spheres and
communities, accessing information from several sources and establishing
relationships. These capabilities refer to the ability to bridge over different
blockages in a conflict-affected society, between national elites and the
grassroots bottom (horizontal gap), among communities (vertical gaps),
or the local and international contexts (diagonal gap).
Previous studies argue that actors who serve as gatekeepers have little
motivation for sabotaging conflict resolution attempts because they are
interested in the immediate outcomes of peace negotiations (Svensson
and Lindgren 2013: 703). Hence, the chances of gatekeepers spoiling the
peace process are low. However, spoiling is not necessarily against peace
or in favour of conflict. For example, a gatekeeper may deem it beneficial
for the peace process to block the flow of certain information and cut
off pernicious relationships (Uesugi and Kagawa 2020: 44–48). Also, the
goals of conflict parties during a negotiation process may differ according
to their perceptions of what caused the conflict, and these perceptions
are informed by their specific backgrounds and histories as well as their
experiences of power hierarchies. These circumstances could lead gate-
keepers to ‘spoil’ the peace process deliberately, not because it works
against their own interest, but because they perceive ‘spoiling’ to be in
the interest of their constituency. There is also a possibility of gatekeepers
being side-lined during negotiations due to a lack of political agency and
resources, resulting in their disengagement from the process (Jackson
and Albrecht 2018: 43–44). These types of ‘spoiling’ might occur unin-
tentionally or simultaneously while trying to bridge existing gaps. In
the case of Cambodia, for example, Buddhist monks worked to bridge
their communities and the international sphere. However, their attempts
to challenge national policies through public demonstrations and other
forms of nonviolent peace movements were suppressed easily by govern-
ment forces. While they were able to bridge the communities they were
engaged with their lack of advocacy towards the elites within the Buddhist
community and national politicians undermined their capacity to connect
the top/national and grassroots levels (Lee 2020). The link between
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conflict and the construction of identity, which could have imposed limi-
tations on the Buddhist monks’ ability to contribute to transformative
relationships, will be elaborated in Chapter 5.
The historical and contextual background of a conflict, the oppor-
tunities and limitations of existing power structures, and the parties’
perceptions of themselves and others, as informed by their attitudes
and behaviours, determine whether gatekeepers will act as spoilers
(Kagawa 2020: 78). These factors are not necessarily negative or conflict-
promoting; the perception of the outcomes of a negotiation process is,
after all, subjective. However, understanding the interplay of these factors
could bolster the potential for gatekeepers to turn into bridge-builders,
especially when they are made aware of the costs and benefits of their
actions for their constituency. In this context spoiling might be only a
temporary measure, hence sometimes recurring, as the dynamics of a
conflict or the perception of actors towards it shifts constantly. Spoiling
should be seen as a fundamental part of the peace process when socioeco-
nomic dynamics evolve and reorganise access to resources and information
(Newman and Richmond 2006: 101–110). Therefore, spoiling does not
necessarily jeopardise a peace process as a whole but instead changes the
positions and angles of actors involved; peace then becomes an outcome
of re-organising the structures and processes of negotiations.
The ambivalent position of a gatekeeper—whether perceived as a
bridge-builder or spoiler, acting beneficially and/or disruptively towards
a peace process—needs to be examined in the light of their social
and power-relational backgrounds. What is perceived to be a ‘spoil-
ing’ behaviour might not be aimed at tarnishing conflict resolution in
the long-run but may simply be a means of readjusting and reposi-
tioning the actors involved (ibid.: 109). This is evident in the case of
the Bangsamoro ceasefire agreements, in which rebel leaders go back
and forth between engaging and disturbing negotiations whenever they
do not feel adequately heard by the government. In instances when the
peace process seems to reach a stalemate they re-engage by bringing in
other actors, even potentially solidifying the peace process by broadening
the spectrum of participants (Kagawa 2020: 71–72). Hence, analysing
the processes of peace negotiations or peacebuilding entails caution to
avoid binaries such as right versus wrong or bridge-building versus
spoiling. These binary conceptualisations neither capture the complexity
and dynamism of post-conflict societies nor differentiate between layers
of behaviour, such as short-, mid- or long-term ‘spoiling’. They also fail
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to consider the peace-promoting potential of spoiling and the conflict-
reinforcing potential of bridge-building from the viewpoint of other
parties involved. It may thus be necessary to rethink the terms ‘bridge-
building’ and ‘spoiling’ and assign them as equally vital capacities for
gatekeepers—without judging them as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ for peacebuilding.
Determining the factors that enable the peace-promoting potential of
a gatekeeper is of pivotal importance in this analysis. It is crucial to under-
stand what pushes gatekeepers to use their unique positionalities and
reach out to other actors across the horizontal, vertical, and diagonal gaps
of peacebuilding. One relevant concept in this puzzle is that of “transfor-
mative relationships” (ibid.: 75–77). According to Kagawa (ibid.: 66–68),
a transformative relationship is based on shared norms, values, and expe-
riences that allow actors to connect to each other and express and act
upon their interests to resolve a conflict. A gatekeeper can contribute
to the cultivation of a transformative relationship by incorporating a
relationship-oriented angle in order to rebuild trust and relationships with
other actors from different conflicting groups. This angle entails looking
not only at the actors and their capacities but also at how and to whom
they are connected, and how frequently and in which ways these relations
are utilised. Hence, it is important to consider what shapes a gatekeeper’s
perspective towards other parties, how relationships can enable and block
engagement during peace negotiations, and how power hierarchies might
encourage or hinder gatekeepers in developing such transformative rela-
tionships (Jackson and Albrecht 2018: 44–46). Those who foster these
transformative relationships become bridge-builders while those who do
not turn into spoilers.
The possibility of gatekeepers turning into either bridge-builders or
spoilers (in some cases, gatekeepers exercise both roles simultaneously,
see for example Lee 2020) demands a broader consideration of the gate-
keepers’ perspective on a conflict and perceptions of other conflicting
parties, as well as the social characteristics that allow actors to take on
the role of a gatekeeper (e.g., social status, horizontal, vertical, and
diagonal capabilities, and capacity to foster transformative relationships)
(Uesugi and Kagawa 2020: 56). Given these compounding characteristics
of gatekeepers, the typology of mid-space actors can be a fruitful tool for
identifying and analysing key peacebuilding actors and their positionalities
in post-conflict settings.
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Critique of the Typology
While the typology of mid-space actors is broad enough to be applicable
to a vast array of case studies, there are still some conceptual issues that
need to be addressed. In particular, more specific definitions concerning
the type of capacities of gatekeepers, how their backgrounds enable or
restrict the development of those capacities, and how outsiders can engage
with gatekeepers need to be substantiated. The following discussion dives
into these issues in an attempt to bolster the conceptual soundness and
nuance the categories embedded in the typology.
Gatekeepers
Firstly, the circumstances under which a gatekeeper becomes either a
bridge-builder or a spoiler are not completely clear. Although Kagawa
(2020: 75–76) introduced the idea of transformative relationships to fill
this conceptual gap, the term itself remains underexplored. As mentioned
earlier, Kagawa (ibid.: 66) defines transformative relationships as relation-
ships “based on [gatekeepers’] common ground and social networks”.
She suggests that the “criteria for nurturing a transformative relationship
include a healthy clan relationship, ethno-cultural-religious commonality,
respective social ranks of the parties, and an authorised person to mobilise
internal peacekeepers” (ibid.: 72). Social position is a key in becoming a
gatekeeper, in particular the ability to exert “a strong influence over ordi-
nary people” and “power to control the access of top leaders and outside
intermediaries to the grassroots constituency under their realm of influ-
ence” (Uesugi and Kagawa 2020: 38). These positions can be summed up
into two criteria: local legitimacy and access to information. Legitimacy is
crucial for how gatekeepers connect the top/national and bottom/local
levels. It determines whether actors on the ground are willing to adapt the
normative narrative of peace according to how it is presented to them by
their leaders. Peace, after all, has to be grounded or conveyed through
a normative understanding that is rooted in the culture of a commu-
nity (Lemay-Hébert and Kappler 2016). To transfer their aspirations and
coalesce support, mid-space actors need to signify a culturally relevant
peace narrative and garner trust from their constituents.
Local legitimacy enables gatekeepers to access information, forge rela-
tionships, and establish a base of support when other actors intend
to spoil ongoing negotiations (Mitchell 2018: 3). For example, in
4 BRIDGING GAPS: FROM A DESCRIPTIVE … 69
Myanmar ethnic groups are highly fragmented and organised not only
through representatives at the governmental level but also through self-
administered areas and arrangements on the township level (Jolliffe
2015). Within this structure actors with local legitimacy connect national
government agencies or representatives and the local villages. They are
not bound under the constitution and engage relatively freely and thus
have the ability to advocate solely for their communities’ interests. The
lack of legal accountability raises the possibility of spoiling based on their
perceived interests or subjective judgements rather than careful consid-
eration of the needs of affected communities (ibid.: 32). For example,
some ethnic group leaders in Myanmar have even encouraged violence
against the government due to their lack of trust in the credibility of the
latter. From a political power perspective, guaranteeing the involvement
of grassroots communities influences heavily on the local legitimacy of
local leaders, hence the absence of opportunities for local involvement
would block the connection to the bottom spheres (Mitchell 2018: 3).
Legitimacy, according to Clements and Uesugi (2020), needs to be
locally grounded, based on local culture and norms, rather than being
imposed by an outside entity such as international organisations. This
raises the question, however, of whether it would be possible to train
mid-space actors as local bridge-builders to engage actively with the
bottom/local during the peacebuilding process while outside intervenors
remain in a more passive position. Would this kind of resolution process
be more effective? Also, to what degree can local bridge-builders be
guided by outside actors without being seen as yielding to the influence of
the international community, which could jeopardise the consent of their
constituent and damage their reputation? What is the role of the mid-
space as positioning factor for legitimacy and how is it shaped by political
power? This chapter, as well as the subsequent empirical chapters, aims to
clarify these questions.
Political Power
Locally grounded legitimacy can be understood as a hybrid form of
legitimacy, combining traditional, charismatic, and rational legitimacy
with normative and legal frameworks as it bridges a set of dichotomies
such as traditional/modern, local/cosmopolitan, particularist/universalist
(Uesugi 2018). It can be questioned, though, whether or not this legit-
imacy is able to bridge both sides. On one hand, the grassroots feel
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included, their values are protected, and their voices heard. On the other
hand, a common ground is established where international and local
frameworks can complement and enhance each other. How international
and local arrangements for monitoring ceasefire agreements in Mindanao
have enhanced each other to promote legitimacy through the inclusion
of diverse actors who could supervise independently the enforcement of
ceasefire agreements will be discussed in Chapter 6. This chapter, never-
theless, argues for the possibility of implementing international priorities
for peaceful negotiations while providing a platform for the engagement
of local actors.
In connection to the ability to tap into various forms of legitimacy,
there is a need to substantiate how the architecture of the mid-space (i.e.,
the network of social and power relations) shapes the opportunities and
perspectives for actors to emerge as gatekeepers. Furthermore, the char-
acteristics required to overcome the blockage between different spheres
inside a conflicting society remain under-examined. In this sense political
power can be understood as an essential yet dynamic and evolving element
that defines the space wherein gatekeepers operate. Thus, power itself can
be seen as product of hybridity as it is shaped through the interaction
of social actors behaving based on and in response to power relations
that restrict and enable their actions. As Jackson and Albrecht (2018:
40) argue, the “power of local actors to resist the imposition of liberal
statebuilding processes…shows that some hybrid structures do provide
a means to subvert externally imposed statebuilding but, importantly,
access to these approaches is controlled and moderated by the political
power of local elites”. Political power might then be one of the crucial
factors that determines whether mid-space actors can develop and facil-
itate transformative relationships, obtain local legitimacy, and maintain
access to information. It can be anticipated that power relations hinder
dialogue, especially in conflict-affected societies (Newman and Richmond
2006: 107–108). Hence, it is fruitful to investigate how outside entities
interact with existing power networks, clearing the blockages around the
mid-space.
Insider-Partial Mediators
In addition to locally grounded legitimacy, the concept of transforma-
tive relationships can be substantiated by drawing on the definition of
‘insider-partial mediators’ presented by Svensson and Lindgren (2013).
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Insider-partial mediators are actors within a conflict-affected society who
can take on mediation roles. They have the potential to “bring impor-
tant indigenous resources to a peace process and […] can complement
external mediators by mitigating the bargaining problem of information
failure”, focusing specifically on their ability to negotiate out of their
specific social position (Svensson and Lindgren 2013: 715). While their
study explains how and why certain actors become bridge-builders, they
do not include the possibility of those actors spoiling negotiation due to
“issue bias” or an inability “to be strictly neutral to the issue at stake”
(Svensson and Lindgren 2013: 703). This bias can also be caused by
the actors’ entanglement in a conflict, prompting them to evaluate the
possible outcomes of their actions based on how those outcomes affect
their homes and social reputations (ibid.: 699). Insider-partial mediators
are ultimately shaped by their unique social position, granting them power
and “pervasive institutional presence”, resulting in “significant cultural
power” (Appleby 2001).
What distinguishes insider-partial mediators from other parties
involved in resolving a conflict (e.g., ‘outsider neutral mediators’ or actors
who are not directly affected by the conflict and can thus be considered
‘objective’ mediators) is their unmatched access to intimate information
about the other parties. These characteristics make insider-partial media-
tors an appropriate substitute or addition to outside intervention, which
is almost always present in conflict resolution processes (Svensson and
Lindgren 2013: 702–703). By building on trusting relationships among
some or all conflicting parties, insider-partial mediators seek to create
solutions explicitly relevant to their socio-economic and political environ-
ment, creating a more localised or contextualised rather than top-down,
cookie-cutter approach. Embedded in the way actors access and share
information at the core of the negotiation process highlights the impor-
tance of investigating what enables them to transfer information. It is
crucial to see not only how information is transferred but also how
frequently, and how this information generate impact on the strength
of relationships between parties. Similarly, by observing how these infor-
mation flow, it might possible to locate gatekeepers within a conflict
situation. This flow of information can also be considered part of the
dynamic nature and complexity of conflict affected societies as discussed
in Chapter 3.
The question remains, however, of how outsider-neutral mediators
(specifically, the international community) can engage effectively with
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insider-partial mediators. This chapter proposes a revision of the mid-
space actor typology by describing gatekeepers located in the mid-space
who can become insider-partial mediators through bridge-building. It
is also important to explore how the international community can
assist gatekeepers in their access to information and knowledge and in
enhancing their legitimacy. Most pressingly, is there a possibility for the
international community, as the outsider-neutral mediator, to draw on
transformative relationships, fostering and enhancing the engagement
between the various stakeholders while guaranteeing an emancipatory
approach? These possibilities, including the balancing of power hierar-
chies, could be the key elements in removing blockages around the
mid-space and guaranteeing the development of dialogue. Such questions
open the discussion on the following questions. Are these transforma-
tive relationships transferrable, since they are viewed as inherent to local
actors in their specific setting? Do transformative relationships hold the
potential for equal and mutual partnerships between insider-partial and
outsider-neutral mediators? Can insider-partial mediators take full respon-
sibility, enabling the international community as the outsider intervener
or mediator to act in a capacity-building rather than a conflict resolution
role? Under which circumstances within these configurations would the
outsiders overstep their mandate and once again simply imprint liberal
values of consensus-building and democratisation while overlooking local
power dynamics?
In terms of outsider intervention and conflict resolution, the work
of Mitchell and Banks (1996) can be used as basis for establishing a
sensible and informed approach to negotiation. Coleman (2018) has
created detailed descriptions of meaningful skills outsider interveners
should encompass to contribute to ongoing peacebuilding endeavours.
In cases where the international community acts in a capacity-building
role, and trains gatekeepers to use effectively their existing transformative
relationships, the question of legitimacy is brought into the spotlight.
Outsider interveners need to consider when and how to identify gate-
keepers who are able and willing to receive capacity-building training.
This kind of engagement can only be guaranteed through a deep and
extensive understanding of the society one is engaging with. It also raises
the issue of trust among outsider-neutral and insider-partial mediators,
extended through them from their communities. Outsider-neutral medi-
ators often have to deliver their mandate within a short timeframe and
sometimes resort to engaging with elite actors with the technical capacity
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to act as gatekeepers but without legitimacy within their communities
(von Billerbeck 2015).
There are various factors shaping the engagement of mid-space actors
within a post-conflict society. How gatekeepers emerge in different forms
and settings, including their social contexts, social identity, and formal
and informal organisations that generate social order, will be discussed
in Chapters 5 and 6. These factors return, once again, to the ques-
tion of identifying and appropriately engaging with mid-space actors and
whether a hybrid understanding of conflict and conflicting societies can
help outsider-neutral mediators to approach gatekeepers. The following
section will explore the potential application of the descriptive lens of
mid-space actor typology in practice.
From Descriptive to Practical?
To bridge the gap between the descriptive lens and a practical approach
to analytical frameworks for peacebuilding, such as the mid-space actor
typology, it may be necessary to step back from an analytical perspective
that tries to locate gatekeepers and their contribution to peace negotia-
tions solely in terms of process. Instead, this chapter proposes an approach
that helps the outside intervener to locate and engage with gatekeepers
and contribute to their bridge-building in a meaningful manner. Such an
approach needs to consider how to properly engage with gatekeepers and
support their mediation role without jeopardising their local legitimacy.
Peacebuilding scholars and practitioners have long recognised the impor-
tance of understanding the various factors influencing a community in a
post-conflict environment in order to ensure appropriate local engage-
ment. The 2015 review of the UN peacebuilding architecture states the
following:
Numerous and varied stakeholders—public and private, domestic, regional
and international—share the responsibility for peacebuilding. The multi-
dimensional nature of sustaining peace is unavoidable and poses major
challenges to achieving coherence; conflict and peace impact on every
single person in a society. Reaching reconciliation and sustainable peace
requires broad and inclusive participation, involving state and civil society
stakeholders all the way down to the grass-roots level. (UNGA 2015)
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Building on this notion, Uesugi and Kagawa (2020: 48) claim that
“it is possible to prevent the rise of spoilers and to convert them to
constituents of the peace process, if we understand factors that influ-
ence the behaviour of a frustrated population”. Given the dynamic
nature of identities and societies, approaches to peacebuilding call
for a constant re-configuration, re-negotiation and re-accumulation of
knowledge regarding local communities. Peacebuilding further demands
listening to evolving local perspectives on peace and what it takes
to achieve it. Therefore, peace processes need to acknowledge the
complexity of conflicts that require complex responses to the “highly
dynamic, non-linear, and emergent” characteristics of societies (de
Coning 2016). An adaptive typology that provides guidance on how
to engage with gatekeepers while taking into account existing power
structures embodies the complex nature of peacebuilding. Specifically,
the capacity-building role of outside actors as mediators, as pointed out
earlier, can contribute to the local resilience that is needed to cope with
and adapt to change, including conflict.
There are several ways in which an outside intervener can influence
the perspectives of gatekeepers on the peace process. First, outside inter-
veners can train gatekeepers to acquire or enhance their skills to establish
transformative relationships. As Kagawa (2020: 76–77) showcases in her
analysis of the Bangsamoro peace process, ceasefire agreements served
as initial diagonal platforms for opposed parties to engage through a
formally established setting. This institutionalised form of engagement
served as the base for the rebel and governmental parties to start
negotiation and eventually sign a renewed peace agreement. It later
informed more dependable, direct connections among the negotiating
parties, proving to be a faster pathway for communication. As a result,
the initial ceasefire agreements served as a learning experience for the
opposing parties on how to approach, engage, and eventually establish
transformative relationships between them.
Secondly, outside interveners can coordinate the transfer of knowledge
among gatekeepers, connecting external and internal intermediation.
Access to information conveyed through specific social positioning inside
a community, as well as local legitimacy rooted in traditional sources,
may be difficult to reproduce. However, the act of transmitting infor-
mation and the type of information transmitted remains feasible. For
example, actors with extensive knowledge of indigenous normative frame-
works can, while conveying international norms to local people, merge the
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insider-partial perspective and outsider-neutral perspective (Honda 2018).
This merging of perspectives directs transformative relationships toward
opportunities for promoting mutual understanding.
Thirdly, outside interveners can assist in building the capacity of gate-
keepers. The role a mid-space actor plays during a peace process depends
on a combination of skills and resources acquired through formal training
or social experiences. For example, UNDP, in cooperation with the
Clingendael Institute (2019), organised capacity-building programmes
for mediation experts to train young leaders of insurgent groups in
Mindanao. The training enabled the participants to share and discuss their
needs and perspectives with each other in a meaningful way, empowering
them to actively support the peacebuilding process in southern Philippines
while enabling their agency to engage with their respective communities
(Lidasan 2016). These types of capacity-building programmes pave the
way for accessing the local knowledge of inside actors while enhancing
their mediation skills and situating the importance of those skills within
the broader context of conflict resolution. With roles built upon their
capacities, gatekeepers also form the basis for them to bridge gaps, build
dialogue platforms, and sustain dialogue.
Finally, another approach to consider might be engaging with the
power-relations present in a conflict-affected society that are shaping the
mid-space. One can look at which dynamics within a conflicting society
block free engagement between the grassroots bottom/local, mid-space,
and top/national levels. It then can be questioned how gatekeepers might
overcome these blockages with the assistance of outside intervention.
Outsiders can provide the environment needed to connect, and they
can train and strengthen gatekeepers’ capacities necessary to promote
dialogue among conflicting parties, bridging vertical, horizontal, and
diagonal gaps. This might happen through granting access to informa-
tion that creates an understanding of the conflict established not only
within local settings, which are usually inaccessible to the international
actors, but also from an outside, meso, or macro perspective. A further
possibility is negotiation and leadership training that draws on already
existing structures of legitimacy, in contrast to attempting to build a
new and unfamiliar social hierarchy. This could entail, as seen in previous
consensus-building approaches in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire by the Japan
International Cooperation Agency, the establishment of local committee
meetings in which local representatives chosen by their community
members participated to discuss their collective needs (JICA 2016).
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This means gatekeepers are supported constantly in their role of devel-
oping relationships of trust with opposed parties—bridge-building or
spoiling when necessary—and working towards sustained ties. At this
point, some of the recommendations presented in this section remain on
a theoretical level but will be discussed in the following empirical chapters
and recapitulated in the concluding chapter.
Conclusion
Hybridity can be understood in different ways, being constantly shaped
and re-shaped by the engagement of a myriad of actors and institutions
(Mac Ginty and Sanghera 2012: 3–8). Hybrid peacebuilding seeks to
understand peace and conflict as hybrid outcomes of a mixture of local
and international norms situated within power structures and struggles.
In hybrid peacebuilding, local communities can preserve their cultural
values, norms, and practices while blending—not replacing—international
(or universal) norms such as democratisation and the rule of law. It also
encompasses a mixture of top-down and bottom-up approaches within
the mid-space where both spheres meet and engage through a dynamic
process of interactions involving all relevant actors.
How do we deal with this constantly shape-shifting concept in a way
that allows us to operationalise the insights it generates? To contribute
to answering this question, this chapter has unpacked the concept of the
mid-space and applied a more fine-grained analysis of the peacebuilding
agency of mid-space actors or gatekeepers who influence knowledge
formation and norm expectation within their local communities. Through
their social position, which grants them locally grounded legitimacy,
access to information outside of their specific local context, and thus the
ability to create transformative relationships, gatekeepers could emerge
as agents of hybridity and—most importantly—hybrid peacebuilding. A
typology that is attuned to the characteristics and skills of mid-space
actors paves the way for a practical approach toward hybrid peacebuilding.
As this chapter has demonstrated, this approach could include means of
engaging and training gatekeepers from an outside perspective, empow-
ering their peacebuilding endeavours, and enabling access to information
that could shape their perception of a conflict. Through this approach,
local leaders could emerge as active users of hybridity as a tool for
accessing and sharing information and creating new understandings of
local and international norms in an emancipatory way.
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To create a deep understanding of the various ways mid-space actors
can get involved in peace processes and, subsequently, enhance the peace-
promoting outcomes of their involvement, there has to be a more precise,
yet comprehensive and adaptive, typology. This typology has the poten-
tial to encompass all relevant assets of gatekeepers without compromising
their entrenchment in a highly complex environment. Hence, this chapter
reconceptualises the typology of mid-space actors on the basis of the
following considerations. First, mid-space actors are enabled through their
unique social position to gatekeep their community from intruders. There
are two aspects that shape this social position: access to different resources
of power, both formal and informal, and a deep cultural and norma-
tive understanding of their community and regional context. Secondly,
through this combination they encompass certain characteristics that are
inherently tied to these actors and are thus difficult or impossible to
reproduce for outside actors. These characteristics include their ability
to forge transformative relationships, obtain locally grounded legitimacy,
and gain access to information and resources. Thirdly, depending on their
perception of a conflict, mid-space gatekeepers might evolve into either
bridge-builders or spoilers. Bridge-builders are actors who actively engage
in connecting themselves and their community to other actors on the
top/national, bottom/local, and international levels. Spoilers are seen
as doing the opposite by blocking passages and connections to others.
However, spoiling does not inherently mean that actors are intentionally
choosing to sabotage the peace process. As pointed out earlier, their act of
‘spoiling’ could be based on their assumption of what is valuable to them
or their community at a given time or their view that the conditions of
interaction need to be adjusted. Rather than perceiving spoiling as based
on inherently ill intentions, it can be seen as point of intervention and
re-configuring what is on the negotiation table (Newman and Richmond
2006: 109). This alternative view of spoilers demonstrates the need to
revise the way peacebuilding actors are labelled and categorised.
A typology of mid-space actors according to their characteristics,
resources, and forms of engagement with outsider interveners fills the
gap between hybrid theory and peacebuilding practice. This typology not
only describes mid-space actors, and their characteristics and skills, but
also aims to keep the ever-evolving environment of social actors in mind
and urges both scholars and practitioners to consider the complexity of
conflict-affected societies. Based on this premise, taking the analytical lens
of hybrid peacebuilding as a baseline for understanding insider-partial
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mediators as mid-space actors is proposed to provide an entry point for
merging theoretical and practical approaches to hybrid peacebuilding.
References
Appleby, R. S. (2001). Religion as an Agent of Conflict Transformation and
Peacebuilding. In C. Crocker, F. O. Hampson, & P. Aall (Eds.), Turbu-
lent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict (pp. 821–840).
Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.
Clements, K. P., & Uesugi, Y. (2020). Conclusion. In Y. Uesugi (Ed.), Hybrid
Peacebuilding in Asia (pp. 139–152). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Clingendael Institute. (2019). Insider Mediators Appointed in Bangsamoro Tran-
sitional Assembly. https://www.clingendael.org/news/insider-mediators-app
ointed-bangsamoro-transitional-assembly#.
Coleman, P. T. (2018). Conflict Intelligence and Systemic Wisdom: Meta-
Competencies for Engaging Conflict in a Complex, Dynamic World. Nego-
tiation Journal , 34, 7–35.
de Coning, C. (2016). From Peacebuilding to Sustaining Peace: Implications of
Complexity for Resilience and Sustainability. Resilience, 4(3), 166–181.
Honda, M. (2018). Chapter 3 Coordination Challenges for the UN-initiated
Peacebuilding Architecture: Problems in Locating ‘Universal’ Norms and
Values on the Local. In M. Yamada & M. Honda (Eds.), Complex Emergencies
and Humanitarian Response (pp. 45–62). Osaka: Union Press.
Jackson, P., & Albrecht, P. (2018). Power Politics and Hybridity. In J. Wallis, L.
Kent, M. Forsyth, S. Dinnen, & S. Bose (Eds.), Hybridity on the Ground in
Peacebuilding and Development: Critical Conversations (pp. 37–49). Australia:
Australian National University Press.
Japan International Cooperation Agency. (2016). The Project on the Reinforce-
ment of Communities for Promoting Social Cohesion in Greater Abidjan
(COSAY): Project Completion Report. Tokyo: Japan International Coopera-
tion Agency (JICA).
Jolliffe, K. (2015). Ethnic Armed Conflict and Territorial Administration in
Myanmar. The Asia Foundation. https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/
ConflictTerritorialAdministrationfullreportENG.pdf.
Kagawa, M. (2020). The Role of Rebel Gatekeepers in the Mid-Space in
Peacebuilding: A Case Study of Bangsamoro. In Y. Uesugi (Ed.), Hybrid
Peacebuilding in Asia (pp. 61–87). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Lederach, J. P. (1997). Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided
Societies. Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press.
Lee, S. Y. (2020). Roles of Religious Leaders as Bridge-Builders: A Case Study in
Cambodia. In Y. Uesugi (Ed.), Hybrid Peacebuilding in Asia (pp. 88–114).
New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
4 BRIDGING GAPS: FROM A DESCRIPTIVE … 79
Lemay-Hébert, N., & Kappler, S. (2016). What Attachment to Peace? Exploring
the Normative and Material Dimensions of Local Ownership in Peacebuilding.
Review of International Studies , 42(5), 895–914.
Lidasan, M. S. (2016). Negotiation and Mediation: Skills Needed for the
Bangsamoro Peace Process. Sunstar.com. https://www.sunstar.com.ph/art
icle/99439/Lifestyle/Lidasan-Negotiation-and-Mediation-Skills-needed-for-
the-Bangsamoro-peace-process.
Mac Ginty, R. (2008). Indigenous Peace-Making Versus the Liberal Peace.
Cooperation and Conflict , 43(2), 139–163.
Mac Ginty, R. (2010). Hybrid Peace: The Interaction Between Top-Down and
Bottom-Up Peace. Security Dialogue, 41(4), 391–412.
Mac, G. R., & Richmond, O. P. (2013). The Local Turn in Peace Building: a
Critical Agenda for Peace. Third World Quarterly, 34(5), 763–783.
Mac, G. R., & Sanghera, G. (2012). Hybridity Peacebuilding and Development:
An Introduction. Journal of Peacebuilding & Development , 7 (2), 3–8.
Millar, G. (2014). Disaggregating Hybridity: Why Hybrid Institutions Do Not
Produce Predictable Experiences of Peace. Journal of Peace Research, 51(4),
501–514.
Mitchell, C. (2018). By What Right? Competing Sources of Legitimacy in
Intractable Conflicts. In L. E. Hancock & C. Mitchell (Eds.), Local Peace-
building and Legitimacy: Interactions Between National and Local Levels
(pp. 1–19). Oxon: Routledge.
Mitchell, C., & Banks, M. (1996). Handbook of Conflict Resolution: The
Analytical Problem-Solving Approach. New York: Pinter.
Newman, E., & Richmond, O. P. (2006). Peace Building and Spoilers. Conflict,
Security & Development , 6(1), 101–110.
Svensson, I., & Lindgren, M. (2013). Peace from the Inside: Exploring the Role
of the Insider-Partial Mediator. International Interactions , 39(5), 698–722.
Uesugi, Y. (2018). Chapter 4 Platforms for Dialogue and Hybrid Facilitators in
the Bangsamoro Peace Process. In M. Yamada & M. Honda (Eds.), Complex
Emergencies and Humanitarian Response (pp. 65–86). Osaka: Union Press.
Uesugi, Y. (2020). Introduction. In Y. Uesugi (Ed.), Hybrid Peacebuilding in
Asia (pp. 1–14). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Uesugi, Y., & Kagawa, M. (2020). A Typology of Mid-Space Local Bridge-
Builders. In Y. Uesugi (Ed.), Hybrid Peacebuilding in Asia (pp. 37–60). New
York: Palgrave Macmillan.
United Nations, General Assembly. (2015). Letter dated 29 June 2015 from the
Chair of the Secretary-General’s Advisory Group of Experts on the 2015 Review
of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture Addressed to the Presidents of
the Security Council and of the General Assembly. New York: United Nations
General Assembly.
80 A. DEEKELING AND D. SIMANGAN
von Billerbeck, S. B. K. (2015). Local Ownership and UN Peacebuilding:
Discourse Versus Operationalization. Global Governance: A Review of Multi-
lateralism and International Organizations , 21(2), 299–331.
Wehr, P., & Lederach, J. P. (1991). Mediating Conflict in Central America.
Journal of Peace Research, 28(1), 85–98.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction
in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the
chapter’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line
to the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons
license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds
the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright
holder.
CHAPTER 5
The Power of Identity in Hybrid
Peacebuilding: Buddhist Monks
in Post-Conflict Cambodia
Sophie Shiori Umeyama and Will Brehm
Introduction
Peacebuilding is a complex endeavour and relies on a multitude of actors
and organisations coming together in an effort to build a sustainable
peace that makes sense not only in international, regional, and local
frameworks but also on the individual level. The actor- and relation-based
approach to peacebuilding, with which this book deals, necessitates an
analysis of ideas beyond conventional politics, namely that of identity
politics (Öjendal et al. 2018). Assuming actors play a fundamental role
in creating hybrid peacebuilding processes (Lutmar and Ockey 2018), it
is important to further assess both the role of individual actors and their
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identity biases. Local actors are often granted natural authority within
their environment (Gippert 2017). A monk, for instance, is well respected
by members of his community. Whilst that may seem like a source of
natural potency as a mid-space actor able to build bridges both vertically
and horizontally, as detailed in Chapter 4, it is pivotal to acknowledge
that this simultaneously predisposes the actor to belong to and represent
an exclusive identity group (Peleg 2019).
The potential exclusivity of an actor’s identity group highlights poten-
tial pitfalls from his or her background. If his or her identities adhere to
hard lines, leaving little room for rapprochement to other identity groups,
then internal belongingness transforms into an obstacle in hybrid peace-
building. If the given ‘other’ or excluded group was part of the conflict
that constitutes the subject of peacebuilding, such constructs may severely
hinder mid-space actor’s ability of fulfilling their role.
Buddhist monks in the Cambodian peacebuilding efforts in recent
decades are cases in point (Kobayashi 2005). When monks in Cambodia
mobilised society to overcome decades of domestic conflict (roughly 1970
to 1998), some scholars attributed their efforts to nationalist impulses
(Lee 2018). Notwithstanding such instincts, the peacebuilding activi-
ties of monks must be understood in terms of identity: they helped
construct—and legitimised (Lee 2020a)—new narratives of belonging-
ness, which subsequently mobilised support for peacebuilding efforts
(see also Ledgerwood 2012). These new narratives included notions
commonly found in liberal peacebuilding, such as human rights and social
justice. Monks were able to intertwine indigenous practices of religion
with international discourses, a phenomenon explored by some scholars
in hybrid peacebuilding theory (e.g., Mac Ginty 2010). In effect, monks
became mid-space actors navigating local, national, and international
spaces, becoming important actors in post-conflict Cambodia. How they
connected across these different spaces was partly dependent on the iden-
tity frames they held and constructed. It is this topic that is explored in
more depth in this chapter.
Much of the peacebuilding success of monks depends on their cultural
and social legitimacy. In the language of hybrid peacebuilding, legiti-
macy depends not only on the faith of religious followers, but also the
constant interaction between monks as peace activists and civil society
groups within and outside Cambodia (Zanker 2017). This interaction
resulted in an amalgamation of international norms and standards coupled
with traditional concepts and practices (Richmond 2012). As mid-spaced
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actors, however, monks also confront the country’s repressive authori-
tarian regime (Kent and Chandler 2008), which at times constrain their
capacities as bridge-builders. In this regard, one of the broader issues of
hybrid peacebuilding has to do with the inability of monks to bridge gaps
between grassroots actors and political and religious elites. Such failures
to unify desperate groups of people highlight the myriad interests at stake
in any peacebuilding process. In extreme cases, such a failure runs the risk
of exacerbating localised conflict and turning religious actors into spoilers,
as outlined in Chapter 4.
This chapter engages with identity politics as well as identity networks
before placing such concepts into the hybrid peacebuilding context. The
case study of Cambodian Buddhist monks is then examined by assessing
successes and failures, leading to a discussion on mid-space actors as so-
called ‘spoilers’ of peace processes before finally offering a conclusion.
Identity Politics
Identity constitutes a fundamental factor in creating group mentalities.
Often identities are distinguished among “nations, races, ethnic groups,
religious traditions, and ideologies” (Berreby 2008: 3). Those outside of
one’s group are ‘othered,’ which occurs both consciously and subcon-
sciously. This process increases one’s own belonging to a group and
consolidates a margin of difference with one or more other groups. Iden-
tities help construct what could be considered ‘In and Out’ groups, and
feelings of ‘Us and Them.’
This type of cognitive inclusion and exclusion is critical in under-
standing the role identity plays in peacebuilding. Identity can create walls
that actors must break down, overcome, or amend in efforts to achieve
a positive peace with a former—or still current—so-called ‘Out’ group.
Deep-rooted identity conflicts, such as during the Rwandan genocide
(Caldwell 2014), conflict in Kashmir (Chowdhary 2015), or struggle for
women’s suffrage in various countries, can widen the gap between groups,
sometimes resulting in horrific violence.
Power relations are intimately intertwined with identity. Korostelina
(2013) for instance put forth that there exists a two-fold opposite rela-
tionship between social identity and power, both of which create a
complex tangled process: national identity defines and is defined by
power systems, leading to first, the embedment of power within iden-
tity concepts and second, the potential of defining power through the
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lens of national identity. This insight is important as it highlights that
power and power relations possess a place within national identity, thus
affecting, shaping, and giving meaning to identity, which in turn may
legitimise given power constructs and imbalances. An analysis of identity
within the hybrid peacebuilding process thus goes beyond sole identity
considerations and towards the concept of power relations.
In post conflict settings, identity conflicts can resurface during peace-
building, potentially hindering or spoiling progress. Successful bridge-
building between groups requires a careful understanding of identity and
the power relations among social groups. Where identity can become an
obstacle, it can also become a tool. Separate identities must not always
clash; they can co-exist, they can intertwine, and they can encourage
rapprochement with other groups (Jackson 1999). This is why nationality
or ethnic background are often closely correlated to religious affiliation,
gender identification, and political identity (Kulich et al. 2018).
Identity is not mutually exclusive; indeed, it is highly intersectional.
The intersectionality of identity, further discussed in Chapter 3, allows
different identities to co-exist and even mutually construct each other
within the same space and even within the same actor (Collins 1998).
This implies that identities overlap and layer; they do not necessarily cause
identity clashes. This insight offers potential for fruitful co-operations
amongst identities groups on a larger scale (McKeown 2013). Iden-
tity intersectionality holds the promise for an enhanced peacebuilding
for actors from these separate yet mutually accepting groups, as these
different groups may indeed, like identities, co-exist peacefully. Thus,
identity can spoil bridge-building and meaningfully support it. How this
works within the context of hybrid peacebuilding will be demonstrated
below, followed by practical examples of prior cases where identity acted
as both an obstacle and tool.
Identity in Hybrid Peacebuilding
In hybrid peacebuilding, the relationships between different actors and
institutions are of utmost importance in pursuing the goal of lasting peace
(Dibley 2014). Mid-space actors must establish transformative relation-
ships in order to commence bridge-building activities (Kagawa 2020),
which means that ties across actors and institutions must be meaning-
fully strengthened to secure the onset and continuation of peacebuilding
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efforts. Inherent to this are the different groups of actors and stake-
holders, which congregate in numerous sub-groups, each with their own
and overlapping identity and power relations.
Hybridity lies in this diversity. Hybridity encompasses varied groups
of interest and background partaking in the peacebuilding process and
working on a positive peace suitable for all participants and beyond
(Bargués-Pedreny 2018). The hybridity of relationships explained in
Chapter 3 assumes that varied groups exist and approach the tasks from
multiple points of interest. Identities are also relationally constituted and
thus are defined in relation to others (Kyriakidou and Èzbilgin 2006).
This is supported by the theory of ‘negative identification,’ which outlines
that identities are constructed against the backdrop of other identities,
thus creating a process of othering but also allowing fluidity of the
created and maintained identities (Oswald Spring et al. 2010). Given
that identities are not fixed, the way in which different actors affect each
other is difficult to predict within the identity networks. The function
and behaviour of each actor thus depends directly on the environment
in which it is required. The intersectionality of identities increases an
actor’s fluidity in the peace process as more channels for interaction with
diverging identity groups are available. This means that actors endowed
with the task of building bridges within their community (and beyond)
may fail to do so comprehensively because intersectional groups and sub-
groups may not feel well represented by them. It is to this failure—what
can be thought of as a ‘spoiler’ of peace—that we now turn in the next
section.
Identity as Spoiler
Although mid-space actors hold the potential for bridging divides in
hybrid peacebuilding, they also hold the potential to be spoilers. One
reason this can happen is because of identity. For instance, a mid-space
actor may represent identity groups despised or anathema to the nascent
norms being constructed within a post-conflict society. In this instance,
the mid-space actor might spoil the peace process. In general, actor-
based approaches to peacebuilding have the potential to spoil the process.
Such approaches intrinsically encourage the categorisation and compart-
mentalisation of local actors by recognising diverging and potentially
clashing identities, which brings the risk of instantiating false binaries and
86 S. S. UMEYAMA AND W. BREHM
enforcing a rigidity of the peace process that does not allow the accom-
modation of identity’s natural fluidity, thereby risking the fluidity of the
peacebuilding process itself.
Whilst it is necessary to analyse how identities operate within the
framework of hybrid peacebuilding it is also pivotal to consider how
peacebuilding can unintentionally entrench divisions between identities,
which may obstruct progress. The binaries common to identity politics
can be reinforced when different identity groups are asked to join the
peacebuilding process, legitimising hard line identities (Uesugi 2020a).
By establishing the necessity to involve diverging, separate identities,
hybrid peacebuilding may indeed incentivise actors to solidify their iden-
tity along hard lines. The opportunity for inclusion in the peacebuilding
process may thus directly intertwine with the fortification of actors’
identities (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013). It is therefore crucial to
acknowledge these complex ways in which identities can both be informed
by and inform the hybrid peacebuilding process. The case of Cambodia
presented below demonstrates the fluidity and intersectionality of identity
in efforts to build peace. The role of Buddhist monks demonstrates ways
in which mid-space actors can be both bridge-builders and spoilers.
Monks as Bridge-Builders
Cambodia suffered decades of civil unrest (see Etcheson 2005). For our
purposes here, the unrest began around 1970, when the royalist-backed
government was ousted by a military regime friendly with Western powers
fighting the communist government in neighbouring North Vietnam.
Five years later, a communist regime came to power in Cambodia. Known
as the Khmer Rouge (KR), this regime aimed to create an agrarian
utopia and destroy modern society. Buddhism was banned and countless
monks were either defrocked or killed. In 1979, after the KR was over-
thrown by a group of military defectors (with the support of Vietnam),
a monastic community slowly returned to the country (Harris 2005).
However, the civil in-fighting between different groups vying for power
did not. Conflict among groups continued until 1998 when a single prime
minister was finally elected. Although unrest can still be found today,
many international organisations and countries perceive Cambodia to be
stable. How this stability occurred is due to many factors. One such factor
was the role monks played in building peace across antagonistic groups
with divergent interests.
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In Buddhist-majority Cambodia, monks possess an authority stem-
ming from their ability to instantiate and mobilise a particular identity
group as well as claiming representation of a higher religious authority.
The social position of these monks as religious leaders thus constituted
a rich potential source for influencing behaviour (Appleby 2008). The
involvement of Buddhist monastic community (known as the sangha) in
social issues has a long history dating back to colonial times in which they
pursued goals against the French protectorate (Becker 1998), and in line
with anti-imperialism against Thailand and Vietnam (Lee 2020a). Whilst
their engagement in the Cambodian peacebuilding process following
civil conflict does not mark the beginning of Buddhist involvement in
social action, it does evidence a remarkable conscious resurgence neces-
sitated by the severe suppression of the Buddhist tradition during the
KR (1975–1979) and the People’s Republic of Kampuchea rule (1979–
1991) (Öjendal and Lilja 2009). While the numbers of monks decreased
drastically and their engagement ceased essentially in full, the significant
influence connected to their professional and cultural importance endured
(Yos Hut 1998).
For survivors of the KR regime, the “very sight of saffron-robed
monks, white-dressed elders, and Cambodians gathered around an altar
comfort[ed] them” (Mortland 2017: 172). The monks’ religious legit-
imacy, extensive cultural knowledge, and strong social network were
meaningfully employed by those who partook in the reconciliation
and peacebuilding process in Cambodia (Lee 2020a). With Cambo-
dians accustomed to the leadership of monks, some sangha members
began participating in bridge-building once again, especially between
minority groups and the wider Cambodian public (Kawanami and Samuel
2013). Maha Ghosananda’s well-known peace march named dham-
mayietra (walking for teaching/truth) mobilised popular support not
only domestically but also internationally. Importantly this ushered in
the bridge-building process by monks in Cambodia on a larger scale.
Ghosananda also established temples, organised readings and religious
conferences, and attended United Nations delegations (Mahatthanadull
2013). Other marches such as the sithiyietra (march for peace) soon
surfaced, with support from the Independent Monk Network for Social
Justice (IMNSJ) and advanced the role of marches as public awareness
campaigns (Lee 2018). The IMNSJ and organisations such as Buddhism
for Peace evidence further initiatives by monks in creating positive peace
in the country (Lee 2020a).
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Alongside public events such as marches, Buddhist monks soon
resumed charity programmes in support of their communities (Brehm
2021). Faith-based groups such as the Dhamma Dana Association
distributed scholarships and study materials; others offered work oppor-
tunities, or sermons (Lee 2018). Some organisations provided aid for
individuals with HIV/AIDS, drug users, and economically challenged
women; aid that transcends identity groups revolving around ethno-
religious lines (ibid.).
Significant horizontal bridging has been achieved as a result of monks’
efforts, which were eased by the strong networks that monasteries enjoy
within their social setting and communities (ibid.). Their continuous
accompaniment through people’s lives and traditions placed them in ideal
situations to shape communities’ outlook on the peacebuilding process
(ibid.). Socially active monks used the concepts of ‘Engaged Buddhism’
to build and solidify bridges within their reach.
People reacting positively to the monks’ efforts originated from group
dynamics of identity. Concepts of respect, karma, and social responsibility
encouraged Cambodians to allow monks’ actions to take effect. Having
said this, negative preconceptions and a severely fractured Buddhist tradi-
tion transformed this into a difficult task for Cambodia’s surviving monks,
of which there were few after the collapse of the KR regime.
Political and economic identities further aided monks in their task of
bridge-building between “direct or indirect manifestations of a vertical
gap in the society” (ibid.: 98). The negative perception of Cambodia’s
elite and their mistreatment of civil society unintentionally united mid-
and lower-levels of society under an umbrella constructed on political-
economic identity. The grouping-in of other identity categories such as
religion and ethnicity not only highlights the intersectionality of iden-
tity but also demonstrates that monks were able to tap into many
identity groups through the process of underlining a common identity,
transforming so-called ‘Out-groups’ into a single ‘In-group.’
When assessing Cambodian monks’ involvement in the peacebuilding
process it becomes evident that important successes have been achieved.
In a post-conflict society faced with fractured identity notions, monks
began bridging the gaps that separated people within their communities.
Traces of identity structures and a deep-rooted respect towards monks
enabled them to build bridges to those who agreed with these ideas.
Their progress remains important in their communities as well as on the
wider grassroots level when challenging the upper socio-political echelons.
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Nevertheless, the same identity frames that enabled such success simulta-
neously obstructed the monks’ progress in other ways—a paradox that
will be discussed below.
Shortcomings of Bridge-Builders
Whilst the work of monks was often positive, it remained extremely
restrained in its reach. Only a small number of monks today survived the
genocide, limiting their involvement in the post-conflict peacebuilding
process. Endowed with importance in Cambodia’s society, monks enjoyed
significant success in places they could reach. Their engagement in the
peacebuilding process and social action was not, however, universally
approved. Some mainstream Buddhist orders, which nurture close rela-
tionships with political authorities, claimed that peacebuilding monks
overstepped their purposes of non-violent and calm lives (Coward and
Smith 2004). The monks’ efforts at peacebuilding, in other words, were
not normal sangha practice. This created a new chasm within the religious
community, evidencing that their involvement did not only unite but also
distance individuals and groups.
More importantly, however, the Buddhist monks’ horizontal bridging
simultaneously widened vertical gaps. Much of Cambodia’s lay society
negatively perceived the government. In this way, a political-economic
identity took precedence over other identity groups, such as religion,
ethnicity, or gender, creating a large coalition of diverse identities.
Whilst this evidences the monks’ ability to bridge horizontal gaps by
transcending strict identity lines, it also demonstrates that vertical bridge-
building between the government and civil society failed to a significant
extent, consolidating or even widening such gaps. This is closely related
to the nature of the conflict: distrust, anger, and distance to the govern-
ment made sense in an environment that suffered from top-down violence
exemplified by the KR and subsequent regimes. The activism responding
to prior conflict can therefore be divisive in nature, especially considering
the political backdrop in which it operates (ibid.).
The immense trauma and consequent negative identification of the
official, top-level ‘Out-group’ made it extremely difficult, if not impos-
sible, for monks to fulfil their role in bridging not only horizontal but also
vertical gaps. These vertical gaps, it should be noted, were not as extreme
as in other neighbouring contexts. Monks in Myanmar, for instance,
were given tacit consent of the government to use violence towards
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certain ethnic groups, notably the Rohingyas (Selengut 2017). This led to
the emergence of Buddhist religious extremism against minority groups,
something similarly found in Sri Lanka. The widening of vertical gaps
carried through by Cambodian monks can thus be considered relatively
minor compared to other contexts.
Whilst government action lent itself to maintenance of the vertical gap,
monks were also aware that they needed to actively challenge the govern-
ment to achieve their aims (Lee 2018). These challenges were carried
through by peaceful means which, coupled with the government’s readi-
ness to use force against monks (Keyes 2007), severely destabilised the
government’s accusation that monks were the source of disorder, thereby
serving a blow to government legitimacy and obstructing the rebuilding
of trust on behalf of citizens who perceived such violence as the worst
action by political elite since the KR regime (Sreang 2008). Overall,
Buddhist leaders’ social engagement provoked harsh government crack-
downs that not only delegitimised the top-level leadership but also clearly
highlighted the vertical gaps that remained intact or un-addressed (Lee
2020b).
This lack of transformative relationships with the government
prevented monks from becoming efficient vertical bridge-builders,
pointing at the difficulty of overcoming frames of othering that were
imposed on and by them during and post conflict. Although it is of
fundamental value in hybrid peacebuilding to involve different groups’
participation in the peace process, it is also necessary to acknowledge
the potential over-burdening of one particular group. Consequently, a
strong intertwined network of actors and institutions must be built in
order to avoid the possibility of failure when important groups (Uesugi
2020b), such as the monks in this case, fall short of their duties to trans-
form relationships and build large political coalitions united by a common
identity.
In addition to political economic identities preventing sound trans-
formative relationships between the government and monks, the ability
to bridge gaps between other communities also evidenced serious short-
comings. As religious figures, monks naturally represent the Buddhist
tradition. Yet, they also increasingly aligned themselves with strong
nationalistic views. The exclusive nationalism supported by Buddhist
leaders has the by-product of indirectly encouraging aggression toward
non-Khmer individuals in Cambodia (Lee 2020a). Through their adher-
ence to nationalism, monks automatically alienated various groups of
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Cambodia’s society, highlighting their likely inability to connect to these
groups in a peaceful and meaningful way.
Buddhist monks in Cambodia face difficult identity groupings in their
environment, critically impairing them as mid-space actors (Kent and
Chandler 2008). The identities formed in the context of their envi-
ronment constructed certain attitudes and prejudices that affected their
behaviour, thereby preventing them from successfully bridge-building.
Other challenges in organisational and policy-making fields further called
for a widened network and cooperation with the monks in order to
prevent failure (Appleby 2008). When assuming that mid-space actors’
importance and unique qualities useful to the peacebuilding process arise
out of their wide-spectrum network with society and their transformative
bottom-up approach, one must also consider that these characteristics
may be compromised from the beginning as their position means their
inclusion in, or at least experience of, the conflict (Svensson and Lind-
gren 2013). Given the deep root of these inherent challenges, such issues
must be addressed explicitly before and during the peace process. The
circumvention of such challenges requires deconstructing these charac-
teristics, predisposing the actors to some forms of exclusionary behaviour
in order to usher in a fundamental understanding of one’s own biases.
Without such processes, as displayed in the case for these mid-space
actors in Cambodia, memories and trauma from an identity-centred
conflict complicate the prospects of peacebuilding whilst therefore also
obstructing Buddhist monks’ tasks (Charbonneau and Parent 2013).
Monks as Spoilers
Analysing how identity can both be useful and obstructive in bridging
gaps raises the question whether the participation of mid-space actors
placed in the settings of identity frameworks is a positive or negative qual-
ifier. In conflicts that evidenced discord along clear identity lines, does
belonging to one of the conflicting ‘In-groups’ benefit the peacebuilding
process or hinder it? Participants in the process recognise the unique posi-
tion that mid-space actors can fill, considering their natural inclusion in
society; however, they also tend to ignore how identity can predispose
these actors to pursue a certain kind of bridge-building and consequently
type of peacebuilding. Such considerations are pondered when the mid-
space group in question demonstrates hyper-evident ideologies which can
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become problematic, as is done with rebel groups (Swain and Öjendal
2018). When the group is overtly peaceful, non-problematic, and in
pursuit of a peacebuilding process favoured by other actors, no evident
potential for spoiling the process is addressed explicitly. The identity
frames that can turn bridge-builders into spoilers, however, are covert,
complicated, and often difficult to trace clearly. It is thus important to
acknowledge these mid-space actors’ resistant positions within existing
identity groupings in order to recognise the potential prejudices that they
can add to the peacebuilding process.
That is not to say that certain mid-space actors such as monks should
be excluded or restrained in the peacebuilding process. Rather, this serves
to demonstrate two points: first, mid-space actors such as monks are
positively supported by existing identity concepts which endow them
with authority and agency, thereby allowing them to reach their commu-
nities on profound and meaningful levels through ‘locally grounded
legitimacy’ (Uesugi 2020b); second, however, if these identity structures
encompass othering of groups that should be included in and benefi-
ciaries of the peacebuilding process, their role as bridge-builders may
be obstructed, turning them into spoilers. Indeed, the violent Buddhist
movement in Myanmar is case in point. Through their placement within
the conflict, mid-space actors have the ability to identify clearly the
existing conflicts which are pressing issues amongst identity groups;
employing their authority to address these conflicts, however, can lead
to at least two opposite outcomes: building bridges, or burning them.
Due to the intrinsically deeply held character of identity, it is difficult to
avoid such spoiling: according to one’s own ideas and views, actions that
alienate Others—such as the Cambodian government’s stance towards
monk’s peacebuilding activism—likely makes sense.
Rather than abandoning such activities, however, it should be preceded
or coupled with a critical understanding of one’s standpoint. Despite
potential efforts in enhancing mutual understanding, tolerance and coex-
istence, it remains considerably difficult to break free from concepts
deeply rooted in one’s identity as a kind of circular reasoning occurs. Yet,
without recognising the roots of these oppositions, truly lasting peace
that addresses misconceptions and underlying discord between identity
groups in the post-conflict society can hardly be made (Richmond 2002).
Whilst a positive peace may arise out of the peacebuilding process, divi-
sion will still likely grow alongside the peace. At this stage, one must
consider external actors’ and scholars’ projection of their ideas to a
5 THE POWER OF IDENTITY IN HYBRID … 93
foreign, unsuitable setting. Divisions, or in more positive terms diver-
sity, are not necessarily bad. Indeed, they should be preserved where
suitable. Addressing identity in the peacebuilding process is not to erase
these distinctions but to use them efficiently in the pursuit of hybrid
peacebuilding in practice.
Conclusion
This chapter argues for the need to include identity frames within the
study of hybrid peacebuilding from an analytical and practical stand-
point. It has suggested that identities play a crucial role in bridging the
gap between horizontal spaces for local peacebuilding initiatives and the
vertical involvement in government-led peace agendas as identity forma-
tions of Buddhist monks have reflected in their agency as actors in the
context of their ability to position themselves as bridge-builders in post-
conflict Cambodia. As mentioned, this is concomitant to the relevance
of identity frames as an important factor in the articulation of othering
that also defines the politics of exclusion and inclusion within conflict and
post-conflict societies.
Identities become a double-edged sword as a tool and obstacle in
the success and failure of peacebuilding agendas. Although monks in
Cambodia have been able to perform a wide-range of activities and tactics
to horizontally intervene and contribute to peacebuilding processes, the
vertical spaces for formal peace processes have not been readily open for
them, which also leaves the question of whether it is possible for one
group to bridge gaps at the horizontal and vertical levels. Nevertheless,
the centrality of identity frames is still an important aspect of hybrid
peacebuilding as it illuminates important aspects that must be considered
in hybrid peacebuilding.
The interaction and cooperation of monks with local and international
civil society groups begs the question of their role in mobilising popular
support for peace processes. After all, religion is only one part of the polit-
ical equation as such sectors as women’s groups, trade unions, youth and
student organisations, and business groups have to be behind the peace
process as well (Laurent Baregu and Landsberg 2003). In fact, this raises
some concerns regarding the relationship of the monks with such organ-
isations and the degree of cooperation they can foster in order to bridge
the gaps between the horizontal and vertical spaces for peacebuilding.
In this regard, this issue turns to the possibility that the ability of the
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monks to bridge the gaps between horizontal and vertical spaces is largely
dependent on the manner they are able to take advantage of or create
linkages with sectoral groups, which can help them achieve their goals in
the peacebuilding process. Of course, this is an issue of the capacity of
the monks to cooperate with other Out-groups. In this case, the success
of Buddhist monks to fulfil their role as mid-space actors can be deter-
mined by their ability to converge these multiple interests and points of
contention with the goal of intervening in the peace process.
The chapter’s conceptualisation within the context of hybrid peace-
building has acknowledged that identities could not and should not
remain in neat categories given the ability of a single religious group
to transgress across different spaces. The following chapter examines the
Bangsamoro civil society’s hybridisation that has emanated from the inter-
action and combination of local and international resources, which have
provided an opportunity for non-state actors to support and intervene
in the formal peace process. For future research, it would be valuable
to compare and contrast the role of ethno-religious and other identity
groups that operate in different contexts. In Asia, the violent conflict in
Myanmar, for example, operates more closely along ethnic and religious
divisions, which runs in contrast to the case used in this chapter. Although
Cambodia is a relatively heterogeneous state, the political factions within
the government run along ideological lines and are typically not based on
racial or ethnic groups, which take into account as to why the mid-space
role of the Buddhist monks has been largely undermined.
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CHAPTER 6
Frictional Binaries: Hybridity, Civil Society,
and Liberal-Local Peacebuilding inMindanao
Ferth Vandensteen Manaysay and Jovanie Camacho Espesor
Introduction
International and local civil society organisations (CSOs) have typi-
cally been included within the conceptual and theoretical discussions
of liberal and post-liberal peace approaches. On the one hand, liberal
peace approaches identify civil society actors as key players in peace
and conflict resolution because of their crucial role in fostering demo-
cratic principles and institutions. Civil society is assumed to run in
parallel with liberal peacebuilding because it provides platforms for greater
participation and accountability from the state in the context of peace
processes. Post-liberal approaches, which are referred to as the ‘local
turn’ (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2016; Mac Ginty 2015, 2016) in
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peacebuilding, on the other hand, emphasise the importance of local
power structures. This takes into account as to why the emergence of
the hybrid peace, for example, has highlighted the need to empower
local civil society actors. The local turn in peacebuilding recognises the
agency of sub-national actors and practices towards the goal of effective
peacebuilding in collaboration with international entities (Leonardsson
and Rudd 2015; Mac Ginty 2011). Critics of the local turn in peace-
building, however, highlight the dangers of romanticising the concept of
hybridity. One of the main issues stressed against the local turn in peace-
building has focused on the inability of hybrid peace to practically and
conceptually transcend beyond the dichotomised categories of ‘illiberal-
local’ and ‘liberal-international’ which overlooks local power structures
on the ground. For civil society, this has resulted to the detachment
of international interventions from local realities and marginalisation of
community-based organisations (Popplewell 2018).
This chapter contends that discussions on liberal-local hybridity can
most meaningfully gain from asking questions not only about the
processes of internationalisation and localisation, but also about the ways
in which hybrid mechanisms are able to produce more or less stable
outcomes. The goal is therefore to describe not only the competitive,
but also the co-constitutive relationships between international and local
actors. By turning into the agency of civil society actors, it suggests that
the concept of hybridity, which is often represented using dichotomised
categories (i.e. ‘liberal-international’ and ‘illiberal-local’), tends to over-
simplify the conceptual intricacies and dynamic relationships between
top-down and bottom-up peace approaches (Mac Ginty 2010). These
‘new binaries’ (Richmond 2009: 229) have been theorised as oppositional
forces. Such binaries, however, disregard that local ownership and inter-
national governance are not always in contestation with each other. The
analysis in this chapter contributes to the debates on hybridity by illus-
trating how civil society actors are able to negotiate the frictional binaries
between liberal institutions and resources vis-à-vis local practices, power
relations and norms.
This chapter demonstrates these arguments using examples from the
subnational conflict community of Mindanao in the southern region
of the Philippines. Mindanao provides important insights as a case
for this chapter for two reasons. First, Mindanao’s civil society serves
as an excellent case to examine hybrid peacebuilding because of the
strong international-local linkages in the region. Many non-governmental
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organisations (NGOs) and community-based organisations (CBO) have
played an important role in peacebuilding and serve as recipients of
large amounts of humanitarian aid and development assistance. Several
international organisations and foreign governments have been involved
in peacebuilding activities in Mindanao, including the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID), Japan International
Cooperation Agency (JICA), United Nations (UN), World Bank (WB),
European Union (EU), New Zealand Agency for International Devel-
opment (NZAID), and the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), among many others. The presence of liberal democratic institu-
tions in the Philippines, however, has entailed that the government did
not require state-building mechanisms from the external actors, which is
different from the large-scale peacebuilding missions and humanitarian
interventions in such neighbouring countries as Cambodia and Timor-
Leste. Uesugi (2018: 8), nevertheless, has also observed that “there is
a noticeable cleavage stemming from the qualitative difference between
the nominal application of a liberal governance system and whether such
a system operates properly on the ground.” This is due to the existence
of local authoritarianism despite the overarching national democracy in
the Philippines. Some scholars describe this phenomenon as “competitive
authoritarianism” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004) that generates “systemic
incoherence” due to the existence of opposing forces “when elements
of democracy and autocracy are combined” (Davenport and Armstrong
2004: 541). After all, the protracted conflict in Mindanao has been a
result of the failures of existing liberal-democratic institutions to accom-
modate the interests of the ethnic minorities in the region (Kagawa 2020;
Abuza 2016).
Second, Mindanao has been considered as a “hybrid political commu-
nity” (Deinla 2018) which is characterised by the amalgamation and inter-
action between liberal-formal and illiberal-informal actors. This entails
that local and international CSOs function in intimate local power struc-
tures, which are based on the dynamics amongst political lords, insurgents
and millenarian families, and marginalised communities (Espesor 2017).
The existence of these power players means that the success of liberal-
international actors has been dependent on the manner they are able
to enmesh themselves within these local networks. In this case, illiberal-
local actors cannot be conceptualised without the examination of the
influence of liberal-international actors. In Mindanao, it is not unusual
to find locals who have been engaged in international NGOs or have
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participated in long-term and short-term UN-supported projects. These
realities have demanded some amount of localisation and international-
isation, which affect the manner both local and international actors are
able to operate in not only the local contexts, but also within the purview
of the external entities they identify themselves with such as international
organisations. In this regard, there is also a necessity to elucidate whether
local peacebuilding and civil society empowerment efforts are intended to
hold local governments accountable to their actions and to foster “trans-
formative relationships” (Kagawa 2020) between formerly antagonistic
identity-based (e.g. ethno-religious, regional, women) communities. In
some ways, liberal-international organisations have also empowered local
CSOs to determine their own peace agendas. Local CSOs are strategic
agents to penetrate and cascade exogenous liberal norms in the conflict
zone.
The rest of the chapter is divided into four sections. It begins with a
conceptualisation of hybrid peacebuilding and civil society. It emphasises
the role of civil society as a recipient of international and local norms,
ideas, and practices, which may sometimes lead to unequal and asymmet-
rical encounters between international and local actors. The second part
presents the role of civil society in internationally-supported peace and
development assistance programmes in Mindanao. In this case, CSOs are
situated in hybridised contexts which entail that local and international
entities are not able to implement their objectives without compro-
mising and taking into account the dynamics of their relationships with
other key players. Building on the attempts of the preceding chapters
to problematise the practical dimensions of hybrid peacebuilding, the
third part describes the following as sites of liberal-local hybridity vis-à-
vis civil society involvement in Mindanao: people’s diplomacy, indigenous
people’s participation, and women empowerment. The case of the civil
society in Mindanao supports the notion that peacebuilding is a hybrid
process of international and local factors (norms, actors, and agencies).
The chapter concludes that there is a need to examine the ways in which
the hybrid peace approach is able to take into consideration how local
civil society actors can possibly leverage international contexts by tapping
into the resources they can gain from liberal-international peacebuilding
institutions.
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Hybrid Peacebuilding and Civil Society
Civil society comprises a wide range of local and international actors,
which may include both independent and quasi-government actors
(Marchetti 2015). In hybrid peacebuilding, civil society actors have
usually been characterised based on their ability to navigate through
local actors (e.g. community leaders, local security groups, political elites,
CBOs, and NGOs) and international political players (e.g. UN offi-
cials and decision makers, international organisations, regional bodies,
foreign states, and other international donors). In post-conflict contexts,
Richmond (2011: 5) contends that civil society actors have provided a
vehicle for the liberal peace agenda’s emancipatory promises based on
“grounded legitimacy, being derived from local agency as well as inter-
national liberal norms.” Mac Ginty (2011) has coined the term “hybrid
civil society” to support his argument about the need to incorporate the
agency and power of local actors. As a process, hybridisation is depen-
dent on the negotiation of opposing forces in which the amenability of
liberal-international actors are confronted with local resistance and indige-
nous alternatives. In this regard, there has been a tendency to ignore and
underestimate indigenous expressions of civil society. Mac Ginty (2010:
398) has perceived this issue this way:
Indeed, it is useful to think of entities (individuals, communities, insti-
tutions) as being hybridised from the outset. In this view, social and
political processes—such as peacemaking, peacebuilding or postwar recon-
struction—involve the interaction of a series of already hybridised actors
and structures.
Many scholars have attempted to illustrate the usefulness of hybridity as
an alternative approach to the inability of liberal peacebuilding to engage
local actors in post-conflict societies (Wallis et al. 2018; Belloni 2012;
Uesugi 2020). The questions and criticisms about liberal peacebuilding
approach have always been about the suitability of introducing value-
laden institutions into the fragile and volatile conditions of post-conflict
communities. Hybridity has been touted as a response to the critique
that liberal peacebuilding approach has not allowed for the emergence
of local forms of conflict resolutions and governance dynamics. In many
cases, democracy-building and economic development projects have been
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labelled as peacebuilding initiatives without adequate support by interna-
tional actors in resolving the different grievances on the ground (Burke
2012). Mac Ginty (2011: 7) accentuates the necessity to create a “new
understanding of how liberal internationalism operates, especially in its
dealings with the local.” The contention is therefore geared towards the
ability of the hybrid peacebuilding approach to obtain grounded legiti-
macy from the actors in the peace process and to foster a more inclusive
approach in peace and conflict resolution (Richmond 2011: 28). This
means that more attention must be slanted toward ‘the local’ in the form
of grassroots local agencies and indigenous people (Mac Ginty 2011:
47). Hybridity has also been conceptualised as a space where interna-
tional and local actors produce constitutive and competitive interactions
with each other. For example, hybridity has been used to interrogate
the ability of local actors to resist the top-down approaches of liberal-
international actors (Jackson and Albrecht 2018), analyse the relational
aspects of peacebuilding between local and international actors (Boege
2018), and consider the ways in which hybridised environments have
impinged on gendered powers relations (Grenfell 2018).
Hybridity, however, is not without its limitations as demonstrated in
Chapter 2. Hybridity has often been criticised for the concept’s over-
stretched notions about the boundaries and interactions between liberal
and local actors. Millar (2014), for example, has observed that hybridity
has been conceptually used in different strands of the post-liberal peace
literature (e.g. hybrid peacekeeping missions, hybrid criminal tribunals,
hybrid governance, and the hybrid peace) without taking into considera-
tion the multiple layers of relations behind this approach. In this regard,
he has proposed the need to clarify the institutional, practical, ritual, and
conceptual definitions of the hybrid peacebuilding approach. Campbell,
Chandler and Sabaratnam (2011) have also emphasised that following a
strict binary schema between liberal-international and illiberal-local actors
may pose some limitations in terms of the different sets of questions which
can be asked about the political logics of inclusion and exclusion within
the peace process. In the same manner, Boege’s (2018: 115) research
on Bougainville’s peace process also highlights the necessity to perceive
hybridisation from a relational perspective, which basically involves the
presence of “fluid and dynamic process of interaction between ‘local’ and
‘international’ actors.”
Another criticism about the hybrid peacebuilding has to do with the
dangers of the romanticisation of the traditional approaches of the local,
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which may be inherently in opposition to liberal values such as human
rights, gender equality, and democratic order (Anam 2018). Grenfell’s
(2018: 237–252) fieldwork in Timor-Leste, for example, has provided
an account of the clash between “customary” and “modern” forms of
spatiality in relation to violence against women. In Timor-Leste, the
dependence of women in their partners has been institutionalised through
modern modes of production work, which have also compounded the
level of violent experiences of women in the country. In India and
Indonesia, meanwhile, hybrid peacebuilding has contained armed sepa-
ratist movements at the expense of the fundamental liberties and human
rights of the marginalised sectors of the population (Wilson 2020: 115).
In these cases, hybridity presents a double-edged sword of the constraints
confronting locally-brokered agreements and the illiberal character of the
peace process which ignore the rights and voices of minority groups.
In consideration of these criticisms, the use of hybrid peacebuilding
approach in this chapter is therefore not aimed at demarcating the
dichotomised logics between liberal and local hybridity given that the
boundaries between these binaries are not always fixed. In Mindanao, for
example, the interventions of Islamic and non-liberal “hybrid facilitators”
have provided an alternative approach to the Bangsamoro peace process
(Uesugi 2018; Santos 2013). In the same manner, as in the case of the
community-based peace activities of the Buddhist monks in Cambodia,
locally-initiated peacebuilding may not necessarily represent the aspira-
tions of the local people (Lee 2020). Instead, the goal of this chapter
is to set out from these categories to examine the spaces of hybridity
between international (e.g. international CSOs, UN, EU, Asia Founda-
tion, etc.) and local (e.g. community leaders, local NGOs, sectoral bodies,
etc.) actors, which cannot be neatly categorised as liberal and non-liberal.
In this regard, Simangan (2018) has used a similar approach in her study
about the entanglements between international-liberal institutions and
illiberal-local elites in Cambodia based on the analytical utility of the
hybrid peacebuilding approach (Mac Ginty 2011; Björkdahl and Höglund
2013). In her study, she finds that the persistent resistance of liberal norms
from local elites has resulted to negative hybrid peace in Cambodia where
peace can be described as neither liberal nor emancipatory. In the case
of Mindanao, the critical analysis of the agency and encounters of civil
society actors provides a conceptual space away from the dichotomised
notions of the liberal-local hybridity.
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Civil Society and Peacebuilding in Mindanao
It is critical to emphasise some contextual differences between Mindanao
and other cases within the hybrid peacebuilding literature. Mindanao
has often been portrayed based on the political and economic roots
of the conflict in the region. Politically, the genesis of the conflict in
Mindanao can be traced all the way back to the colonial past of the Philip-
pines, which was problematised through the unsuccessful integration of
Muslim minorities within the Catholic-dominated country. In the Muslim
Mindanao, there was a perceived struggle between the two religions with
Christianity as the anti-thesis of Islam (Tadem 2008: 102). The conflict
has mainly been a result of the rejection of the Moro communities against
the decision that their ‘ancestral domain’ should be integrated into the
territory of the Philippines. The overarching struggle of the conflict has
been an attempt by groups within the region to obtain the right to self-
determination or independence, which has evolved into a decades-long
secessionist movement (Kagawa 2020).
The complexity of the Bangsamoro peace process, of course, has to
do with the presence of competing peace processes which have been
running simultaneously under the same territory (Abuza 2016). The first
that formed was the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), created
in the 1960s by Moro leaders who wanted to achieve self-determination
for the region. This has culminated with the 1996 final peace agree-
ment between MNLF and the Philippine government. In 1984, the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), however, broke off from the MNLF
largely from what is viewed as a disagreement of the leaders towards what
the goals of the organisation should be. By splitting the organisation, it
has also resulted in many other much smaller actors, some more radical
than others. For example, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) was established in
1991 as an offshoot organisation from the MNLF, whist the Bangsamoro
Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) broke away from the MILF. Although
the peace process between the MILF and the Philippines government has
been institutionalised due to the signing of the Comprehensive Agree-
ment on the Bangsamoro (CAB) and the legislation of the Bangsamoro
Organic Law (BOL) the recent episodes of political violence by insur-
gent groups in the Southern Philippines, including the Zamboanga siege
(2013), Mamasapano incident (2015), and the Marawi crisis (2017), have
also indicated that the peace process is still in a fragile and unstable
condition.
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Civilian communities, meanwhile, have been confronted with the
possible eruptions of Islamic State-inspired violence and greater militari-
sation due to the recent imposition of martial law. In this sense, there
is no clear-cut answer as to whether Mindanao can be considered as a
war zone (taking into consideration the presence of breakaway groups
like the BIFF and ASG), a conflict area (mostly because of the rampant
cycles of violence and extra-judicial killings during elections and terrorist
and organised criminal activities), or a post-conflict society (due to the
1996 peace deal with the MNLF and the 2014 CAB and 2018 BOL with
the MILF). Nonetheless, the grassroots rivalries between political clans
and landlords have also been a matter of concern for peace activists in
the region. Such conditions produce “negative hybrid peace” in which
liberal norms are challenged, and a repressive status quo is maintained
(Richmond 2015: 54).
A major lesson from the Mindanao peace process was the realisation
that the government cannot and should not do it alone. There is a need
to consult with civil society actors who are demanding for participa-
tion since the peace process impacts the lives of the local stakeholders.
After all, the “failed experiment” of the peace deal with the MNLF has
indicated that autonomy and economic growth are not necessarily mutu-
ally inclusive. The fall of the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos during
the 1986 Peoples Power Revolution is often seen as one of the major
factors which have enabled the growth and development of civil society
in the Philippines. In fact, the role of civil society actors in the country’s
socio-economic and political development has been enshrined within the
1987 Philippine Constitution’s Article II (Declaration of Principles and
State Policies), Section 23, which states that it is the policy of the state
“to encourage non-governmental, community-based, or sectoral organi-
sations that promote the welfare of the nation.” This takes into account
as to why civil society participation has been institutionalised as one of
the fundamental laws of the land. It is not hard to imagine that the same
political condition has enabled civil society in Mindanao to engage the
government in the peace process.
In addition, the passage of the 1991 Local Government Code (RA
37160) has also provided an enabling legal environment for the direct
participation of civil society actors in the local governance. The growth of
the civil society and the development of the peace process have coincided
with the trend towards greater democratisation and decentralisation of
political power and economic-decision making process in the Philippines.
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These conditions have also opened sectoral representations for women,
indigenous people, youth, urban poor, and farmers, among others. In
Mindanao, there is an expectation that local CSOs should play an active
role in the consultative process of provincial and regional peace and
order councils which also provide the accreditation for them. It goes
without saying that support for civil society actors has been one of core
features of international peacebuilding in Mindanao. Civil society actors
in the region have gained a broad level of support from many interna-
tional NGOs and donor agencies. Aside from the development aid from
foreign governments and financial institutions, many local CSOs have also
worked with international NGOs, including the Catholic Relief Services,
Asia Foundation, and International Crisis Group. International organi-
sations frequently support local CSOs in the form of technical-logistical
assistance, facilitation services, and capacity-building programmes.
There have also been attempts from international actors to work with
local civil society groups to create different platforms for reconciliation
at the grassroots level. MILF’s reliance on the expertise of international
and local civil society groups, for example, is evident in the establishment
of the Bangsamoro People’s Consultative Assembly (BPCA), which has
been instrumental in providing important inputs and policies regarding
the negotiated autonomy with the Philippine government. In Mindanao,
Rood (2005: 21–29) enumerates that the involvements of civil society
groups in peacebuilding efforts are three-fold: (1) dialogue between
communities (e.g. Bishops-Ulama Conference in support of bridging the
sectarian divide and preventing communal violence in Mindanao); (2)
horizontal spaces for peace (e.g. the establishment of ‘peace zones’ in
Mindanao as a concerted effort between local and international organisa-
tions); and (3) vertical involvement in peace policy-making (i.e. the goal
of the civil society to influence the peace process through consultative
and collective action efforts. Local CSOs, however, have been prone to
the capture of both national and local elites. In a report from the Asia
Foundation on development assistance in the region, Parks, Colletta and
Oppenheim (2013: 120) note that:
… patronage and corruption are so deeply entrenched that the well-
designed plans and aims of donors rarely result in transformative impacts,
and more often than not, actually reinforce traditional political power and
patronage structures. In sum, aid in Mindanao has become yet another
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source of contestation among local actors, as well as a self-perpetuating
industry for donors, government, and NGOs, alike.
Nevertheless, local CSOs have maintained a crucial role in the
Mindanao peace process given that minority groups (e.g. Moros and non-
Muslim ethnic communities) have very restricted powers in the national
political landscape. Civil society groups have wide-ranging and broadly-
defined activities in the region, including peace movements and alliances,
peace education and research, relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction,
truth commissions and investigative missions, grassroots ceasefire moni-
toring, dialogue and consultations, interfaith dialogue, arts and culture
for peace advocacy, and peace journalism (Abubakar 2007). From this
view, the dependence of the MILF peace negotiators, for example, on
BPCA’s recommendations suggests that civil society actors have become
supplementary players in the peace process by pushing for strategies
against political violence in the region. Most notably, local and regional
CSO networks (e.g. Mindanao Caucus of Development NGO Networks
and Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society) have been instrumental
in terms of fostering ‘transformative relationships’ and creating diagonal
platforms for negotiations. In this regard, an adequate degree of inter-
national support opens an opportunity for civil society organisations to
strengthen their capacity in building and maintaining ‘transformative rela-
tionships’ as part of the peace process. Kagawa’s (2020) critical analysis
of the mid-space actors in the context of the Bangsamoro, for instance,
includes the involvement of Ulama leaders, who have not only supported
humanitarian endeavours in the region, but have also served as a religious
blanket for local and national peacebuilding efforts.
In this sense, the role of the civil society can also be attributed to
that of mid-space actors or gatekeepers (see Chapter 4) who have the
capacity to wield some influence in knowledge formation and possess
locally-grounded legitimacy as agents of hybrid peacebuilding. This is
concomitant to the ability of local actors to have access to different
sources of power, i.e. formal and informal, due to their normative under-
standing of the contexts and complexities on the ground. Local and
international resources, on the one hand, can enable CSOs to play
the role of ‘bridge-builders’ who have the ability to navigate them-
selves across different levels of peace engagement. On the other hand,
however, locally-based actors can also unintentionally become spoilers
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especially when their interests and demands constrain the peace process
(see Chapter 5).
Surprisingly, peacebuilding activities have not been evenly spread
within the southern part of the Philippines. Many local CSOs have
pointed out that international peacebuilding has not been extensively
entertained in the region if it is not supplemented by developmental
and financial interventions, which target such sectoral needs as educa-
tion, livelihood, and healthcare. Some NGOs, for example, have pointed
out the challenge of getting people to participate in their programmes,
which is why community-based activities in Mindanao have been geared
towards particular interests (e.g. youth, women, indigenous people, etc.)
to narrow down the sets of local grievances that need to be addressed.
Peace education, for example, is popular area of work which most local
and international CSOs have engaged in because it covers not only educa-
tional institutions in Mindanao, but also grassroots communities which
are willing to learn about better inter-faith relationships and ethnic toler-
ance. In peace education programmes, local NGOs have usually followed
internationally-accepted frameworks such as the curriculum of Univer-
sity for Peace in Costa Rica on intercultural respect, harmony, and active
non-violence (Bacani 2004).
Two points are worth emphasising about the dynamics of civil society
involvement in Mindanao. The first is that despite the violent conflict
the (flawed) liberal-democratic system of the Philippines has still provided
some openings for the growth of civil society in Mindanao. Morada and
Tadem (2006: 429) have noted that “these openings for civil society are
meant to promote not only popular participation but also local account-
ability and transparency.” This is quite different from the experiences
of the authoritarian post-conflict countries in Southeast Asia such as
Cambodia and Timor-Lester where foreign liberal influence in peace-
keeping missions was needed to achieve peace. There has also been a
significant level of variation in the activities of civil society actors, which
are not completely captured by “outsiders” such as international devel-
opment groups and security analysts. In reality, “conflict dynamics in one
community may contrast starkly with conflict in neighbouring communi-
ties where, due to a different configuration of political actors, family or
clan networks, ethnic cultural groups, security forces, and/or insurgents,
local conflict conditions may be very different” (Schuler et al. 2013).
The second point is that the presumed tensions within the hybridity
literature between illiberal-local and liberal-international communities
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have not always been clear-cut. This is also perhaps reflected in the lack of
comprehensive and critical studies about the wider range of peacebuilding
initiatives within the region. In Mindanao, some organisations have drawn
from discourses and practices from both local and international sources.
The presence of these organisations has resulted to a broad range of
programmatic concerns which are not only rooted in communities, but
are also located within the radars of international actors. Liberal-local rela-
tions contribute to the hybridisation of the peace process. Hence, it is
important to identify the areas of dynamic entanglements between local
and international actors (Boege 2018: 117).
Sites of Liberal-Local Hybrid
Peacebuilding in Mindanao
Hybrid peacebuilding encourages the everyday processes of local-
international exchange which demands a process of recalibration and
re-negotiation in the relationships between the local and international
actors in the course of peacebuilding. It is therefore productive to
think about hybridity as a continuum in which locally-based organi-
sations are able to frame their personal grievances within the wider
discourses of the international community. In this sense, the specific
interplay of the hybridised relationships between the international and
the local actors produces a space for accommodation and resistance to
liberal peace agendas. In Mindanao, as implicated in the above discussion,
the success of local CSOs and community leaders are largely depen-
dent on the manner they are able to take advantage of “skills that allow
them to manoeuvre within the intricate power relations that are part of
conflict-affected communities” (Espesor 2017: 78).
Three spaces of hybrid peacebuilding engagements in the region,
where there have been considerable encounters and entanglements
between local and international actors, are people’s diplomacy, indige-
nous people’s participation, and women empowerment. The first example
in this section shows the ability of local and international CSOs to create
innovative and non-formal mechanisms to address the shortcomings of
the formal peace process. It supports the contention that hybrid struc-
tures may enable local and international actors to strengthen the potential
of their engagements. The second example, meanwhile, illustrates the
ways in which local actors are able to utilise international ideas to frame
their grievances. The presence of international treaties and agreements on
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indigenous people’s rights, for instance, has provided an opportunity for
CSOs to enhance their call for inclusivity in the formal peace process. As
discussed in the third example, the goal of empowering women within the
formal and informal aspects of the peace process has also been accompa-
nied by the hybrid cooperation between local and international actors. In
these cases, the objective of local and international actors has been the
encouragement of non-elite actors to exercise their agency and diversify
the local voices within the peacebuilding process.
People’s Diplomacy
People’s diplomacy has been considered as one of the key innovations of
the civil society in achieving their role as a third party in the Mindanao
peace process. This was pioneered by the Initiative for International
Dialogue (IID) which introduced the idea of ‘South-to-South Solidar-
ity’ as a new framework for peacebuilding and international development
intervention. As a Mindanao-based international NGO, IID was founded
in 1988 with the goal of promoting human security, democratisation, and
people-to-people solidarity. Aside from their work in Mindanao, IID has
also been very active in other parts of Southeast Asia, including Myanmar,
Southern Thailand, West Papua, and Timor-Leste. One of the achieve-
ments of IID was the formation of the Mindanao Peoples Caucus (MPC)
which has served as a platform for conflict-affected grassroots commu-
nities and organisations in the region. Several NGOs have supported
this platform, including the Community and Family Services Interna-
tional (CFSI), Salaam-Mindanao, and Habitat for Humanity, ranging
from rehabilitation and livelihood projects for displaced communities to
psycho-social interventions and relief operations for victims of trauma.
In 2001, IID provided technical assistance to MPC for the formation
of Bantay Ceasefire (Ceasefire Watch), a grassroots and community-based
ceasefire-monitoring network aimed at connecting the Philippine govern-
ment’s top-down strategies with the civil society’s bottom-up efforts in
Mindanao. This civil society-led initiative provided an opening for local
organisations to independently monitor and verify ceasefire violations with
international organisations. It can be considered as one of the first “cit-
izen security” mechanisms and “hybrid structures” (i.e. local-international
civil society information exchange) within the evolving peace infrastruc-
tures of the Mindanao peace process. In an online interview with the
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Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (2019), IID’s
regional coordinator Marc Batac has noted that:
IID’s Moro and Mindanao partners sought the assistance of civil society
and IID in helping to galvanize a response and projection of their
voices and perspectives into the entire peace process. IID then proceeded
to establish platforms and networks to concretize this accompaniment,
forming the Mindanao Peoples Caucus (MPC)—a Tri-people (Moro,
settlers and Indigenous peoples) network that engaged the peace process.
In essence, the success of Bantay Ceasefire provided a venue for the
Philippine government and MILF to recognise the need for the expan-
sion of a civilian-led and third-party mechanism, which targeted the active
participation of Mindanao-based and foreign civilian monitors (Iglesias
2013: 4). In addition, Bantay Ceasefire also supported the Independent
Fact-Finding Committee (IFFC) under the Notre Dame University Peace
Education Centre, the Maguindanao Professional Employees’ Associa-
tion, and Cotabato City Media Multipurpose Cooperative. IID assisted
this movement by involving groups from the Global South, especially
from the member-states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN). In effect, this initiative has provided an opportunity for
conflict-affected communities in the region to share their experiences
and best practices in resolving the security challenges facing them. This
has also proven that local CSOs in Mindanao are capable of mobil-
ising support from organisations at the national and international levels.
Eventually, Bantay Ceasefire resulted to a broad consortium of peace
organisations in the country dubbed as Mindanao Peace Weavers. There
have also been attempts from the part of the Philippine government
to include an International Monitoring Team (IMT) within the formal
ceasefire monitoring structure. As discussed in Chapter 8, Japan, along
with some member-countries of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
(OIC), was part of this team. The official monitoring system, however,
was constrained by the lack of independence and influence of the IMT
and Local Monitoring Teams (LMTs) at the grassroots level. These gaps
have been addressed by civil society-led initiatives such as Bantay Ceasefire
(Colleta 2006: 27).
The strong networks between local and international CSOs have there-
fore provided an opening for the Bantay Ceasefire to promote people’s
diplomacy based on the concepts of good governance, peace monitoring,
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and citizen participation. In this case, there is blurred notion of the
international and the local given that the CSOs in this initiative cannot
be easily characterised using liberal peace agendas. For the most part,
the formation of this civil society initiative was a hybrid process, which
gave priority not only to the participation of international actors, but
also to the wishes of the local actors. It also raises the need to under-
score the role of the civil society, for example, in terms of their influence
during the critical junctures of the peace negotiations. Nevertheless, it
is important to highlight that broad-based civil society coalitions are
important in promoting non-violent mechanisms and mobilising popular
support towards the peace process. In this case, the diverse involve-
ment of and cooperation between the international and local actors
in the peace process has been considered as beneficial because of the
ways in which they have enhanced the legitimacy and the credibility of
their political claims. From this perspective, it can be surmised that this
cooperative mechanism has opened a window of opportunity for local
and international CSOs to create spaces of cooperation (as shown in
this book’s conceptualisation of mid-space actors). After all, the hori-
zontal and vertical functions of the civil society actors have provided
them with foundations for their diagonal functions as bridge-builders and
gatekeepers.
Indigenous People’s Participation
In Mindanao, civil society groups have generally focused on three broad
categories relevant to the rights of the indigenous peoples and minorities
which are embodied in the international legal system: rights to protec-
tion, empowerment, and preservation of identity. The rights pertaining
to protection and empowerment are perhaps the more controversial cate-
gories given that the status of indigenous peoples and minorities has
always been a matter of political debate. There has been an expectation for
the Philippine government to provide indigenous peoples in the region
with special protections based on the assumption that such minority
groups have been subjected to protracted historical, socio-political, and
economic injustices within the purview of colonisation and forced dispos-
session of lands, territories, and resources. From this perspective, local
and international CSOs, for example, have pointed out that the peace
process has not fully enshrined the equitable participation and protection
of indigenous peoples and non-Muslims.
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More concretely, there have been different proposals to address this
problem. One of the most prominent solutions has emanated from the
inclusion and development of the concept of ‘ancestral domain’ as part
of the power-sharing mechanisms for the proposed Bangsamoro polit-
ical entity. The formulation of the ancestral domain started during the
Tripoli Agreement of 2001, although this concept came into public
consciousness as a result of the signing of the 2007 Memorandum of
Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD), which was aimed at adding
more villages to the autonomous region in the southern Philippines. The
agreement, however, was scrapped after the Philippine Supreme Court
declared it unconstitutional. CSOs supported the ancestral domain aspect
of the peace process not only because it could foster an enabling legal
environment for the realisation of one of the important aspects of the
1997 Philippine Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), but also because
of the possible institutionalisation of the land rights of the indigenous
peoples and non-Muslims within the Bangsamoro peace process. Because
they were not included in the official peace process between the govern-
ment and MILF, indigenous peoples have formed a major part of the
membership of the civil society networks in Mindanao.
The efforts of Mindanao-based civil society coalition movements for
indigenous people’s security of tenure in ancestral domain coincided with
the approval of the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indige-
nous Peoples (UNDRIP). The Institute for Autonomy and Governance
(IAG), for example, has contributed in helping indigenous movement
leaders deepen their understanding of how existing legal regime promotes
indigenous rights. Eventually, the ancestral domain has been included as
BOL’s core feature. The global recognition of the indigenous rights may
have helped create the openness of the Philippine government to enter-
tain the term of ancestral domain. The proposed autonomous entity of
Bangsamoro attempts to address the needs of the indigenous peoples in
the region, including their freedom of choice and the protection of their
rights. Rood (2014), as part of the Asia Foundation’s involvement as a
peace mediator, raises challenges for the indigenous rights, including the
recognition of their ancestral domains:
Indigenous people’s organisations and their allies, though, point out that
what is missing from this is a recognition of their ancestral domains
(plural). Immediately, lobbying sprang up both in the media and in
Congress, and has found an echo among some members of the legislature
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… The MILF has been firm on this matter, regarding those who press
the case for recognition of plural ancestral domains as “spoilers” who are
diluting the meaning of the Bangsamoro people and the Moro’s ancestral
domain.
Whilst international donors have been instrumental in supporting the
financial needs of local NGOs some community leaders have noted
that their intervention has not always been developed based on careful
planning. Nonetheless, there is an expectation from these ‘outsiders’
to be integrated and consulted for the areas and types of assistance
that local NGOs need. There have also been unwritten preferences
from international donors to mainly engage with large CSO coalitions
instead of working with smaller organisations. Rural-based organisations,
for example, have been excluded in internationally-organised trainings.
The unequal level of resources among local NGOs can additionally be
connected to the inability of some grassroots actors to grasp the complex
monitoring systems and concepts which are being brought in by inter-
national donors. In some cases, international development projects fail
because of the lack of coordination between the international donors
and local partners. In the case of conflict management mechanisms, local
indigenous CSOs also lament that international donors usually ask them
to introduce new liberal-based systems of governance even though the
norms and practices at the grassroots level are different. Such practices
neither set out with conventional values of liberal peacebuilding, and
produces tension with the local actors. Richmond (2012: 4) argues that
there are dilemmas produced by the encounters between liberal-formal
institutions and illiberal-informal actors:
From the perspective of the international actor agency revolves around
how to use its capacity to legitimately induce a top-down liberal peace,
so addressing the local causes of conflict. From the perspective of its local
subjects agency revolves around how to both learn from peacebuilding or
statebuilding in order to address root causes, and how to merge interna-
tional support or prescriptions with local political frameworks necessary for
localized autonomy and identity. However, many of those advocating this
are, in fact, quite sympathetic to the peace process and have been oper-
ating for years under a “tri-people” framework trying to promote peace
and development in Mindanao by bringing together Muslims, Lumads, and
“settlers” (Christians whose family origins are from outside Mindanao).
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Nevertheless, peace negotiators have also learned that the need to gain
input from civil society is not only a local but also a global trend in
the light of the inclusion of the rights of the minorities and indigenous
peoples in the proposed Bangsamoro autonomous region. International
organisations like the UN Development Programme (UNDP), mean-
while, have offered technical assistance and funding to advocate for the
participation of indigenous peoples. It goes without saying that indige-
nous people’s organisations also pushed for the expansion of their rights at
every step of the way. The support of international actors has been instru-
mental in enhancing the capacity of local groups to undertake broader
engagements in the form of policy consultations. A major success which
local actors have viewed in their peace engagements is the improved
awareness of the government about the legitimacy of the core grievances
of the minorities in Mindanao and the necessity to address the different
historical injustices they have encountered.
Women Empowerment
Gender inequality has emerged as one of the leading issues within the
hybrid peacebuilding literature (see Grenfell 2018; George 2018). In
the issue of the Mindanao peace process, the international community
has often lauded the presence of the women in the negotiating team of
the Philippines. In this regard, there have been numerous provisions to
advance women’s rights and participation in the Bangsamoro autonomous
region. At first glance, it can be said the gender provisions of the BOL
have been heavily influenced by the commitment of the Philippines to
such international legal instruments as the UN Security Council resolu-
tion 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. After the BOL’s passage, the
UN Women, for example, commented that:
These provisions create a positive environment for women’s participation
and gender-responsive governance. However, the advocacy and support
from communities, NGOs and other actors—and the buy-in and support
from government officials—will be vital to guarantee women’s rights and
gender equality. Women’s participation in the new government is critical
to meeting women’s needs in laws and policies. These should be crafted
in an inclusive process with women, youth and indigenous peoples. They
must also consider the conflict, including threats of violent extremism, that
has constantly challenged the region.
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Such a statement, however, indicates that women empowerment within
the peace process has not only been achieved through the political
opportunity structures embedded with global gendered norms, but also
through the efforts of the local actors. The government’s previous lead
negotiator Professor Miriam Coronel-Ferrer, for instance, has noted that
the civil society groups in the Philippines have been overwhelmingly
comprised of women (Santiago 2015: 13). In particular, the international
engagements of Mindanao-based CSOs have ranged from organising
consultative meetings and capacity-building programmes to writing reso-
lutions and the policy agendas of women for the proposed autonomous
region of Bangsamoro. In this sense, women’s civil society groups can be
treated as hybrid spaces due to the high level of engagements that they
have with international organisations and agendas. They can be consid-
ered as local in that the main goals of these organisations are focused on
the development of Bangsamoro, but at the same time they can be seen
as international because of their engagements with external actors.
The gendered hybrid spaces, however, can also be viewed outside the
boundaries of the formal peace process. In particular, women’s NGOs
have played an extremely important role in the different areas of local
peacebuilding such as peace monitoring, conflict mediation and resolu-
tion, and gender-based planning. Some women leaders have also formed
peace platforms and networks which have partnered with international aid
donors (e.g. Bangsamoro Women Solidarity Forum, Mindanao Human
Rights Action Network, and the Kadtabanga Foundation). These women-
led platforms have been active in informal mechanisms such as Bantay
Ceasefire in which they have been applauded for their roles in highlighting
the rights and concerns of women in times of conflict (Arnado 2012:
13). In Mindanao, it is worth noting that women’s engagement in the
peacebuilding activities are also embedded within hybridised power struc-
tures which are composed of formal players such as the local and national
government agencies and such informal actors as clans and ethnic groups.
Some women leaders have also been involved in preserving their tradi-
tional approaches through clan organising as a form of conflict resolution.
Hall and Hoare (2015: 107) note that women have also participated in
the implementation and preservation of hybridised conflict management
mechanisms for clan-based conflicts (e.g. rido):
Rido does not generally target women and children, but when violence
erupts between clans, Muslim women act as pacifiers and documenters…
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Women NGO representatives working on security and peacebuilding are
cognisant of the serious challenges faced by IDP women and rido-
burdened Muslim women. Nonetheless, they have not been able to map
these out in the formal peace process in terms of specific mechanisms or
programmatic commitments by the future Bangsamoro Government.
In some cases, local CSOs have also used international spaces to amplify
their agendas. The Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society, for example,
has often partnered with the UN Women to diversify their understanding
of gender issues (Hall and Hoare 2015). In Mindanao, these empirical
examples show that there is an intersection between local NGOs and
their foreign donors. Although the Philippines has made advancements
in terms of the formal participation of women in politics and the peace
process, local CSOs can be considered as hybrid spaces where gender
issues have flourished. These spaces have allowed women to exercise
their agency whist navigating the different tools and mechanisms avail-
able to them at the local and international levels. It can also be surmised
that international engagements towards women empowerment for the
Mindanao peace process have opened spaces for transformative form of
local involvement.
In this regard, the participation of women in peacebuilding activi-
ties has emancipatory elements as evidenced by the local agencies of the
civil society groups through localised and internationalised approaches
to peacebuilding. However, this also leaves an important question of
whether hybridised contexts have provided an opening for the represen-
tation of women on the ground. It also raises similar questions on the
ability of minorities and vulnerable populations to enhance their participa-
tion given that these concerns also offer an opportunity to operationalize
hybrid peacebuilding. Such key issues warrant further investigation from
the purview of hybrid peacebuilding as they directly affect the dynamics
of inclusion and exclusion in peace processes.
Conclusion
The sites of liberal-local hybridity discussed in this chapter imply the need
to contextualise the spaces of interaction between dichotomised categories
in peacebuilding. The experiences of civil society groups in Mindanao
illustrate the ways in which local and international actors operate within
hybridised environments. The interactions between these “new binaries”
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have been characterised by resistance and accommodation. From the view
of the local actors, international donors, for example, can be consid-
ered as a double-edged sword. Whilst international actors can enhance
the capacity of local CSOs, the former’s lack of engagement with the
political realities on the ground can also create tensions between them.
International actors, meanwhile, is expected to have a dynamic relation-
ship with local actors beyond financial support. As such, the encounters
between local and international actors must be analysed in terms of agen-
cies, norms, and spaces. In the case of Mindanao, it is also important to
analyse hybridity by taking into consideration not only the institutions,
but also the practices and the competitive and cooperative relationships
amongst the actors across multiple levels of interaction. Encounters of
local and international organisations particularly raise important issues
about the tendency of post-liberal approaches to recognise some degrees
of emancipation with the support of international agents.
In the hybrid peacebuilding literature, the international-local interface
of the actors has typically been seen as a unidirectional mechanism in
which the international affects the local. For future research, it would
be worth examining the ways in which local actors can contribute in
the expansion of international peacebuilding agendas. Of course, this
is deeply connected to the challenges confronting the institutionalisa-
tion of civil society participation in peace processes. Theoretically, one
of the remaining constraints facing the hybrid peacebuilding approach is
to develop a practical tool to consider how top-down approaches (i.e.
influence of international declarations on national peace processes) can
amalgamate with the bottom-up agendas of CSOs to impinge not only
on the peace process, but also on policy outcomes such as human rights.
As mentioned, one of the main criticisms about hybrid peacebuilding
has been about the use of dichotomies. The process of hybridisation, of
course, could not and should not be merely confined within the neat
categories of the international and local actors. Mac Ginty (2011: 46),
nevertheless, underscores that whist hybrid peacebuilding tends to bifur-
cate between the spheres of ‘local’ and ‘international’ “it does seem that
many international peace-support actors are more comfortable thinking
about and exercising material forms of power, while local communi-
ties in some settings tend to think about power in terms of legitimacy
and moral standing.” This chapter does not intend to suggest the prob-
lematic approval of situating the self-representations of actors. Instead,
it contributes to the existing knowledge on hybrid peacebuilding by
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citing concrete examples based on the perceived level of entanglements
between local and international actors. The varying levels of success of
civil society actors in these examples, however, show that hybridised
contexts can somewhat produce different outcomes. This entails hybridi-
sation is inherent in the dynamics of conflict that may also lead to
the bourgeoning of the everyday local spaces whereby international and
transnational relations of power may co-constitute one another.
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CHAPTER 7
Rise of China’s Developmental Peace:
Prospects for AsianHybrid Peacebuilding
KwokChung Wong and Fujian Li
Introduction
The previous chapters of this book have focused on exploring the
changing environments of peacebuilding using hybrid peacebuilding
theory. As a new player in the area of peacebuilding, and primarily
focusing on Asia, the rise of China’s peacebuilding is open to a great
deal of debate. While China has been an extensive contributor to United
Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO), the theory and practices
of Chinese peacebuilding have never been made clear by the Chinese
government. This chapter aims to identify the traits of Chinese peace-
building based on its model of developmental peace and on evidence in
Chinese practices on the ground. By so doing, it attempts to determine
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whether China’s peacebuilding model can be categorized as a form of
hybrid peacebuilding.
An important concept to consider is that of the mid-space actors
discussed in Chapter 4. These mid-space actors can help to bridge the
gap between the top or national level of peacebuilding undertaken among
elites and the bottom or grassroots level of peacebuilding undertaken
by locals because peacebuilders use the mid-space as ‘transit zones’ in
which peacebuilders of all levels can interact with each other (Uesugi
and Kagawa 2020). Sometimes mid-space actors can function as ‘gate-
keepers’ that reach across the different cleavages of society in the vertical,
horizontal and diagonal gaps because these actors perform functions that
cannot be effected by outsiders. However, while mid-space actors have the
potential to become bridge-builders, they can also become peace-spoilers
(Uesugi 2020), where they may impede a peace process or deny interna-
tional access to their local community. It is important to understand that
appearing to be a peace-spoiler does not necessarily mean that these actors
aim to spoil the peace process, rather it can simply mean that they want
to readjust their position or bring in new actors to increase the number
of stakeholders that can strengthen the peace process, as in the case of
Bangsamoro in the southern Philippines (Kagawa 2020). It is particu-
larly important to consider the concepts of mid-space actors and adaptive
peacebuilding that were introduced in Chapter 3 because China’s style of
peacebuilding is beginning to show the traits of these existing concepts.
Adaptive peacebuilding is a process through which both peacebuilders
and local communities come together to learn the means of creating
sustained peace (de Coning 2018). Thus, adaptive peacebuilding operates
according to the principle that peacebuilders should not lock themselves
into a unified, standardised approach to peacebuilding, but should try
to adapt to the unique local situation of each society in need. At times,
the assumption of using a single unified approach, such as international
peacebuilding as a tool to ‘fix’ conflict-affected societies can be a harmful
mentality. In fact, sustainable peace is only likely if complex social systems
fix themselves (Luhmann 1990).
This chapter aims to examine China’s developmental peace and asks
whether it can be recognised as a variation of hybrid or adaptive peace-
building. The chapter also investigates whether China should continue
its current approach in the future by referring to evidence provided by
Chinese engagement with the post-conflict societies of Myanmar and
Afghanistan/Pakistan. Given that a great deal of the extensive scholarship
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on peacebuilding is written from a Western perspective, it is imperative
to consider the Chinese perspectives and mindset towards peacebuilding
before dismissing the Chinese style of peacebuilding as illiberal or lacking
human rights. To clarify the impact that the rise of China’s developmental
peace has on the environment of international peacebuilding, this chapter
first examines the traits and background of developmental peace, which
is followed by an analysis of how the Chinese approach is related to
existing approaches of hybrid and adaptive peacebuilding. Case studies
are then presented to provide evidence of Chinese developmental peace
in practice in countries suffering from conflict, such as Myanmar and
Afghanistan/Pakistan.
Traits of Developmental Peace
as Chinese Peacebuilding
This section explains the origins of China’s concept of developmental
peace and how China’s previous experiences in using developmental
peace at home led to shaping this concept into a model of economic
development-facilitated peacebuilding. There are three main reasons for
China pursuing an alternative model of developmental peace to existing
liberal models: (1) its own experiences of being a developing, commu-
nist/socialist country; (2) its non-intervention foreign policy; and (3) its
desire to develop peace abroad to compensate for its lack of peacebuilding
policy at home.
World’s Largest Developing Country
China is both one of the largest economies in the world and the world’s
largest developing country. It not only has the largest economy in Asia,
but also has the incentive to contribute to the stability of the region to
ensure the realisation of President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI) in the hope that this initiative will contribute to the economic
growth of China and partners in Asia and Africa. It is important to note
that China is an Asian country that has taken a different path from other
Asian countries (e.g. Japan) in its modernization and has not adopted
liberal democracy by Western standards. This means that it is highly
unlikely that China would follow what the West has been doing in rela-
tion to liberal peacebuilding. Some may also see China as one of the few
remaining communist/socialist countries in the world. For example, in
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2010, the then Vice President Xi Jinping wrote a paper advocating the
importance of studying Marxism with Chinese characteristics and said
that its core agenda is scientific development and that the contradictions
of Western capitalism would eventually lead to regression (Xi 2010). It is
undeniable that Chairman Mao Zedong’s China was communist, that it
actively exported revolution and that it backed communist regimes over-
seas, such as Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge (Wang 2018). However, there
is little evidence of exporting revolution being shown by the Chinese
government after the nation’s reform and opening in the late 1970s.
Given that China is also a new player in international peacebuilding,
where existing actors such as the United States (US) and Japan have
already made clear achievements, to be a major contributor to such peace-
building, it cannot simply replicate processes that previous actors have
already implemented, and thus must take a different approach to provide
tangible evidence that it is an active and responsible member of interna-
tional society, contributing to peace. Therefore, China may take a socialist
approach towards issues such as peacebuilding; however, in reality, when
the Chinese government refers to China a ‘socialist state’, it uses this
term more as part of a narrative directed towards its domestic audience.
On the international stage, China’s approach to peacebuilding is based
on non-intervention, respect of the host country’s sovereignty, and most
importantly, as will be seen in the following section, provision of aid
without strings attached.
Further, China’s attempt to seek an alternative style of peacebuilding
does not mean that desires to go against the West. In fact, it is more
interested in cooperating with established norms than fighting with them.
However, as Johnston (2003) states, China does not want to be simply
a blind follower of the US order, even if it has been the biggest bene-
ficiary of that order. There are two possible reasons for this: the first is
national pride and the second, and arguably more important reason, is
that China does not always follow rules that were made when China was
mostly absent from international affairs (i.e. before 1978) (Glosserman
2020). Feigenbaum (2018) states that China prefers existing ‘forms’ but
not always ‘norms’. That is, China agrees that concepts such as peace-
building are important; however, it does not prefer the norm of liberal
peacebuilding established by Western actors when China was not partic-
ipating in international geopolitics during its isolationism in the 60s and
70s. Unlike Johnston (2003), Feigenbaum (2018) considers China a
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revisionist power (ibid.), but neither of them refer to China as a ‘revo-
lutionary’ power. China provides mainly supplemental institutions to the
existing global institutions. For example, the Asian Infrastructure Invest-
ment Bank adds to the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank;
the BRI to the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation and the
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO); and developmental peace to
liberal peacebuilding. China does not intend to reject the existing forms
but it operates under different norms.
Non-intervention and Respect for Sovereignty
While China itself is the largest developing country in the world, it
aims to support other developing countries by using the methods it
employed to lift itself out of poverty. China must provide this support in
a way that respects the sovereignty of the host country, following China’s
non-intervention principle. This principle has guided China’s foreign
policy ever since it was first established in the Bandung Conference in
1955 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MOFA] of the People’s Republic
of China 2014) under the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and
was reemphasised in the s Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Tech-
nical Assistance to Other Countries during Premier Zhou Enlai’s tour
to Africa in 1964 (Zhou 1964). However, it is important to note that
non-intervention does not mean indifference, just as abstaining from a
particular United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution does not
necessarily mean being against the resolution. China is not against inter-
ventionism, but it must be with the host country’s consent or under the
mandate of the UN Security Council. Ruan (2012), a scholar at the China
Institute of International Studies, states that China is against the style of
military interventionism in which the West has shown. For example, the
West’s regime-change intervention in Libya ostensibly provided humani-
tarian aid and acted on the responsibility to protect (R2P), and its creation
of highly complicated situations and regional strife in Afghanistan and
Iraq. Ruan (2012) adds that the world needs to pay more attention to
new players such as China entering the field of international peace, and
specifically to become familiar with China as a new actor in international
peacebuilding. China’s official position in peace-related activities abroad
can be summarised with Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s remarks that China
will continue to uphold the peaceful, legitimate and constructive nature
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of its style of conflict resolution with Chinese characteristics (Xinhua
2018b).
‘Developmental Peace’ as Chinese Hybrid Peacebuilding
The concept of developmental peace originated from a small group of
scholars in China. One of these notable scholars is He Yin (2019b),
who states that developmental peace is a significant departure from
liberal peace because it is based on China’s peaceful rise and interna-
tional aid practices, adding that developmental peace aims to achieve
political stability that is supported by strong institutions and economic
development. Abb (2018) adds that developmental peace is based on
China’s own experience of strong state-led development and overseeing
of political reforms and on China’s principle of maintaining the stability of
governing institutions and providing foreign aid with no political strings
attached. However, Johnston (2003) notes that China is neither a blind
follower nor a radical revisionist of current norms, so it is inaccurate to
consider that developmental peace aims to develop into a new norm
or become the antithesis of existing models of peacebuilding such as
liberal peacebuilding. Rather, developmental peace mainly functions as
an alternative Chinese approach to peacebuilding, particularly consid-
ering that the premise that development can facilitate lasting peace is
shared by major international and Asian institutions such as the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the Japan International
Cooperation Agency (JICA). The main difference with China’s devel-
opmental peace and others is that China aims to preserve the standing
political parties in the host countries, whereas liberal peacebuilding aims
to create democracy in the post-conflict society through the expansion of
liberal institutions. International organisations such as the IMF and the
World Bank lean more towards the liberal model in holding that develop-
ment will eventually lead to democratisation, as per modernisation theory
(Limpach and Michaelowa 2010).
China needs to take advantage of its materialistic power and formulate
an approach that will distinguish its style of peacebuilding from that of
existing actors such as Japan. At the same time, it needs to uphold the
non-intervention principle that forms the core of Chinese foreign policy.
Numerous times in the past, the Chinese government has expressed its
interest in expanding its role in international peacebuilding. For example,
President Xi Jinping’s New Year’s Speech of 2020 highlighted the many
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domestic achievements of China, but also emphasised the importance of
its BRI and of building a shared community for all humanity (Xi 2020).
However, despite the positive signs of China aiming to adopt a greater
role in international peacebuilding, it does not have any official doctrines
or policies at home which constitute as a pillar of a ‘Chinese model’ of
peacebuilding. Butler and Wheeler (2012) state that despite its active role
in UNPKO, China has yet to play a significant role in peacebuilding.
However, this lack of official statement is exactly what China needs: not
a standardised template to implement in each conflict area, but a flex-
ible and adaptive peacekeeping policy based on China’s core values of
development-led peace and non-intervention.
While it may appear contradictory to connect developmental peace
(which would be likely to lead China to engage in top-down government-
to-government approaches of peacebuilding) with hybrid peacebuilding
(which requires a bottom–up grassroots approach), the superficial discon-
nect between China’s developmental peace and style of liberal peace-
keeping have been rapidly changing as China engages with more complex
Asian conflicts. In fact, in practice, China’s developmental peace has
been adopting a similar eclectic approach to the approach adopted by
hybrid and adaptive peacebuilding. As stated in the Encyclopaedia Britan-
nica (2017), eclecticism is a philosophical idea of practices that choose
doctrines from a wide variety of schools of thought but do not completely
adopt the parent system. When considering the US style of peacebuilding
that is considered to operate according to neoliberal values, Matyok et al.
(2011: 127) draw from the work of Galtung to argue that actors such
as the US should use eclectic development to expand capitalist ideologies
that can include both socialist and African local structures, so that it is
possible to be considerate of local practices even if they do not meet the
standards of liberal peace. Liberal peacebuilding models have previously
been criticised for being overly top-down and institutionalised (Mac Ginty
and Sanghera 2012). However, it is important to remember that non-
intervention remains at the core of Chinese foreign policy despite that fact
that at times, China try to enshrine local ownership when putting more
focus on local issues. Given that developmental peace does not have a
standardised approach, China is allowed to take an eclectic approach with
the different types of conflict in Asia, which mean that developmental
peace shares some traits of adaptive peacebuilding because both China’s
developmental peace and adaptive peacebuilding are process-oriented
pragmatic approaches (de Coning 2018).
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As stated, non-intervention remains at the core of Chinese foreign
policy and thus, when China is engaging in international peacebuilding,
the host country’s sovereignty is respected through China’s develop-
mental peace. This approach is useful when trying to build trust with
the host government. For example, China’s mediation between Sudan
and South Sudan enjoyed support from both sides, despite Beijing’s poor
relationship with Juba resulting from the fact that China did not force
outcomes but mainly set the stage for the conflicting parties to negotiate
(ICG 2017). In addition, the RAND Corporation’s research on China’s
foreign aid reveals that among the three types of foreign aid (i.e. grants,
interest-free loans and concessional loans), China prefers to give conces-
sional loans, while the US mostly provides grants (Wolf et al. 2013).
China’s preference for giving aid is vulnerable to criticism. For example,
US Vice President Mike Pence made critical remarks against China, refer-
ring to its ‘debt diplomacy’ in Sri Lanka (The Hudson Institute 2018).
The West does not consider China a democracy, so traditional donors
such as the US sometimes become sceptical of Chinese practices abroad.
In fact, China is similar to Japan in relation to providing foreign aid.
In addition, accusing China of engaging in debt diplomacy is simplistic
because China has forgiven significant debts of its partners such as Cuba
and Cambodia (Rapoza 2019). As stated, this is similar to Japan, who in
2012 forgave US$3.72 billion worth of debt for Myanmar and restarted
loans (Reuters 2012).
The feature that most differentiates developmental peace from existing
models of peacebuilding is its ‘no political strings attached’ policy. All
types of government can receive Chinese aid, so long as the recipient
government respects the One China Policy by not recognising Taiwan.
For China, regardless of the recipient’s type of government, all coun-
tries should enjoy equal rights and opportunities for development. This
also connects to the concept that is introduced later in this chapter,
whereby China focuses on the right to development as a basic human
right. Other Asian countries such as Japan displays a similar style. For
example, in 2018, Japan was criticised by the West for continuing to
provide developmental aid to Cambodia despite Prime Minister Hun
Sen’s move towards authoritarianism, which discouraged most Western
actors from engaging with Cambodia (Kasai and Adams 2018). Given that
China is not a member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD), it has even fewer restrictions on the type of
recipient government to which it can provide aid, which allows China
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more flexibility in how it supports the development of other developing
countries. As a new player in international peacebuilding, China must use
this flexibility to its advantage to engage with countries such as Myanmar,
Pakistan and Afghanistan, with whom Western countries may have diffi-
culty directly engaging. To some extent, this can be considered a unique
‘niche’ for peacebuilding of non-Western countries such as China and
Japan.
Thus, China’s developmental peace is based on its own experience as
the largest developing country in the world that does not pursue the
liberal model of peacebuilding. Instead, China adopts a more process-
oriented pragmatic approach to peacebuilding, maintaining the firm belief
that all countries, regardless of their government type, should enjoy the
benefits of economic development, and that such development will facil-
itate lasting peace in conflict-affected societies. China is not a member
of the OECD and is less constrained by existing international institutions
in relation to providing foreign aid to developing countries. However,
given that it is a new player in the field of peacebuilding, China still has
many weaknesses compared with experienced players such as Japan. Later,
this chapter discusses that China does not have the necessary nongovern-
ment organisations (NGOs) to replicate the Japanese model, and this
has resulted in hindering the ability of the Chinese to deliver effective
development aid directly aimed at grassroots operations. The following
two case studies examine the application of China’s developmental peace
in the post-conflict societies of Myanmar and Afghanistan to provide
understanding of developmental peace in practice.
Case Studies
The following two case studies of Myanmar and Afghanistan/Pakistan
explore the practice of developmental peace in post-conflict societies.
Strictly speaking, both Myanmar and Afghanistan (with some parts of
Pakistan) have ongoing conflicts that require careful attention from inter-
national society. The developmental peace conducted in these countries
has induced a shift in the Chinese approach from non-intervention to
what Lin (2019) refers to as ‘constructive intervention’. The following
case studies provide understanding of Chinese peacebuilding on the
ground in conflict-affected societies to provide evidence that China’s
developmental peace resembles existing hybrid peacebuilding models.
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The case studies identify the unique Chinese characteristics of develop-
mental peace as well as its shortcomings.
Myanmar
Background
China shares a border with Myanmar. As neighbours, Sino–Burmese
official relations began in 1950, shortly after the establishment of the
People’s Republic of China. China and Myanmar often call each other
‘paukphaw’, which translates to ‘sibling’ or ‘intimate’, demonstrating that
the two countries have enjoyed close relations ever since their diplo-
matic relations were established (Geng 2006). China’s engagement with
Myanmar is also based on the Sino-Burmese Joint Declaration (signed
29 June 1954), which emphasised that China and Myanmar’s relations
should be based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (ibid.).
That is, China approached Myanmar with a policy of non-intervention.
However, China’s non-intervention approach to Myanmar encountered
difficulties when constant ethnic fighting between Myanmar’s armed
ethnic groups and the Tatmadaw (Myanmar military) began spilling over
the Chinese border, killing Chinese civilians and damaging Chinese prop-
erty. In March 2015, four Chinese citizens were reported by the Chinese
state media to have been killed in a misjudged bombing by the Myanmar
air force, and two months later, another mistake killed five more citizens
and injured more (Panda 2015; Tiezzi 2015). In addition to fighting
spilling over into China, there has been a surge of refugees crossing the
China-Myanmar border, which compelled China to take more robust
actions to address the problem of the ethnic conflict in Myanmar.
A turning point for Sino-Burmese relations was when Aung San Suu
Kyi became the state counsellor of Myanmar in 2016, ruling through a
civilian government alongside Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, who has
been Myanmar’s commander-in-chief since 2011. At that time in 2016,
the Chinese government considered how Aung San Suu Kyi becoming
state counsellor would change the political situation in Myanmar and
how China should react to the shift in Myanmar’s new political envi-
ronment. Zhang (2020) claims that with the rise of Aung San Suu Kyi,
Myanmar became a diarchy, but the same problems (e.g. ethnic tensions
and economic underdevelopment outside the capital) remained despite
finally having a civilian-led government, alongside the military govern-
ment of Myanmar. He adds that the eight occasions on which President Xi
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Jinping met with Aung San Suu Kyi and the four times he met with Min
Aung Hlaing were mainly about addressing ethnic tensions in Myanmar
(ibid.). This demonstrates that China recognises that the crux of Myan-
mar’s conflicts is centred on the various ethnic groups that have been in
conflict with the Tatmadaw, and that if China is to realise its geopolit-
ical, strategic and economic incentives in the BRI, it cannot remain a side
player in Myanmar, adhering to its principles of non-intervention, but
would have to directly engage in Myanmar’s internal conflict.
While most Western media outlets have focused their attention on the
humanitarian crisis with the Rohingyas in Rakhine State, other ethnic
minorities, such as the Wa and Kachin minorities, have also been engaged
in armed conflict with the Myanmar government. Therefore, the situation
in Myanmar requires a targeted approach that needs to adapt to the local
situation of the many ethnic groups.
Developmental Peace in the Mid-Space
When considering locating mid-space actors in the ethnic conflicts of
Myanmar, China recognises that ethnic tensions are at the heart of most
conflicts in Myanmar. Thus, the armed militia of these ethnic groups, such
as the United Wa State Army (UWSA), are gatekeepers in the mid-space
in Myanmar, and China often must go through these players to engage
directly with the grassroots groups. However, the importance of China’s
close relations with and potential leverage over the Tatmadaw cannot be
understated because China is one of the few international actors that
have the potential to mediate ethnic conflicts in Myanmar. Sun (2019)
claims that over the six years of Chinese mediation in Myanmar, China
came to the conclusion that the distrust between the Myanmar govern-
ment and the country’s ethnic groups was too great for any negotiations
related to power sharing to occur or to have any positive effect, and top–
down negotiations provided little incentive for locals to support the peace
process.
Thus, China has sought to transform the relations between the
Tatmadaw and the armed ethnic groups through economic develop-
ment and to reduce the incentives for fighting. China considers that
through this approach, the Tatmadaw will be forced to realise that they
can no longer defeat armed ethnic militias permanently, thus allowing
ethnic groups to be beneficiaries of economic development, which will
increase the resilience of these groups to conflict caused by the scarcity of
resources. China’s developmental peace supports this process by bringing
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Myanmar into the BRI megaproject, for example, through the construc-
tion of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), which will
encompass Tengchong city and Kachin State’s capital Myitkyina, the
Ruili-Muse gate of northern Shan State and the Mengding-Chinshwehaw
gate, close to Wa and Kokang (Sun 2019).
Returning to the example of the UWSA, the border province of Wa
State has received such extensive development through Chinese invest-
ment that it resembles a Chinse province more than it does Myanmar.
A report by the BBC reveals that Wa State uses the Chinese Yuan as its
currency, Mandarin is widely spoken in the state, and basic infrastructure
such as water, electricity and even mobile telephone signals are provided
across the border from Chinese companies (Fisher 2016). The report adds
that the UWSA protects Wa State from the Tatmadaw and that Wa State
has enjoyed prosperous relationships with the Chinese owing to its prox-
imity with China (ibid.). For Chinese development to penetrate on the
ground in Myanmar (or in the case of the Wa State, to penetrate across
the border), China must also have considerable leverage over the UWSA.
In fact, the UWSA is armed by the Chinese, and China uses this army as
a buffer against the Tatmadaw to push for potential benefits elsewhere in
Myanmar, for example, with the Kyaukpyu Port oil pipeline in Rakhine
State (Lintner 2019). Given that it is armed with sophisticated military
hardware from China, it is unlikely that the UWSA can be defeated by the
Tatmadaw. Thus, the two conflicting parties should be more compelled to
negotiate, and without fighting, the Wa State’s grassroots have the oppor-
tunity to enjoy many of the beneficial effects of Chinese development as
long as China maintains positive relations with the UWSA.
In the Kachin state, China has assumed the role of a mediator between
the Kachin Independence Organisation and the Myanmar government.
Without China, it would have been difficult for any talks to occur between
these two parties because they harbour a great deal of distrust of each
other (Sun 2013).
It is also important to consider the position that the Tatmadaw takes
in the ethnic conflicts in Myanmar. Just as the armed ethnic militias are
gatekeepers that can allow or prevent Chinese development from reaching
their people, the Tatmadaw can also act as a gatekeeper. With the rise of
Aung Sun Suu Kyi’s civilian government, Myanmar was effectively turned
into a diarchy. Therefore, it is important for outside actors such as China
to maintain close relations with both the civilian and the military govern-
ment of Myanmar. China has also armed the Tatmadaw over the years.
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Chen and Ning (2020) argue that Beijing needs to stop prioritising the
economic benefits of arms sales to Naypyidaw and consider halting these
sales because there have been many cases where China has suffered casu-
alties from the spillover effects of the war. If China stops the supply of
arms, it would be unrealistic for the Tatmadaw to defeat all the armed
ethnic groups in Myanmar, compelling parties at conflict in Myanmar to
make peace and work together for economic development.
This principle also applies to the UWSA because they are also armed
by the Chinese, and as fighting continues, leading to the stagnation of
Chinese development in Myanmar, China should feel obliged to use
its leverage over the Tatmadaw and the UWSA to negotiate for peace.
Reporting on development in Myanmar, the Irrawaddy (a Burmese news-
paper) states that recently pledged 4 billion yuan (US$580 million)
over three years to support Myanmar’s economic development, and that
between 2014 and 2019, China invested a total of 4.9 billion yuan
(US$690 million) focused on the sectors of infrastructure, agriculture
and education (Thiha 2020). Without positive relations between China
and both the civilian and the military governments of Myanmar, Chinese
development aid cannot reach the grassroots. Without positive relations
with mid-space actors such as the UWSA, China would not be able to
access Wa State despite its geographical proximity to the Chinese border.
Another case in which China attempts to engage in developmental
peace in Myanmar is in the Rakhine crisis. With the Rakhine crisis,
China has surprisingly taken a step back towards non-intervention, advo-
cating the importance of allowing only the directly concerned parties
(i.e. Myanmar and Bangladesh) to negotiate repatriation of the Rohingya
refugees. The role China took between the two was that of a mediator,
proposing the Three Point Plan as a three-step approach to ceasing the
violence, repatriating the refugees and facilitating the economic develop-
ment of the Rakhine State. However, this Three Point Plan has received
criticism from international actors. For example, Joy (2018) claims that
the first point of the plan, which calls for a ceasefire, is no longer relevant
because the violence has mostly ceased; that in relation to the second
point of the plan, China’s role during the signing of the influential repa-
triation pact between Myanmar and Bangladesh is not clear; and that in
relation to the third point of the plan, China understates the severity of
the crisis by considering that it can be solved through economic under-
development. Human Rights Watch (2018) reported that there are no
signs in Myanmar that the refugees will be safe when they return to
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Rakhine, despite China’s offer to provide the Rakhine State with prefabri-
cated homes to enable refugees trapped in Bangladesh to return (Xinhua
2018a). From the perspectives of the West, China struggles to address
problems such as the Rakhine crisis. For example, it is claimed that China
is not ready to tackle sensitive issues, unlike traditional donors, because
the Chinese government faces similar problems at home (Richmond and
Tellidis 2014).
Given the unique situation of Myanmar, in which civilian and mili-
tary leaders are juxtaposed, China must constantly engage with both
Aung San Suu Kyi’s civilian government and Min Aung Hlaing’s military
government. Over the years as China has engaged with Myanmar, China
has realised that ethnic groups are gatekeepers and any peace process
must begin with transforming relations between the ethnic groups and
the Myanmar government, particularly the Tatmadaw. This realisation
demonstrates that China has adapted to the local situation of Myanmar
and has aimed to transform the relations between the conflicting parties
through economic development such as the BRI’s CMEC to decrease
incentives for fighting. However, China’s use of a similar approach to




Afghanistan and Pakistan are considered as one case study because China’s
peacebuilding efforts in Afghanistan cannot be divorced from China’s
engagement with Pakistan. This situation dates back to 1962 in the Cold
War, when both Afghanistan and Pakistan expected China to play the role
of a mediator, but at the time, China’s Premier Zhou Enlai did not want
China assuming the role (Khalil 2018). In fact, Pakistan did not become
China’s strategic partner until after the Sino-Indian War in 1964. In addi-
tion, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, China supported the
Mujahideen insurgency against the Soviets, which resulted in strained ties
between China and Afghanistan, but also Afghan’s belief that Pakistan
was behind the insecurity in Afghanistan (ibid.). Further, there are many
current reports that the Taliban is in the Western Balochistan province
of Pakistan (Notezai 2019), and the fact that Osama Bin Laden was
found and killed in Pakistan in 2011 demonstrates how closely Pakistan
was involved with Afghanistan and the Taliban. This also means that
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China’s close relationship with Pakistan also gives the Chinese access to
the Taliban.
Afghanistan shares a much shorter border with China that does with
Myanmar, but the importance and implications of China’s relationship
with Afghanistan are no less significant than China’s relationship with
Myanmar. In 2001 when George W. Bush invaded Afghanistan to retaliate
against the September 11 attacks, China provided moral support to the
US action. However, this support was only verbal because China did not
want to be seen by the Islamic world as directly supporting what was seen
by many as an anti-Muslim NATO coalition, fearing that this would fuel
further extremism in the Xinjiang province (Zhao 2013). It is interesting
that the Chinese government decided to support (but did not provide
physical support) the US during the US invasion of Afghanistan despite
Sino-US relations being at an all-time low because of the 1999 bombing
of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by NATO, which occurred only
two years before the September 11 attacks (Hui 2019). When the war
ended, China emphasised that the post-war Afghan peace process should
be ‘Afghan owned and Afghan led’, and the Chinese have maintained this
narrative to the present day (Xinhua 2020). To support the peace process
being Afghan owned and Afghan led, China’s permanent representative
to the UN, Zhang Jun, stated at a plenary meeting in the UN General
Assembly that the Afghan-owned and Afghan-led peace process must be
supported by international actors such as the US in the existing peace
talks, while China would also promote peace talks through international
organisations such as the SCO and through China-Afghanistan-Pakistan
Foreign Ministers’ Dialogues (Xinhua 2019b). China also stated that it
would continue to support Afghanistan’s economic development through
implementing a bilateral memorandum of understanding with the BRI to
help Afghanistan boost trade links in the region (ibid.).
China is interested in the peaceful resolution of the war in Afghanistan
for two principal reasons. First, China wants to prevent the spillover
of religious extremism from neighbouring Afghanistan into its relatively
short western boarder of the Xinjiang province. Foreign Minister Wang Yi
praised Afghanistan’s efforts in taking effective measures against the East
Turkestan Islamic Movement, and in ensuring Afghanistan’s increased
cooperation with China through participation in the BRI (MOFA of
China 2019). However, China also wants to protect its BRI inter-
ests in Pakistan. The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), often
regarded as the BRI’s flagship project, is constantly under threat of from
142 K. WONG AND F. LI
militant groups in Pakistan that have links to the Taliban (Biberman and
Schwartz 2019). Chinese analysts also say China has benefited greatly
from the temporary order created by the US presence in Afghanistan,
and if the US is to withdraw entirely from Afghanistan, it must be done
in an ‘orderly fashion’ to avoid creating any sudden power vacuums in
the region (Zhao 2013). After the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, it
will be the responsibility of regional actors such as China to support
Afghanistan’s reintegration into Asian economy. Thus, China’s interest
in order in the region and its economic interests related to the BRI in
Afghanistan continue to compel China to engage proactively in aiding
the peace process in Afghanistan.
Developmental Peace in the Mid-Space
Pakistan is an important strategic and economic partner for China.
Economically, Pakistan provides China with the valuable Gwadar Port,
which enables Chinese access to the Indian Ocean, and strategically,
both countries have a common regional rival—India. In addition, China’s
relationship with the Afghan government deteriorated significantly when
China supported the Mujahideen insurgency during the Soviet invasion.
Meanwhile, Pakistan and Afghanistan have enjoyed close, but not always
friendly, relations with each other in the past (Khalil 2018). For example,
Pakistan often exploited Afghanistan’s vulnerabilities such as its weak state
and practiced predatory politics against it, such as attempting to install a
mujahideen government in Kabul after Soviet withdrawal in 1989 (Akhtar
2008). As stated, during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan
was also accused by Afghanistan of causing the insecurity of Afghanistan.
Given that insecurity in the Balochistan province in Pakistan has threat-
ened the wellbeing of the CPEC, China needs to bring its close economic
partner, Pakistan, together with a less familiar actor, Afghanistan, to
jointly address the cross-border instability that could potentially threaten
the BRI. In addition, Pakistan and Afghanistan have often approached
China to request its mediation between the Afghan government and the
Taliban, and Kabul have expressed interest in being a part of the BRI
in connection with the CPEC (Bokhari 2019) if stability is attained in
Afghanistan. Therefore, in theory, it is possible for China to engage
Afghanistan directly, but it would be more effective to also engage
Pakistan because the conflict involves a cross-border regional problem for
both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Overall, China’s approach to Afghanistan
has three levels. On the international level, China and the US engage
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Afghanistan through international organisations; on the regional level,
China engages Afghanistan through Pakistan; and on the ground level
in Afghanistan, the engagement is bilateral between Beijing and Kabul,
and will possibly include the Taliban.
Pakistan plays an important role of giving China access to the
local Afghan gatekeepers: the Taliban. The China-Afghanistan-Pakistan
Foreign Ministers’ Dialogue has been conducted on an annual basis
since 2017. In the first meeting between Chinese Foreign Minister Wang
Yi, Afghan Foreign Minister Salahuddin Rabbani and Pakistani Foreign
Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif, the basic premises of the coopera-
tion among these countries were outlined, emphasising the importance
of bringing Afghanistan to peace through mutual trust, with the issue
of counterterrorism being mentioned briefly (MOFA of the People’s
Republic of China 2017). In 2018, when the three foreign ministers
(with the new foreign minister of Pakistan, Shah Mahmood Qureshi)
met again, the issue of counterterrorism and the Taliban received greater
attention (MOFA of the People’s Republic of China 2018). Finally, in
2019, the three countries continued to underline the importance of
counterterrorism and the greater commitment of Afghanistan to partici-
pating in the BRI (MOFA of Afghanistan 2019). Given that the Taliban
insurgency is a regional problem that spills over the borders of Pakistan
and Afghanistan, it is important for China to include both countries in
resolving tensions in the region and the threat of terrorism. Of course,
there is always the option for China to engage directly with the Taliban,
but this would contradict China’s principle of non-intervention if it
conducted such engagement without the consent of the Afghan and
Pakistani governments.
In talking with the Taliban, China emulates the approach it has taken
with other parties such as Myanmar and recognises that the Taliban insur-
gency is the root cause of the instability in Afghanistan. While the US
has also initiated talks with the Taliban, US diplomacy alone is insuf-
ficient in bringing stability to Afghanistan. For example, in September
2019, US President Donald Trump called off a scheduled meeting with
the Taliban after a bomb attack in Kabul killed 11 people, including
one US soldier (Sediqi 2019). Another difficulty in engaging in talks
with the Taliban is that they have refused to talk to the ‘puppet govern-
ment’ of Kabul and have demanded direct talks with the US; however,
this attitude has changed considerably after the many years of fighting
in Afghanistan (Jackson 2018). China’s recognition of the Taliban as a
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gatekeeper is important because it shows that China has considerable
adaptability in its approach to Afghanistan. It could even be argued
that China is practising Track II diplomacy in this case. For example,
in top-down government-to-government talks, China remains flexible in
involving many stakeholders, such as Pakistan, the Afghan government in
Kabul, and the US, related to the conflict, which is seen in the establish-
ment of a Quadrilateral Coordination Group consists of China, the US,
Pakistan and Afghanistan that was characterised as a peace mechanism
for strengthening unity and forming consensus (Global Times 2017). In
addition, China has organised direct talks with the Taliban as well, with
the consent from Kabul, but specifics of these talks remain classified for
now.
China realises that it cannot rely only on the top-down government-
to-government approach in Afghanistan because national identity and
unity has never been strong in Afghanistan (K.R. He 2019a). For
example, Dupree (2002) notes that despite the rich cultural heritage of
Afghanistan, attempts to facilitate national unity have seen mixed success
because Afghans took little pride in their country’s heritage before the
war, and even less after. Since Afghanistan’s state unity is so weak, it
is important for outside intervenors such as China and the US to help
Afghans first to consolidate a common national identity, or at least to
strive for a common goal through the establishment of a ‘transformative
relationship’. Kagawa (2020) argues that a transformative relationship is
an asset that enables mid-space actors to connect with each other through
shared norms and experiences. Through a transformative relationship,
gatekeepers can help to rebuild broken trust and relationships between
conflicting parties.
Jackson (2018) states that on the ground, the Taliban have relin-
quished their cruel and brutal ways of the past and are attempting to show
a different face—that they can do everything the government can do, but
better. That is, the Taliban were once peace-spoilers who denounced the
US-led Afghan government in Kabul as a ‘US puppet’ (Sediqi 2019), but
are now trying to compete with the government in Kabul as a provider
of public goods to the grassroots communities in Afghanistan. Given that
the Afghan government is mainly focused on the reconstruction of major
cities, the rural areas are run mostly by the Taliban, who appoint village
elders as civil servants to monitor schools and hospitals or collect taxes in
villages, and at times, to provide connections to Kabul (Jackson 2018).
The precise extent of the Taliban’s control is difficult to judge, but in
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many areas, it is an accepted fact that the Taliban are in charge even
without flying its flag (ibid.).
Given that it is difficult to nurture the creation of a national identity in
Afghanistan in the short term, China is investing in constructing a trans-
formative relationship between the Taliban and the government in Kabul
through working towards a common goal of rebuilding Afghanistan.
Because Afghanistan needs foreign aid to rebuild its war-torn country,
China has already shown positive signs that it wants to incorporate
Afghanistan into the BRI, connecting it with the CPEC in Pakistan. An
overseas analyst on Afghanistan claims that Afghanistan’s natural resources
would be better exploited by neighbouring countries, and that China,
with its economic resources, happens to be the only country capable
of doing so (Sarwar 2020). While this may omit consideration of other
potential regional actors such as India and Japan, China is definitely one
of the closest sources of foreign aid for both Kabul and the Taliban if
they decide to cease direct violence and to compete with each other to
attract foreign aid or investment such as is offered through Chinese devel-
opment projects included in the BRI. This is similar to the CMEC in
Myanmar, where special economic zones could be established and where
an increase in the number of stakeholders in these projects would lessen
the likelihood of direct violence that could jeopardise development and
lead to losing the support of the locals. Both Kabul and the Taliban could
be empowered by development projects because the Taliban too have
shown signs that they require local support with the help of village elders,
transforming their gatekeeper role from peace-spoiler to bridge-builder.
However, it is always useful to remember that China still considers itself
an outsider to Afghanistan’s problems. Through the Istanbul Process,
a platform created for Afghanistan to discuss regional issues with its
neighbours, China has pushed for reconciliation processes for local ethnic
groups in Afghanistan (Hu 2018). In relation to specific development aid,
one of the first forms of infrastructure that China built in Afghanistan
was hydraulic engineering, and as water begins to flow, there will be
electricity and other developments (Sun 2014). For the future, Presi-
dent Xi Jinping has encouraged Chinese companies to actively invest in
Afghanistan (ibid.), but of course these investments will only occur if the
situation becomes stable in Afghanistan. Therefore, there are clear and
strong incentives for the Taliban to become bridge-builders if they are
competing with Kabul for governing rights of the country, as continued
fighting and violence will scare investors away.
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Shortcomings and a Step Forward
Chinese peacebuilding through developmental peace is by no means
perfect. It is a new approach that has many loopholes that make it a target
of criticism from the West. One of these weaknesses is the lack of Chinese
NGOs that can support the bottom-up process. China’s NGOs are under-
developed, not only because they are too tightly controlled by Beijing
but also because at times, they are seen as jeopardising government aims,
such that even environmental NGOs can be subjected to strict regula-
tions (Feldshuh 2018). In contrast, many Japanese NGOs are familiar
with the situation at the grassroots level (MOFA of Japan 2017) because
Japan conducts its Official Development Assistance (ODA) through these
NGOs and has public-private partnership organisations such as the Japan
Platform that provide emergency humanitarian aid, and enable the coor-
dination of government and private sector funding with NGOs (Japan
Platform 2019). Unlike Tokyo, Beijing has not shown the same type of
support for local NGOs in the host county it operates, such as Myanmar.
For example, Chen and Ning (2020) argue that in Myanmar, communi-
ties that are located away from the city centres may not feel the benefits
of the BRI, and thus, such communities would prefer a Japanese NGO
to construct a school or dig a well in their local village.
A potential remedy for this problem is that China would substitute
the role usually played by NGOs with Chinese State-Owned Enterprises
(SOEs), similar to the way in which Japanese NGOs and JICA coordi-
nate the public and private sectors to efficiently deliver ODA to the host
country (JICA, n.d.). A study conducted in Myanmar demonstrates that
many Chinese SOEs are conducting grassroots projects, where smaller
Chinese private companies provide logistics support for larger companies
while also engaging with local companies (Dunn et al. 2016). However,
the problem with Chinese SOEs substituting Chinese NGOs does little
to improve Myanmar’s general negative public perception of China.
In a policy brief written by the International Growth Centre presents
evidence that Chinese companies on the ground are subject to negative
bias because they are from China, and that this bias is greatly reduced
when the foreign company is from Japan (Yao and Zhang 2018). In fact,
Dunn et al. (2016) note that Chinese SOEs are generally aware of the
environmental and social impacts of investment, but that these compa-
nies often lack the capacity to address issues related to these impacts,
thus these researchers suggest that Chinese SOEs should collaborate and
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share experiences with established foreign companies on the ground. In
contrast, private companies are more difficult to monitor and often rely on
the knowledge of their local partners for information on environmental
and social impacts of investment (ibid.). This reveals the inexperience
of Chinese companies operating in grassroots development compared
with experienced foreign actors such as the Japanese private sector. As
China becomes more engaged in peacebuilding, these shortcomings can
be addressed more effectively with closer coordination between Chinese
actors and their local counterparts such as private companies and NGOs,
as well as between Chinese actors and established foreign actors such as
Japanese companies and NGOs.
Another common criticism directed against China is the lack of
promotion of human rights. In Myanmar, Human Rights Watch (2018)
criticised the rushed repatriation process of the Rohingyas, where the
issue of citizenship has never been addressed. In defence of China, it
can be argued that the Chinese have a fundamentally different under-
standing from the West of what constitutes basic human rights. While
the West considers metaphysical concepts such as identity as a basis of
human rights, as seen in the Rakhine crisis, China considers human rights
of groups such as the Rohingya refugees are met by ensuring the equal
right to live a life with dignity under the economic development that
Chinese BRI projects can bring to the Rakhine State. Xinhua (2019a)
(China’s state media agency) reported that China, on behalf of 139 states
in the UN, called for the full realisation of the right to development for all
people in 2019, stating that all people should have equal rights to partic-
ipate in development and ensure ‘a life of dignity’. With Afghanistan, it
is also possible that China will continue to engage with the government
to improve the standard of living for the locals as violence ceases and
development is allowed to occur.
It is also possible that Chinese peacebuilding based on developmental
peace can drive the overall peacebuilding environment in the region
towards being more elite driven. The Chinese style of developmental
peace emphasises the fact that stable government-centred policies are
most efficient in helping a developing country achieve economic develop-
ment, as was true for Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and China.
Currently, there is no clear evidence that China has been in close coop-
eration with grassroots mid-space actors such as local NGOs. Some of
China’s local engagement that is not with the official government of the
host country is mainly with local armed groups such as the UWSA. To
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some extent, engagement with such groups still represents a somewhat
elite-driven process because the unarmed civilians do not always have a say
in the decision-making process between the UWSA and the Tatmadaw.
However, it is also important to recognise that local armed groups are
also a type of mid-space gatekeeper. For example, Kagawa (2020) argues
the importance of building a transformative relationship with Bangsamoro
rebel leaders.
Another example of China focusing their relationship mainly on local
elites is seen in their relationship with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelli-
gence (ISI) that plays a role of gatekeepers to the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Taliban commanders stated that the power of the ISI is “as clear as the
sun in the sky” (Waldman 2010). While they are not a puppet of the ISI,
the Taliban are often at the mercy of the ISI’s power and the ISI has
previously arrested Taliban leaders with the aim of disrupting peace talks
because Pakistan does not want peace in Afghanistan. However, without
the ISI, the Taliban find it difficult to even host meetings (ibid.). Western
powers have a troubling relationship with the ISI as there is little evidence
that the US and international pressure has had any impact on safe havens
in Pakistan for the Taliban (ibid.). Because of the ISI’s profoundly impor-
tant role in Afghanistan and its deep connections with the Taliban, and
because of China’s close relations with the Pakistani government, the
Chinese are granted access to the ground level of Afghan communities
under the Taliban’s control. Unlike the ISI, China’s main interests in
Afghanistan are economic, that is, China seeks peace in Afghanistan for
the sake of the BRI.
Given the amount of geopolitical competition in Asia, peacebuilding in
this region may not always be based on altruistic motives. For example,
the geopolitical implications of China’s engagement with the Taliban in
bringing peace to Afghanistan for the BRI may be only a by-product of
China’s close relationship with Pakistan to counter India. In addition,
China may exercise its leverage on the UWSA only to prevent excessive
foreign influences on Myanmar using the UWSA as a buffer with the
Tatmadaw. The West, with its epistemology of liberal peace has done the
same by facilitating regime change to sweep out authoritarian regimes and
replace them with Western friendly democracies, giving rise to arguments
that Western regimes are more interested in being agents of transforma-
tion than helping with conflict resolution (Orakzai 2015). The Chinese
model is not perfect by any means, currently, China continues to collab-
orate with government and local elites more than with local grassroots
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groups. This may be because China itself does not have a well-developed
system of civil society and NGOs to support its developmental peace on
the ground. Perhaps this is where actors such as Japan who have the
necessary tools such as NGOs can supplement China’s efforts after China
gains unique access to mid-space actors through developmental peace.
Conclusion
At the beginning of the chapter, we asked whether China’s developmental
peace represents a form of hybrid peacebuilding: the answer is yes and no.
China’s developmental peace has transcended its previous foreign policy
principle of non-intervention, and has pushed China to engage not only
with the host country’s government through a top-down approach, but
also with a much wider variety of local actors to pursue the bottom-up
approach of hybrid peacebuilding. However, given that China is still a
beginner in hybrid peacebuilding, it faces criticism from both interna-
tional and local communities for its lack of engagement with grassroots
groups. Therefore, it may be more accurate to say that China’s develop-
mental peace is a style of Asian peacebuilding that has traits of or the
potential for hybrid peacebuilding. China is aware that no standardised
template of peacebuilding can address the wide variety of different conflict
scenarios, and that peacebuilding must be adaptive to the different types
of conflict faced in different regions.
As the second largest economy in the world, China is keen to be
an active player in international peacebuilding. In Myanmar, where
China was traditionally constrained by its non-intervention principle, the
Chinese government was eventually compelled to address the root prob-
lems of ethnic unrest as border clashes became more serious, causing casu-
alties among Chinese citizens. China’s peacebuilding goal in Myanmar
was to increase the resilience of local ethnic groups through the BRI’s
CMEC so that these ethnic groups longer had to compete with the
Tatmadaw for scarce resources. China has engaged with gatekeepers such
as the UWSA and maintained friendly relationships with these gate-
keepers, leading to a type of development in Wa State that made the
state look like a Chinese province. In addition, China has not forgotten
its fundamental principle of non-intervention, as seen in the fact that it
continues to engage with the Tatmadaw to convince both sides to cease
violence to allow development to occur in Myanmar under the BRI.
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To enable development in Afghanistan, China must collaborate with
its local economic and strategic partner, Pakistan, because the conflict
in Afghanistan is a cross-border regional problem for both China and
Pakistan. Through mediating the peace process between Pakistan and
Afghanistan, China created the opportunity to engage with the Taliban,
who were the key gatekeepers, and to address the root cause of the
instability in Afghanistan. Because the Taliban are competing with the
Afghan government in Kabul as a provider of public goods, the Taliban
are more interested in the peace and development that the BRI offers.
Given this interest, the Taliban could be transformed from a peace-spoiler
to a bridge-builder because they want to attract more Chinese investment
in the areas they occupy.
However, China’s developmental peace also attracts criticism. The
lack of the presence of Chinese NGOs at the grassroots level of the
host country severely hinders China’s ability to deliver aid to grassroots
communities that are located away from the cities that receive Chinese aid
and are the focus of BRI projects. Even when China attempts to remedy
this through its SOEs to directly target remote communities in the host
country, the negative image of China held by the people in countries
such as Myanmar and Afghanistan makes it difficult for China to effec-
tively deliver aid in such areas. China has also been criticised for not
placing sufficient emphasis on the importance of human rights when it
has served as a mediator. However, this criticism mostly arises because
of the mismatch between China and the West over what constitutes basic
human rights, and which aspect of basic human rights must be prioritised.
The Chinese focus more on the physical side of human rights, prioritising
providing grassroots groups with the right to economic development and
to live a life in dignity because for China, economic development is one of
the best ways to realise human dignity. Meanwhile the West, puts more
priority on ideas such as human rights and democracy, with economic
development coming afterwards.
As conflict situations change around the world, processes of peace-
building must continue to adapt and evolve. Complex conflicts involving
ethnic minorities in Myanmar and non-state actors in Afghanistan can
no longer be solved through a standardised approach of expanding
liberal institutions as guided by the model of liberal peacebuilding. New
approaches such as hybrid peacebuilding, which places strong emphasis
on the interactive nature of the top-down and bottom-up process, and
adaptive peacebuilding, which changes the course according to the needs
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of the society concerned, are considered vital for peace to be sustainable.
China has employed the model of developmental peace and attempted
to apply it to neighbouring countries suffering from conflict, such as
Myanmar and Afghanistan, through collaborating with its neighbours,
Bangladesh and Pakistan, respectively. China’s developmental peace shares
many traits and similarities with the Japanese style of peacebuilding, which
will be elaborated in the following chapter of this book. Unlike liberal
peacebuilding, China’s developmental peace does not apply a standardised
approach, but treats each conflict as a unique situation that requires China
to continue adapting its approach to ensure it is responsive to changing
realities on the ground. In this sense, China’s developmental peace is
adaptive. However, this developmental peace needs to be improved so
that it can achieve closer engagement with the grassroots level, trans-
forming China’s developmental peace into a fully developed model of
hybrid peacebuilding.
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CHAPTER 8
Japan’s Peacebuilding andMid-Space Actors:
A Bridge Between theWest and the Rest
Yuji Uesugi and Anna Deekeling
Introduction
In the previous chapters, it was discussed how the hybrid peacebuilding
theory might transform existing approaches to peacebuilding. The aim
was to solidify the theoretical framework of an operationalisation of the
hybrid peacebuilding theory so that it can better address the realities
of peacebuilding in Asia. In contrast, this chapter takes an inductive
approach and examines Japan’s approaches to peacebuilding, which is
defined by the Japanese government as “consolidation of peace” and
“nation-building” (MOFA 2007).
Before turning to the main task, three core premises of this study are
recapitulated here. First, mid-space actors who enjoy access to different
sources of power, both formal and informal, and maintain a deep cultural
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and normative understanding of their community, can assume the func-
tion of a gatekeeper (Uesugi 2020). Second, these gatekeepers possess
inherent characteristics that cannot be emulated by outsiders. These
include transformative relationships (the ability and willingness to interact
with key stakeholders outside one’s immediate social sphere), locally
grounded legitimacy (a collective trust of the constituency gained through
their knowledge and power), and laissez-passer (a special access to infor-
mation and resources that are closed to strangers). Third, depending on
the circumstances, these gatekeepers become either bridge-builders who
can cross over the existing cleavages or spoilers who can oppose and
jeopardise ongoing peacebuilding efforts.
A logical corollary of these propositions is that outside intervenors
need to identify mid-space actors and work with them and, if necessary
and appropriate, help them serve as bridge-builders. This chapter is an
attempt to evaluate Japan’s peacebuilding efforts from that angle. The
following sheds light on three cases of outstanding Japanese engagement
with mid-space actors in conflict-affected localities in Asia—Timor-Leste,
Myanmar and Mindanao, the Philippines. Features of Japan’s peace-
building approaches are outlined first, and then, empirical records of
Japan’s peacebuilding efforts in the above three cases are examined.
Before concluding the chapter, the shortcomings of Japanese approaches
are also discussed.
Features of Japan’s Peacebuilding
This section highlights distinctive and unique characteristics of Japan’s
peacebuilding approach. An inherent trait of Japan’s peacebuilding is
found in the origin and the genesis of modern Japan, a non-Western
nation-state located at the eastern offshore end of the Eurasian conti-
nent (Umesao 1957/1967). Japan’s defeat in the Second World War
(WWII), and most notably its post-war Constitution, has shaped the basic
foundation of Japan’s peacebuilding approach. In the following, features
of Japan’s peacebuilding approach are outlined from three angles: (1)
historical traits, (2) aid architectures, and (3) three recurrent practices.
Historical Traits as a Bridge-Builder
Having undergone a difficult modernisation process in the nineteenth
century and embarked on a costly colonisation of its neighbours in the
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first half of the twentieth century, Japan learned the lesson that the sense
of emancipatory local ownership is a key to successful modernisation and
development. Japan once endeavoured to establish the Great East Asia
Co-prosperity Sphere, in which Japan was conceived to serve as a bridge
between the colonial powers in Europe and their colonies in East Asia,
with an aim of establishing an autonomous regional order that would
emancipate East Asia from European control (Ikeda 2008). After this
dream was shattered, Japan sought to present its representational self-
image as a peacebuilder in the post-WWII world (Iwami 2016). Along the
same line, Japan has promoted its own capacity as a bridge-builder (Black
2013), this time, bridging between developed countries in the West and
developing countries in general but especially in Southeast Asia. The
Japanese government justifies this role not only through its geograph-
ical location but also through its own experience as a former developing
country trying to catch up to the West in the nineteenth century, and in
the aftermath of the fierce defeat of WWII.
Japan’s own history of encounter with and infringement by the West,
as well as its experience of post-war reconstruction under ‘colonial arro-
gance’ (Richmond 2018) of the US, has equipped Japan to refine
international peacebuilding to be a more reflective and adaptive under-
taking (de Coning 2018). Utilising its own experience of modernisation
by adopting Western systems and adapting them to fit with the domestic
context, Japan has projected itself as a great example of how to exploit
outside intervention for its own advantage and prosperity.
Aid Architectures
Official Development Assistance (ODA) has been a substantial tool for
Japan’s peacebuilding efforts. Although ODA started mainly as reparation
payments for WWII to Japan’s neighbours, the Japanese government used
it to promote its own economy through contracting Japanese compa-
nies for infrastructure and development projects in Asia (Reilly 2013).
This is a prototype of a win-win approach that Japan advocates. Under
the policy of ‘Boomerang Economy’, private investments and conces-
sional loans by Japanese investors supported large-scale infrastructure
and capital-intensive investments in developing countries (Seekins 2015).
For example, in 2016, 51.1% of bilateral Japanese ODA was used for
economic infrastructure and services, while 59% was for trade promoting
incentives for developing countries (OECD 2018: 349). In addition,
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Japan’s private enterprises play an important role in Japan’s aid archi-
tectures beyond the Government-to-Government level. Around 38% of
Japan’s multilateral ODA is privately funded in cooperation with the
World Bank Group (ibid.: 347). Also, an increasing number of Japanese
companies engage with local businesses in developing countries (ibid.:
346).
Japan’s ODA has two principal aid modalities: Yen loan and technical
cooperation. The former was implemented by the Japanese government
in partnership with Japanese private enterprises. This public-private part-
nership (PPP) is also known as the ‘flying goose’ model of economic
development. The PPP was formed as a vehicle for delivering Yen
loan projects, which symbolise Japan’s long-term commitment to and
guarantee for continuing interest in the successful development of its
investment destinations. In the area of infrastructure and development
assistance, the PPP has been a driving force for Japan’s ODA. On tech-
nical cooperation, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
has led numerous human resource development projects which contribute
to empowering mid-space actors to function as bridge-builders and thus
insider-partial mediators for their communities. Complementary collab-
oration between JICA and Japanese Non-Governmental Organisations
(NGOs) in the execution of Japan’s ODA is another spearhead of Japan’s
peacebuilding approach, which is called the ODANGO. In short, the twin
engines of Japanese approaches are the PPP and the ODANGO.
It is undeniable that a large portion of Japan’s ODA pours into
economic development, concentrating on building key infrastructures
to boost the economy of both Japan and developing countries. Japan’s
private sector collaborates with the Japanese government and continues
to play a vital role in this endeavour (MOFA 2008). As Japan has located
its PPP for economic development under the ‘peace through devel-
opment’ narrative, it would be misleading to omit the contributions
made by Japan’s private companies to peacebuilding. While they have
recently begun to undertake an increasing number of community devel-
opment projects in conflict-affected areas, so far these projects involve
only national actors and their interface with mid-space actors remains
underexplored.
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Three Recurrent Practices
The recurrent practices of Japan’s efforts can be classified into three:
(1) apolitical nature, (2) request-based, and (3) non-interference. While
they are closely intertwined with one another, all of them point to an
underlying Westphalian virtue: primacy of Government-to-Government
relationships.
Japan has been reluctant to get involved in politically sensitive issues.
With this, Japan’s ODA has kept an apolitical nature, revolving around
Japanese expertise in areas of technical solutions and support. This prac-
tice is closely linked with Japan’s emphasis on economic development,
particularly through infrastructure development via Yen loans. In 2003,
when the Japanese government revised its ODA Charter, it decided to
use its foreign aid to facilitate democratic development abroad. Still,
the approach remained distinctive from that of Western donors. Ichi-
hara (2017) called this an “ostensible” departure from Japan’s traditional
policy as Japan’s democratic support centred around helping state insti-
tutions, in effect avoiding unnecessary conflicts with the aid-recipient
government.
The second recurring practice is that Japan’s ODA projects are in prin-
ciple formulated based on requests from the aid-recipient government.
Although Japan can maintain a certain degree of leverage on the final
decisions through offering advice and technical support to key figures
in the aid-recipient government, this practice has given the aid-recipient
governments a sense of security that Japan would not bluntly intrude into
their internal terrain, which resulted in lowering their protective barrier
of sovereignty.
The third practice is represented by Japan’s non-interference stance,
which enabled Japanese actors to engage in situations where access was
denied for Western donors. This non-interference posture of Japan helped
its peacebuilding actors gain an initial advantage by reducing suspicions
in the minds of internationally isolated actors. On the contrary, Western
donors suffered a deficit of trust due to their intrusive approach that
exploited aid as a concealment for regulating the behaviour of an aid-
recipient society so that it would follow ‘universal’ models/standards.
The principle of non-interference, which can be traced back to the
United Nations Charter (Chapter 1, Article 2.7), served as a Westphalian
framework for Japan to invest in developing countries without criticising
unpleasant policies of its counterpart.
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Japan’s Peacebuilding Approaches in Practice
Having outlined the orthodox features of Japan’s peacebuilding efforts,
it is now time to turn our attention to the core quest. While main-
taining an orthodox approach of mainstreaming the Government-to-
Government interface, some Japanese actors made innovative departures
from the recurring patterns in three distinctive peacebuilding settings in
Asia—Timor-Leste, Myanmar and Mindanao. The records of Japanese
engagement in these cases are scrutinised by focusing on the interac-
tion of Japanese actors with mid-space actors who hold the capacities
to bridge vertical, horizontal and diagonal gaps that hamper the peace
process (Uesugi 2020).
Mid-space actors possess attributes of their unique social position
that is rooted in access to varying sources of power and their deep
cultural and normative understanding about the community they control.
Acknowledging the importance of mid-space actors and their function of
placing restrictions on the outreach of an outside agency can enhance
the potential of external actors for working with local actors outside the
immediate range of governmental control. This point is worth noting
if one subscribes to an assumption that acquiring sufficient and accu-
rate knowledge about the local context and dynamics is a prerequisite
for successful outside intervention. Japan’s official peacebuilding actors
such as JICA have worked through the central government of an aid-
recipient country, and often collaborated with Japanese NGOs to carry
out projects at the grassroots. This pattern of partnership can face a diffi-
cult challenge, however, when the central government does not have its
grip on subaltern communities at the grassroots level. Under such circum-
stances, for Japanese actors to operate in areas beyond the reach of the
central government, they would have to earn the trust of mid-space actors
and help them build bridges over existing cleavages.
The mid-space actor typology introduced in Chapter 4 of this study
suggests that outsiders may support mid-space actors by empowering
them as bridge-builders, often through offering them technical and
political skills training, and sharing information that can widen their
perspectives about the conflict dynamics and domains. Building upon the
typology, this section explores the following two inquiries. How have
Japanese actors and mid-space actors interacted with each other in the
peacebuilding process? How have Japanese actors supported them to
better serve as bridge-builders? To clarify these questions, the following
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section examines the empirical records of Japan’s peacebuilding activities
in Timor-Leste, Myanmar and Mindanao, where Japan has engaged in
the capacity development of mid-space actors including key gatekeepers
in the respective peacebuilding processes.
Timor-Leste
Background
Japan’s engagement in Timor-Leste was unprecedented as Japanese actors
started their support to Timor-Leste before Timor-Leste became indepen-
dent in May 2002. The conventional approach of Japan’s ODA was based
on the Government-to-Government agreement. Nonetheless, before a
sovereign authority was established in Timor-Leste (except that the UN
Transitional Administrator was given the legal authority to govern by the
UN Security Council), the Japanese government set the priority of its
support to Timor-Leste in three areas: (1) human resource development,
(2) infrastructure rehabilitation, and (3) rural development. Although
none of JICA’s projects had specific features of peacebuilding (JICA
2008: 12), they were introduced under the ‘fast-track’ scheme to meet the
urgent needs on the ground. JICA initially hesitated to extend its support
to security and justice sectors as it was understood that Western donors
were interested in engaging in these sectors where Japan’s resources
and expertise were limited (ibid.: 14). Accordingly, many humanitarian
aid and development projects delivered by the Japanese actors including
NGOs were apolitical in nature.
In Timor-Leste, the timing of Japan’s intervention went against
convention, but the repertoire of its peacebuilding efforts remained
unvaried. After all, the basic philosophy of Japan’s peacebuilding engage-
ment was that any humanitarian aid and development projects could
contribute to peace in a post-conflict society (MOFA 2011). For example,
Japanese Ambassador Iwao Kitahara proudly stated, under the banner of
‘water of life’, that providing clean water for all could reduce the risk of
children being infected by illness, and claimed that “if people are healthy,
so is the country” (Embassy of Japan in Timor-Leste 2009).
Engagement with Mid-Space Actors
Nevertheless, there were two innovative approaches made by Japanese
actors to engage with mid-space actors in Timor-Leste. The first case
was initiated by the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) who were deployed to
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the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET). The
second initiative was led by a Japanese NGO called the Okinawa Peace
Assistance Center (OPAC).
Japan deployed its SDF engineering unit to UNMISET, authorised
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to take all the necessary means
to achieve its mandate. Although Japan’s engagements were limited to
non-coercive activities, it was the first time that Japan sent its SDFs to a
UN peacekeeping operation acting under Chapter VII. SDF’s engineers
deployed to UNMISET took part in an innovative programme named
the Recovery, Employment, and Stability Program for Ex-combatants and
Communities in Timor-Leste (RESPECT) that aimed to address some
of the immediate needs of mid-space actors in the rural areas of Timor-
Leste. RESPECT encompassed over 300 projects that were funded by
the Japanese government, channelled through the United Nations Devel-
opment Programme (MOFA 2011). SDF engineers who were deployed
on the ground to undertake rehabilitation of damaged infrastructures
were mobilised to offer ‘technical support’, or more precisely on-the-job
training, to former members of a liberation army called the FALINTIL.
Because of their long-term commitment as guerrilla fighters in the jungle,
many of the FALINTIL senior members were in poor physical condition
and had a weak education background, and thus more than 1,300 former
FALINTIL combatants were not recruited in a newly established defence
force and the police (Uesugi 2014a; Howe and Uesugi 2015).
After independence in May 2002, FALINTIL veterans who felt
neglected raised their voices against their government. They became a
major source of instability in a newly born state as they maintained
their influence over their former cadets and members of the community.
Therefore, Japan’s attempt to engage with frustrated mid-space actors
through RESPECT had the potential to evolve into a sound peace-
building strategy. Nevertheless, RESPECT did not go beyond a stop-gap
measure to provide livelihoods (daily allowance) to mid-space actors in
Timor-Leste, albeit it was conceived as a capacity development opportu-
nity for former combatants to facilitate their reintegration into the civilian
life (MOFA 2011: 96). Japan’s involvement remained at the superficial
level and no Japanese actors were available to follow up the initial contacts
with mid-space actors developed through this undertaking. In 2006, frus-
trated actors both inside and outside the security apparatus turned against
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the peacebuilding process and led their followers to cause a security distur-
bance in Dili that shook the earlier investments and achievements in the
security sector of Timor-Leste (Uesugi 2014b, 2018a).
The next example of Japan’s engagement in the mid-space was
attempted by OPAC, which was founded by one of the authors of this
chapter. While most of the Japanese NGOs which operated at the grass-
roots level in Timor-Leste followed the conventional Japanese approach,
OPAC together with JICA launched an unprecedented project called the
Community Peace for Development in 2010 (which lasted until 2016).
Before the launch, OPAC had worked with JICA in 2002, 2005, 2006,
2009, and 2010, inviting around 25 prominent mid-space leaders from
Timor-Leste to Japan each time for training (over 125 trainees in total).
The trainees included, for example, district administrators (an equivalent
of a governor), civil servants, police officers, village chiefs, NGO repre-
sentatives, youth group leaders and former members of the clandestine
movement (OPAC, n.d.).
Building on the multiple networks developed through these training
programmes, OPAC earned the trust of two key local counterparts of
the project: (1) the National Directorate for Prevention of Community
Conflict (NDPCC), that was under the Secretary of State for Security,
and (2) the Comoro Village Council (Higuchi 2013). The NDPCC was
established in 2008 after the Government of Timor-Leste failed to prevent
the crisis in 2006, with an aim of preventing community-level conflicts
from posing threats to the nation-wide stability (Ribeiro 2008). One of
the major concerns for the NDPCC at the time of joint project planning
was fragile security situations in Comoro Village, located at the outskirts
of the capital city where a large number of youth from various rural areas
gathered to find jobs, and several martial arts groups (gangs) were organ-
ised to offer a sense of protection and belonging to vulnerable people
who were away from home (Lopes 2009).
After consultation with the NDPCC leadership, OPAC’s assistance for
the NDPCC’s effort to address the security concerns in Comoro Village
was divided into two: (1) national level efforts geared toward capacity
development of mid-space actors, and (2) sub-national level efforts
revolved around establishing platforms for information sharing through
multi-level networks (Higuchi 2013). OPAC extended its support to
build platforms and networks for dialogue among mid-space actors at the
national level, which included the staff of the NDPCC, the Secretary of
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State for Youth, various national NGOs specialising in conflict preven-
tion, youth organisations, and district and sub-district police commanders
(OPAC 2011).
This initiative led to the institutionalisation of the Conflict Prevention
and Response Network (CPRN) which brought together both state and
civil society actors in Timor-Leste working toward peacebuilding (Belun
2014; da Costa 2013: 32–35). Upon the launch of the CPRN, an NGO
called the Belun, established with support from the Center for Interna-
tional Conflict Resolution at Columbia University, played an important
role (Cutter et al. 2004). Because OPAC was collaborating with both the
NDPCC (a government actor) and the Belun (a civil society actor), a
national-level platform for dialogue was constructed rather smoothly.
OPAC’s second major activity was implemented in Comoro Village,
where repeated skirmishes between rival martial art groups occurred
frequently (Scambary 2019: 122). Upon the introduction of activities
aimed at contributing to conflict prevention in Comoro Village, OPAC
consulted with the Comoro Village Council. One of the highlights of
OPAC’s sub-national level activity, implemented jointly with the NDPCC,
was a village-wide workshop on conflict prevention that received endorse-
ments from the Comoro Village Council and a local monastery. In the
workshop, mid-space actors such as traditional leaders (liurai), represen-
tatives from youth and women’s organisations, and leaders of martial arts
groups, all assembled in one place to analyse the security challenges they
faced and discuss ways to overcome them (OPAC 2011).
Even though the effects of OPAC’s intervention are unverifiable and
it is difficult to establish the causal relationship, OPAC sought to insti-
tute contacts with mid-space actors, whilst a decade was invested in
nurturing relationship and earning their trust before the project was
launched officially.
At the same time, the CPRN was kept as a consultation and infor-
mation sharing forum at the national level, and no formal mechanism
was institutionalised between the national level and the sub-national level
in the CPRN. While bridge-building support made by OPAC could have
been amplified to cover a much wider geographical range beyond Comoro
Village, such attempts did not bear fruit and OPAC’s efforts were limited
in terms of their impact and the scope. Therefore, what OPAC endeav-
oured in the mid-space in Comoro Village cannot be generalised as
Japan’s peacebuilding approach in Timor-Leste. Still, this case deserves
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more than a passing notice as it demonstrates that approaches elicited
from the hybrid peacebuilding theory would work in a real situation.
Myanmar
Background
Japanese engagement in Myanmar, particularly after the military coup
d’état in 1988, has deviated from that of the West. It provided much
needed support for Myanmar in times of diplomatic isolation and
economic decline (Seekins 1992; Reilly 2013). Although Japan had
been one of the top donors among the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) countries, it had to act in concert
with the West when economic sanctions were placed on Myanmar. After
the birth of democratic government in 2011 and with the sanctions being
partially lifted, Japan resumed its ODA to Myanmar in 2012, which
amounted to over 82% of the total foreign aid that Myanmar received
from the OECD countries in 2013 (MOFA 2018).
Japan’s flagship development aid to Myanmar has been Yen loans for
infrastructure projects which aimed to promote sustainable economic
development. Besides the major infrastructure projects that would
support the central government’s National Comprehensive Development
Plan, Japan has allocated its ODA projects in Myanmar’s border states
where ethnic armed groups reside. Japan carries out its infrastructure
projects under the PPP scheme, in which the Japanese private sector
plays a pivotal role. For example, in 2013 JICA launched a Regional
Development Project for Poverty Reduction that covered all seven states
controlled by ethnic armed groups (i.e., Chin, Kachin, Karen, Kayah,
Mon, Rakhine and Shan). In 2020, the Government of Myanmar and
JICA signed loan agreement which included the Regional Infrastructure
Improvement Project (JICA 2020a).
These projects are apolitical in nature as their expected outcomes
included reducing poverty in and inequality among Myanmar’s bordering
states (JICA 2020b). At the same time, a new development was witnessed
as these Yen loan projects were introduced in conflict-affected areas as a
peace dividend, which had been avoided before as such an attempt could
drag Japan into a politically challenging situation.
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Engagement with Mid-Space Actors
One of the most noteworthy peacebuilding approaches in Myanmar can
be found in efforts made by The Nippon Foundation (TNF), a Japanese
NGO (to be more precise, public interest incorporated foundation),
which has operated in Myanmar since 1976 (TNF, n.d.). Its humanitarian
support in the areas of health and education continued even during the
period of military rule in Myanmar (ibid.). In concert with the shift of
the Japanese government’s policy toward Myanmar in 2012, TNF began
its quiet diplomacy in the area of Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts. The Chair-
person of TNF, Yohei Sasakawa, who was appointed as the Special Envoy
of the Government of Japan for National Reconciliation in Myanmar
in 2013, took advantage of TNF’s four decades of commitment in the
country when he started a peacebuilding project that aimed at fostering
confidence-building between the central government and armed ethnic
groups. To establish an initial contact with leaders of armed ethnic groups,
he sought support from Katsuyuki Imoto, a Japanese Buddhist monk
and the head of another Japanese NGO that was set up to collect ashes
of former Japanese soldiers who died in Myanmar during the Battle of
Imphal in 1944 (Nojima 2019). Imoto played an instrumental role in
the launch of the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), a coali-
tion of 12 opposition groups, which created a united front to negotiate
with the Myanmar’s central government (Molloy, unpublished). Through
this endeavour, Imoto earned the trust of not only gatekeepers in armed
ethnic groups in Shan, Karen, Kayah and Mon States, but also of Presi-
dent Tein Sein who asked Imoto to serve as a go-between (ibid.; Imoto,
n.d.).
Since then, TNF has supported a series of national dialogues among
different stakeholders and adversaries, which had little guarantee of
instant and visible outcomes. With self-sufficient financial resources at
its disposal, TNF did not have to be accountable to donors, and thus
had a luxury of operating with a long timeframe. It did not even need a
‘success’ story to attract further funding and to marshal sufficient finan-
cial resources to continue the project. It could afford to wait for the
time to become ripe for the peace process to evolve naturally. This was a
huge advantage of TNF acting as a reliable patron for mid-space actors,
since most of the official peacebuilding actors of the OECD members,
including those of Japan, had to be transparent and accountable to donors
(and their tax payers) and were expected to bring positive results in a rela-
tively short timeframe. In fact, unlike other actors, TNF did not have to
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claim its contribution to the peace process, which allowed it to operate
from behind the scenes. It served as an enabler and convener of the peace
dialogue by paying travel expenses on behalf of the armed ethnic groups,
but it did not interfere with the substance of the peace dialogue (Mori
2018).
In concert with the progress made at the negotiation table, TNF
provided positive incentive in a timely manner as a peace dividend for
communities which signed a ceasefire agreement (Molloy, unpublished).
Its combined funding scheme worked to its advantage, and its ability to
deliver what was required gave TNF additional strengths. While TNF has
its pooled fund at its disposal, since 2013 it has been granted funds from
the Japanese government to provide humanitarian aid to the people in
conflict-affected areas under the control of armed ethnic groups (TNF,
n.d.).
Furthermore, being the Special Envoy of the Government of Japan
as well as TNF’s Chairperson, Sasakawa assumed a hybrid function and
performed quiet multi-track diplomacy at all levels (Track 1, 2 and 3).
He was in a position to manoeuvre his official capacity to marshal Japan’s
ODA and to link up with the highest-ranking officials in Myanmar’s
central government. At the same time, he could also distance himself
from the official endeavours by the Japanese actors such as the Japanese
Embassy and JICA in Myanmar to circumvent the situations that are
diplomatically too sensitive.
Desmond Molloy (unpublished: 11), who served as an aid to Sasakawa
in TNF’s Myanmar Liaison Office describes TNF’s approach as “Sus-
tained Incremental Trust Establishment and Support”, which is in essence
a trust-building approach. TNF maintained its independence from the
Western donors throughout the process, which enabled it to remain more
adaptive and flexible to dynamics on the ground, while promoting various
forms of peace dividend through a conflict sensitive approach (ibid.).
In addition to peace dialogue support in the field, TNF invested in
human resource development of the Tatmadaw (the armed forces of
Myanmar). Instead of criticising the Tatmadaw, TNF helped to initiate
the necessary reform by themselves, believing that it was not wise to
push them into a corner, which could have made them feel isolated and
induced radical reactions. Each year since 2014, TNF invited around
10 highest-level commanders, including the Commander-in-Chief Min
Aung Hlaing, of the Tatmadaw as well as high-ranking officers from the
Ministry of Border Affairs (also under the control of the Tatmadaw),
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including the Minister Lt. Gen. Thet Naing Win and Lt. Gen. Ye Aung,
to Japan (Sasakawa 2014; IUJ 2019a). TNF also funds a programme
called the Training Program for Capacity Development for Leadership
Potential for Government Officials at the Ministry of Border Affairs in
Myanmar offered by the International University of Japan (IUJ 2019b).
All these concerted efforts constitute Japanese investment in relationship-
building with Myanmar’s mid-space actors as well as their empowerment
and capacity development.
Let us recapitulate Japan’s peacebuilding engagement with Myanmar’s
mid-space actors. The above discussion shows two points. First, it was
essential that appealing incentives were provided to both the central
government and the state governments (under the control of armed
ethnic groups) to earn their trust so that Japanese actors were permitted
a broader and deeper outreach in the bordering states in conflict with the
Tatmadaw. Second, it was useful for Japanese actors to remain patient
and stay within the parameters set by the central government so that
they were not seen as demanding and threatening, while extending
its altruistic support for the most vulnerable people in conflict-affected
communities to help increase the legitimacy of mid-space actors who were
inclined towards peace. The case of Japan’s peacebuilding engagement in
Myanmar was indicative of the fact that when disciplinary acts by the West
can exert pressure on the recalcitrant gatekeepers to alter their behaviour,
an alternative conciliatory approach based on long-term commitment and
a trustworthy relationship can induce them to explore alternative options.
Mindanao
Background
Japan’s engagement in Mindanao deserves special attention as it encom-
passes long and broad cooperation across various stakeholders, and
includes not only development assistance but also mediation and facil-
itation services in the peace process. Japan’s engagement in Mindanao
departed from a more conventional style in December 2002 when Prime
Minister Junichiro Koizumi announced the “Support Package for Peace
and Stability in Mindanao” (Ochiai 2019; Ishikawa 2014; MOFA 2002).
Under the new policy, JICA employed both conventional and inno-
vative approaches. The former revolved around the assistance provided
to the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), which was
established in 1990 as an official sub-national entity responsible for the
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administration of the territory, based on the 1974 Tripoli agreement
made between the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF). A more innovative approach was
employed in the second peace process, this time with the GPH and the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which is the focus of this section.
Engagement with Mid-Space Actors
Japan’s innovative approaches to mid-space actors in Mindanao can be
found in four domains. The first interaction was made possible with
the launch of the MILF Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA), an
organisation created to undertake the formulation of the Bangsamoro
Development Plan (JICA 2015a). The second connection was made
through another MILF organisation called the Bangsamoro Leadership
and Management Institute (BLMI), which served as a vehicle of capacity
development for the MILF combatants and emerging gatekeepers. The
third point of contact was developed through Japan’s engagement in
the International Monitoring Team (IMT) through which JICA’s devel-
opment experts were given access to non-permissive areas beyond the
control of the central government. The fourth encounter was the Consol-
idation for Peace (COP) in Mindanao, a series of Track 1.5 mediation
efforts created to provide opportunities for mid-space actors to exchange
their views on the peace process (Ishikawa 2014: 87–92).
The BDA was established by the Central Committee of the MILF
in 2002. While the BDA had close ties with the MILF, its leader-
ship was not drawn directly from the MILF (Kilmesova 2015: 223).
Instead BDA’s leadership was composed of respected members in the
Maguindanao area, many of whom were medical doctors and former
members of the Bangsamoro Development Council, a civil society organ-
isation (ibid.). In other words, the BDA consisted of various gatekeepers
and assumed a leadership role in not only fulfilling its mandate of
reconstruction, rehabilitation and development in the conflict-affected
communities in Bangsamoro but also transforming itself as a key lynchpin
for peacebuilding (Abubakar 2019: 194).
The BDA was recognised as Japan’s legitimate counterpart for territo-
ries in Mindanao beyond the reach of the central government before the
comprehensive peace agreements were signed between the GPH and the
MILF. It gave Japan a channel to provide a peace dividend to conflict-
affected communities in Bangsamoro to entice mid-space actors into the
peace process. Japan also contributed to the capacity development of the
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BDA (JICA 2015b) and, through the BDA, Japanese actors such as the
Japanese Embassy and JICA were able to implement a variety of grass-
roots development projects under the rubric of the Japan-Bangsamoro
Initiatives for Reconstruction and Development (J-BIRD) for the most
vulnerable people in conflict-affected areas in Bangsamoro (Kilmesova
2015: 224).
The BLMI was established as a dividend of an agreement between the
GPH and the MILF (Conciliation Resources 2012). It was a training
facility for MILF mid-space actors to enhance their capacities in prepara-
tion for the establishment of the new Bangsamoro Government (ibid.;
Abubakar 2019; Mabasa 2018). The GPH contributed to the opera-
tional fees while the Japanese government, under the Grant Assistance for
Grassroots Human Security Project, constructed the facility for the BLMI
(ibid.; Felongco 2011). Under the Comprehensive Capacity Develop-
ment Project for the Bangsamoro, JICA used the BLMI as a springboard
to offer an alternative livelihood to the MILF combatants that could rein-
force the efforts of the MILF gatekeepers who were supportive of the
peace process (JICA 2017; 2018).
The IMT was established in October 2004 in response to the cease-
fire agreement made between the GPH and the MILF in 2003. It
is an unarmed cease-fire monitoring team originally composed of the
military, police and civilian personnel from Malaysia, Brunei and Libya
(MOFA 2010). Japan announced its participation in the IMT in July
2006 in a statement titled “Japan Takes a More Active Role in the
Mindanao Peace Process” (MOFA 2006). Unlike other countries that
have despatched their military or police officers to the IMT, Japan endeav-
oured to add a new department specialising in social and economic
development to the IMT and send JICA personnel to that department,
so that they would act as hinges of Japan’s development assistance in
conflict-affected areas in Bangsamoro. Through the IMT’s activities of
cease-fire monitoring, Japanese representatives were able to access deep
into communities affected by conflict and communicate needed informa-
tion on the ground back to the Japanese Embassy and the JICA office in
Manila for project formulation (Uesugi 2015).
Because of this special engagement in the grassroots communities
under the control of the MILF where access was not granted to ordinary
aid workers, Japanese actors were able to establish regular contact with
mid-space actors in the hinterland. Legitimate requests for support made
by gatekeepers were transmitted, along with the situation analysis on the
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ground made by Japanese actors in the IMT, to the Japanese Embassy
in Manila, which were often responded to with tangible measures under
the banner of the J-BIRD in a timely manner. This combined effort
helped Japanese actors to earn the trust of mid-space actors who were
encouraged to support the peace process (ibid.).
The COP in Mindanao was another unprecedented attempt for JICA
as it sought to engage itself with political exercises. Under the COP
from January 2006 till June 2014 JICA organised six seminars with
the Universiti Sains Malaysia (Ishikawa 2014; JICA 2019). The COP
started as an opportunity for mutual learning among sub-national stake-
holders from different conflicts in Asia—Mindanao, Aceh and Southern
Thailand. In the first two seminars and the fourth seminar, the partici-
pants drawn from these conflict-affected areas shared their lessons (JICA
2014). The third seminar, which was held in 2008 when the official
peace talks for Mindanao had been stalled, was given a special task to
serve as an alternative channel to the official mediation process. The
seminar focused on the peace process in Mindanao and the participants
were limited to mid-space actors in Mindanao such as civil society repre-
sentatives, religious leaders, scholars, journalists and government officials
(ibid.). Sachiko Ishikawa (2014), who was JICA’s interlocutor for the
COP, argued that the COP provided an optimal platform for addressing
needs and exchanging perspectives of the civil society actors in Mindanao.
When the formal peace talks resumed as a result of the breakthrough
summit meeting held in Japan in August 2011, the fifth seminar was held
in January 2012 with Track 1 stakeholders such as representatives of the
ARMM government, all governors in the ARMM, and Members of the
Congress (JICA 2019). After the comprehensive peace agreements were
signed in March 2014, the last seminar was held in Hiroshima, Japan,
in June 2014, at which President Benigno S. Aquino III and MILF’s
Chairman Al Haj Murad Ebrahim were present. This time, the COP
was set out to further solidify the work for an inclusive framework of
the peace process in Mindanao, and remaining issues were discussed and
trust relationships among the participating gatekeepers were consolidated
(ibid.).
These COP sessions provided safe-space for formal and informal actors
to interact with each other, which promoted mutual understanding and
a pivotal shift in the recalcitrant gatekeepers’ perspective, from isolation
and power-hoarding to recognising the value of interaction and trust-
building (Ishikawa 2014: 87–92). The COP broadened Japan’s horizons
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of engagement, as Japanese actors such as JICA have been recognised
as trust-worthy and productive contributors to the peace process. The
COP took the advantage of existing family ties between actors in Malaysia
and Mindanao that provided a basis for earning trust of mid-space actors
(Ochiai 2019), who could reach out to various stakeholders outside their
own immediate sphere. Their presence helped establish the COP and
nurtured it as a broader and more resilient network of interaction and
dialogue.
The most important function of the COP was that it provided plat-
forms for mid-space actors to interact not only with each other but also
with other key stakeholders at different levels and intermediaries from
outside. It gave gatekeepers, who were not allowed to participate in the
official peace talks, a channel to express their concerns. In effect, the COP
functioned to bridge horizontal, vertical and diagonal gaps. Through
this bridge, Japanese actors gained informal access to mid-space actors
from different domains such as the MILF rebel community, the ARMM
community and the Christian community, and a chance to build trust
with them. For instance, two innovative Japanese ventures in Mindanao
emerged through discussion with mid-space actors at the COP. The first
one was the dispatch of JICA’s staff to the IMT, and the second one was
the channelling of Japan’s ODA to conflict-affected areas in Bangsamoro
through the BDA (Uesugi 2015).
A detailed analysis of the interaction between Japanese actors and mid-
space actors in Mindanao illuminates both strengths and existing gaps in
Japanese approaches to peacebuilding. The lessons drawn from the case
study of Mindanao are twofold. First, JICA has served as a spearhead of
Japanese initiatives and has attempted various innovative measures which
transcended recurrent patterns of Japan’s peacebuilding practice. Second,
JICA’s innovative initiatives were designed to create a conducive envi-
ronment for mid-space actors to interact with each other and exert their
influence on the formal peace process, and they did not interfere with the
substantive aspects of the peace process.
Shortcomings of Japan’s Approach
The previous section discussed innovative approaches of Japanese peace-
building applied in Timor-Leste, Myanmar and Mindanao, which show-
cased ways that Japanese actors engaged with mid-space actors in
conflict-affected zones. What the previous section did not cover includes
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shortcomings and negative effects/consequences of Japanese efforts.
Hence, this section elucidates these unexplored aspects and suggests a
way forward to overcome these shortcomings.
Shortcomings
The first limitation is associated with Japan’s strength of being seen as
non-threatening. Japanese actors are only allowed to enter into non-
kinetic permissive environments. This principle also applies to Japanese
SDF personnel as part of the pacifist doctrine enshrined in the Japanese
Constitution (Dobson 2003). While this policy of staying away from coer-
cive measures has reassured aid-recipient governments of Japan’s altruistic
motives for engagement, it severely limited the parameters within which
Japanese actors were allowed to operate.
The second limitation is related to the fact that Japanese support is
request-based, which gives the aid-recipient government decisional power
about what projects are to be pursued and where (Uesugi 2014a: 215–
220). This practice prevented Japanese actors from reaching those who
were diametrically opposing the aid-recipient government. In Mindanao,
while the COP provided a platform for the rebel and governmental repre-
sentatives to meet, it did not include representatives of certain key power
holders. For example, ‘warlord politicians’ who had vested interests in
the existing order and thus were hostile to the peace process that could
shake their power-basis, were not integrated into various Japan’s efforts
such as the COP (Espesor 2017). It is beyond the scope of this chapter
to verify the cognitive impact which Japanese engagement had on the
perceptions of mid-space actors. Rather it seeks to shed light on the fact
that Japanese actors in each case established diagonal relationships with
mid-space actors and facilitated vertical as well as horizontal interactions
constructively among them.
As the hybrid peacebuilding theory indicates, it is vital for peace-
builders to be able to engage with as many stakeholders as possible
to bridge existing cleavages. Underestimating the problem of unequal
representation of mid-space actors in the peace process and the influ-
ence of local power structures that involve actors other than the primary
interlocutors at the negotiation table can reinforce existing gaps in the
distribution of aid and development (Taniguchi 2019). As proven in
the case of Timor-Leste, marginalised and frustrated groups can under-
mine peacebuilding endeavours and amplify disparities which already exist
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in a society rather than leading to equitable and sustainable growth
(Mac Ginty 2008; 2010). Japan’s avoidance of politically sensitive issues,
as well as unequal distribution and accessibility of aid for a broad
range of mid-space actors, can cause existing conflicts to deteriorate, by
widening disparities on the ground, and furthering discrimination towards
marginalised groups.
A Step Forward
The question is how to circumvent political, socio-economic and psycho-
logical blockages placed by the central government in the channels that
lead to crucial mid-space actors in the hinterland, who are considered
hostile to the incumbent government or the ongoing peace process.
One way to avoid this central dilemma is to acknowledge that peace-
building endeavours are inherently ‘political’ (Hughes 2012: 102–103).
Development projects have an indirect socio-economic impact, and they
can influence dynamics in the local context and reshape existing power
relations. The decision over which project is to be implemented has signif-
icant political implications for the prospect of peacebuilding. Thus, as
demonstrated in this chapter, Japanese actors can continue to utilise their
humanitarian and development assistance as positive incentives to entice
both the government and mid-space actors to move towards a peaceful
settlement. Yet, they should be aware of the unintended political conse-
quences that their apolitical intervention could bring, and keep their
efforts responsive, adaptable and flexible in relation to the fluctuating
political landscapes (de Coning 2018).
On this point, Japan should stay within accepted parameters and refrain
from using the fact that peacebuilding is inherently political as an excuse
to infringe upon the sovereign rights of other countries. Mutual trust
remains a key factor for guaranteeing smooth execution of peacebuilding
efforts. This brings us back to the dilemma of selectivity. The most prag-
matic response is to uphold its long-term commitment and stay patient
and tolerant towards slow progress in peace processes. While Japanese
peacebuilding actors can mobilise reinforcement from the development
community, including its private sector, they are essentially equipped with
two tools for providing peace dividend: Yen loans and technical assistance.
Japan needs to come up with more effective ways (including optimal
combinations of various aid modalities and projects) to employ a set of
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incentives at its disposal to facilitate its access to and cultivate a trust-
relationship with mid-space actors who have broken or dubious ties with
the aid-recipient government. At the same time, Japan should be open to
various types of possibilities for expanding its horizon and gaining deeper
accesses to hidden mid-space actors in the hinterland.
Conclusion
This chapter adopted the typology of mid-space actors introduced in
Chapter 4 to verify the overarching theoretical arguments of this book. It
examined in what way Japanese peacebuilding actors operated in three
conflict-affected areas focusing on their relationship-building attempts
with gatekeepers, and how Japanese actors were able to approach and
collaborate with them. Throughout the journey, this chapter strove to
clarify where Japan already holds its potential for becoming a ‘hybrid
peacebuilding facilitator’, a bridge between the Western interventionists
style of peacebuilding and the anthropological approaches indispens-
able for realising emancipatory peacebuilding (Uesugi 2018b; Richmond
2018).
Mid-space actors such as FALINTIL veterans in Timor-Leste,
commanders of the Tatmadaw and armed ethnic groups in Myanmar, and
rebel commanders and warlord politicians in Mindanao were all consid-
ered ‘illiberal’ by the Western donors, as they did not root their leadership
in rational or democratic legitimacy, but their source of power lay in their
prestige and lineage. Thus, Western donors were reluctant to treat these
actors as legitimate in their dialogue-building approaches. Although secu-
rity and intelligence actors of the West do not hesitate to collaborate with
these ‘illiberal’ elements, developmental actors of the West are usually
covered with a façade and their ethical codes prohibit them from engaging
with these actors. On the contrary, Japanese actors explored this turbu-
lent passage by nurturing the relationship with these ‘illiberal’ mid-space
actors. In this respect, the notions of ‘non-interference’ and ‘apoliti-
cal’ allowed Japanese actors to approach seemingly ‘illiberal’ gatekeepers.
On this point, Japan has also utilised its private sector involvement in
economic development to counter acts of spoiling by addressing material
needs of gatekeepers and their community. Japan’s distinctive stance on
the primacy of trust-building through long-term commitment and mutual
respect has worked well in the three cases examined in this chapter.
180 Y. UESUGI AND A. DEEKELING
By scrutinising Japan’s ability to work between the central govern-
ment and mid-space actors, and to fill the gaps between locally grounded
approaches and those of Western donors, this chapter arrives at the
conclusion that Japan has manifested its potential as a ‘hybrid peace-
building facilitator’. Japanese approaches were instrumental in bridging
existing cleavages between mid-space actors and Western donors, which
contributed to achieving emancipatory local ownership and sustaining
peace in conflict-affected communities in Timor-Leste, Myanmar and
Mindanao (Manantan and Simangan 2019).
Being a non-Western member of the OECD, Japan identifies itself
as a bridge between the West and the Rest. This underlines Japan’s
self-identity as a bridge-building nation, which is represented by its “kake-
hashi” policy (Black 2013). Because Japan has been recognised as an
integral part of the OECD or the Global North, its unique positionality
and potential as a hybrid peacebuilding facilitator have been overlooked.
But it does not mean that Japan can automatically claim such a role. Japan
has demonstrated its capacity to act as a hybrid peacebuilding facilitator
between Western approaches and locally grounded approaches in three
specific cases in Asia. If Japan would be able to overcome its shortcom-
ings such as the lack of inclusiveness and access to mid-space actors in
the hinterland, Japan might be able to emerge as a full-fledged hybrid
peacebuilding facilitator. While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to
investigate Japan’s peacebuilding involvement outside of Asia, if Japan can
fulfil similar functions elsewhere, Japan could rightfully claim its role as a
bridge between the West and the Rest.
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CHAPTER 9
Conclusion: Alternative Theory and Practice
of Peacebuilding in Asia
Yuji Uesugi, Anna Deekeling, Sophie Shiori Umeyama,
and Lawrence McDonald-Colbert
Introduction
The aim of this volume is to highlight shortcomings in the practical
application of hybrid peacebuilding. A typology of mid-space actors is
presented to function as a bridge for the existing gap between theory and
practice. Insider-partial mediation is put forth as a suitable medium for
addressing the blockage between academic knowledge and operationali-
sation on the ground without compromising the premises of complexity
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and hybridity. This assumption is then tested in two case studies from an
insider perspective, highlighting additional key factors to be considered
when engaging with mid-space actors. Identity was explored through the
case of Cambodian Buddhist monks whilst the case study of Mindanao
analysed the role of civil society. The case studies of China and Japan
provided perspectives of outside intervenors focusing on their peace-
building endeavours in Asia. The aim of this closing chapter thus is to
integrate these findings and conclude whether or not the gap between
hybrid peacebuilding theory and practice has been bridged.
Complexity and Hybridity
Chapter 3 assessed hybrid peacebuilding from a complexity perspec-
tive, highlighting crucial takeaways for the successful operationalisation
of hybridity. Adaptive peacebuilding (de Coning 2018) was further
discussed as an approach which engages well with complexity. Both adap-
tivity and hybridity address the concerns of a complex systems approach
to peacebuilding, though the sites of their emphasis vary. An adaptive
methodology of peacebuilding that emphasises flexibility marries well with
a hybrid epistemology for which inclusion and openness is paramount.
The contentions of this chapter served as the theoretical foundation
upon which Chapter 4 developed hybrid peacebuilding into a practical
application via constructing a typology of mid-space actors.
Complexity theory provides a deeper understanding of how dynamic
and multifaceted systems like societies can lapse into conflict. Social
systems must be self-sustainable and resilient so that they can respond and
adapt to external or internal impulses. Resilience manifests within social
institutions that are rooted in the unique contexts of a society; power
structures, cultural practices etc. are important sites to ensure robust-
ness in the face of pressure. Thus, peace must be built upon the internal
strengths of a conflict-affected society in order to ensure its sustainability
(de Coning 2016). It is therefore imperative that local peacebuilders are
active participants in the peacebuilding process so as to foster resilience
and achieve sustainable peace. The role of outside intervention is to
facilitate the process of societal transformation through supporting the
capacity of local mid-space actors to initiate and nurture long-lasting
relationships.
Adaptive peacebuilding proposes a complexity-informed approach that
can respond to shifting dynamics on the ground, including inter-actor
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relations. Hybrid peacebuilding underlines the significance of paying
attention to the idiosyncratic context of each conflict-affected society and
advocates for the inclusion of a broad array of representatives in the peace-
building process (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013). The primary concern
for adaptive and hybrid peacebuilding is the centrality of dynamism in
the relations between actors; how they constantly influence one another,
how their interactions influence them, and how such feedback affects
the peacebuilding process over time and space (Richmond and Mitchell
2012).
A complexity-informed approach illuminates the varying capacities of
participating actors and highlights the implications of these capacities for
peacebuilders. Chapter 5 demonstrated that identity can be mobilised for
a dual capacity of connector and divider. Identity itself is further part
of complex emergence and intersectionality, thus transforming over time.
Chapter 6 amplified this finding through its discussion of the role of civil
society in Mindanao. It stressed that use of oversimplified binaries––‘lib-
eral’ and ‘illiberal’ actors—can block pathways to relationship building to
actors on the ground. Chapter 6 further accounted for the omission of
support for certain actors and found that their inclusion or exclusion has a
direct impacting on a peace process by destabilising local power balances.
A complexity-informed approach cautions prospective interveners that the
social context in which actors exist must be taken into account and that
intervention may lead to unpredictable outcomes. Actors are not inher-
ently trapped in a single, fixed identity such as ‘illiberal’. Rather, their
identity is subject to change and is influenced by their position within
relationships and surroundings.
The premise of complexity and hybridity lies in the careful consid-
eration of all dynamics whilst maintaining adaptivity to change. Conse-
quently, how can one conceive of a practical approach that would navigate
through constantly evolving complexity, emerging relations, and unpre-
dictability? Chapter 4 addressed this question by discussing a typology of
mid-space actors, which could be used by outsiders when extending their
support to a conflict-affected society.
Mid-Space Actors and Hybridity
Mid-space actors are defined as local leaders who are equipped with
unique social attributes that support their function as gatekeepers for
their respected communities. To fulfil this role, they encompass the ability
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to tap into various sources of power, both formal and informal, while
possessing a deep cultural and normative understanding of their locality.
They can develop distinctive capacities that enable them to connect
with actors beyond their immediate sphere of influence. These capaci-
ties include (1) transformative relationships (the ability and willingness
to interact with key stakeholders outside one’s immediate domain), (2)
locally grounded legitimacy (a collective trust of the constituency in their
leadership, which is generated and justified through leaders’ access to
power, cultural norms, and other information and resources), and (3)
laissez-passer (a special access to idiosyncratic information and resources
that are unattainable to strangers). Because outside intervenors usually
do not possess these critical capacities, it is essential that they identify and
collaborate with these mid-space actors in order to create positive impacts
on the peace process.
The empirical studies of this volume demonstrated that mid-space
actors emerge as either bridge-builders or spoilers depending on their
relational positionality in time and space regarding the conflict and peace
process. This suggests that acts of spoiling committed by mid-space actors
should not be linked to their inherently ‘illiberal’ nature or selfish motives.
Instead, they may obstruct access of other stakeholders simply because
they wish to protect their community from unknown outside interven-
tion, or to draw attention from and deliver messages to outsiders. Their
act of spoiling may be a side-effect triggered by other efforts to bridge a
different gap (Newman and Richmond 2006).
In Chapter 5 Cambodian Buddhist monks served as an example of
mid-space actors who succeeded in bridging horizontal gaps among
different communities yet failed to establish a needed vertical bridge
to reach the top/national stakeholders. It was argued that the identity
of these monks functioned in both ways: it facilitated the horizontal
bridge-building while hindering the vertical bridge-building. Identity is
intertwined with the three capacities as the consciousness of self and
others can (1) influence the decision (or perceived ability) to approach
outsiders, (2) help create intra-community bonding that grants legiti-
macy, and (3) deny the access of outsiders to internally shared knowledge.
The case study of Cambodian monks indicated that recognising the
disposition of mid-space actors’ identity was key to appreciating the
bridge-building prospects in this particular context. It also suggested
that the identities of mid-space actors influenced the perceived relations
between them and other stakeholders at different levels or spheres and
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shaped the ability of mid-space actors to connect stakeholders and created
access-points for dialogue.
Chapter 6 discussed how civil society organisations in Mindanao
contributed to the establishment of a shared identity among different
actors, especially between international actors and local communities,
including marginalised groups who were initially excluded from the state-
led peace process. The case study demonstrated the dichotomisation of
commonly employed narratives in peacebuilding, as was done for local vs.
international. By exposing these polarised spaces of interaction, it became
clear that the concept of ‘illiberal’ actors is a phenomenon imagined by
‘liberal’ actors. ‘Liberal’ actors’ domination of the discourse led to the
ultimate classification of ‘illiberal’ actors. Such a classification reinforces
an oversimplified binary of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, hindering equal and inclu-
sive participation of all relevant stakeholders in the peace process. While
this can be seen as a negative effect of the local-liberal binary, through
adopting the international (or liberal) norm frameworks mid-space actors
have marshalled resources from outside of their immediate social realm
and translated their needs into the narratives of international actors.
By functioning as cross-cultural translators, civil society representatives
in Mindanao established a diagonal bridge between the local/bottom and
international actors, channelling external resources and aid toward the
grassroots. They also succeeded in connecting horizontal gaps between
different communities by building transformative relationships to cut
across social cleavages on the ground. Yet, the biggest challenge they
faced was the lack of effective vertical links to the top/national level,
which prevented them from realising a more inclusive approach to
peacebuilding.
Chapters 7 and 8 demonstrated how the identity of an outside inter-
venor would affect the ability of outsiders to engage with mid-space
actors. Chapter 7 revealed that due to its state centric focus and elite-
driven modality, the Chinese peacebuilding approach lacks connections
with potential mid-space actors who can articulate the grassroots reality
regarding the subaltern needs on the ground. China may have to diver-
sify its own peacebuilding agencies beyond conventional state actors to
include Chinese State-Owned Enterprises or expand its partnership with
non-state actors in the recipient country to overcome this limitation.
In addition, the lack of a critical stance against authoritarian regimes
has given Chinese endeavours a reputation of supporting illiberal peace,
although China refrains from meddling in the internal affairs of other
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states. While strict adherence to the Westphalian principle helped establish
trusting relationships between the two Asian donor governments and aid-
recipient governments, such a practice may induce negative repercussions
from the Western donors as Asian ‘pragmatic’ approaches can under-
mine Western ‘dogmatic’ approaches. Japan has succeeded in projecting
its efforts as complementary to those of the Western donors, given that
Japan’s fundamental polity is democracy. On the other hand, China, as
a non-democracy, faces difficulties convincing Western donors that its
efforts are complementary in the same way as Japan. The question of
how China and Western donors can find a way to coordinate with each
other without converting their fundamental polity and identity remains.
Chapter 8 revealed that Japan maintained a dual identity as a successful
example of modernisation and post-WWII recovery, which helped Japan
to function as a bridge between the West and Asia. This dual identity
provided Japan with the necessary access and expertise to engage with
mid-space actors in a meaningful manner. As Japanese aid functions within
frameworks set out by a recipient government, Japanese peacebuilders
have been able to build connections to actors that might be blocked for
Western donors. At the same time, unlike China, Japan identifies itself as a
civilian power and is unable to offer military aid and sanctions to warring
factions, thus it lacks leverage over recalcitrant mid-space actors. Never-
theless, Japan’s grassroots-based and community development projects
have been operated by Japanese NGOs often in partnership with the
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and/or the Japanese
embassies in the respected countries, which has given Japan an extensive
reach and commitment to actors on the ground. With this Japan was able
to create a unique access point for communication and point of interac-
tion with mid-space actors. The type of interactions are various, such as
capacity-building, community development and facilitating discussion.
The two cases jointly illustrated that the identity frames of outside
intervenors have shaped their approaches to peacebuilding and influenced
their engagement with mid-space actors in the aid-recipient societies.
Alternative Approaches to Peacebuilding
Chapters 7 and 8, which examined the efforts of two leading peace-
builders in Asia, China and Japan respectively, illustrated two alternative
approaches to peacebuilding. These approaches, whilst sharing some
similarities, are distinct and both represent a considerable deviation
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from conventional Western-style peacebuilding. Chinese ‘developmental
peace’ approaches focus on large infrastructure and thus resemble the
economic peacebuilding approach discussed in Chapter 2. Unlike the
Western liberal peacebuilding, Chinese approaches are not liberal value-
driven, foregoing concerns for democracy and human rights and focusing
instead on technical construction projects. Both Chinese and Japanese
approaches respect the sovereignty of the aid-recipient country and retain
the decision-making power of national governments. Whereas Japanese
approaches include bottom-up feedback mechanisms to involve on-the-
ground beneficiaries, Chinese endeavours lack such a dynamic and thus
face a significant inclusivity gap.
The lack of sufficient bottom-up projects that encourage local owner-
ship and participation of grassroots communities means that Chinese
approaches miss an imperative aspect of hybrid peacebuilding. Chinese
approaches further lack the capacity to build trusting relationships and
diagonal bridges between international and grassroots actors as they
do not engage sufficiently with the hinterland. These deficits prevent
China from functioning as a truly hybrid peacebuilder. However, due
to the size and magnitude of aid capacity China possesses, the influence
of Chinese approaches on the conventional peacebuilding endeavours
cannot be underestimated. Unless guided in a more inclusive direction,
Chinese approaches threaten to dismantle the nuanced understanding of
interactive processes of peacebuilding developed by hybrid peacebuilding
theory. As proposed in Chapter 7, peacebuilding actors such as Japan
could collaborate with China to supplement the shortcomings of Chinese
approaches by relying on trust-relationships with mid-space actors who
have access to the communities at the grassroots level.
Chapter 8 discussed strengths and weaknesses of Japanese peace-
building by examining three cases of Japan’s involvement in Asia in which
Japanese actors attempted to engage with mid-space actors in conflict-
affected areas without compromising their positive relationships with the
respective national governments. As an integral member of the Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Japan can
operate within the framework of the OECD standards and when appro-
priate it can influence the behaviour of Western donors, ensuring their
efforts to support mid-space actors in building horizontal, vertical and
diagonal bridges across societal cleavages.
Both China and Japan enjoy unique positions that allow them to
engage and work with ‘illiberal’ actors who are side-lined by Western
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peacebuilders. Japan’s strength lies in its ability to remain within accept-
able parameters that exist between local norms/customs and Western
standards/principles, whilst China’s strength stems from its immense
material power, enabling it to formulate and finance numerous develop-
ment projects. Japan could assist China in identifying acceptable parame-
ters, although their geopolitical rivalry may hinder cooperation. Collabo-
ration between these two Asian leaders has a potential for constructing a
new innovative and effective alternative to Western liberal peacebuilding
on the ground.
Key Findings
This study sought to bridge contemporary gaps between hybrid peace-
building theory and practice so as to achieve its effective operational-
isation. It explored how engagement with mid-space actors and their
accumulated local understanding might aid intervenors in supporting on-
the-ground peacebuilding. Guided by the insights of complex system
theory and the mid-space actor typology, four empirical studies were
conducted: two from an insider’s perspectives (Cambodia and Mindanao),
and two from outsider’s perspectives (China and Japan).
This study was based on the premise that theory and practice should
work hand in hand to enhance each other’s advantages. Theories provide
general guidance on what and how to analyse but they need to be comple-
mented by analytical lenses such as complexity and hybridity so that the
outcomes can be adapted to fit into the contextual reality. In practice,
these analytical lenses help peacebuilders visualise a shared and systemic
understanding of the local situation, allowing them to stay flexible and
adaptive, and thus tuned.
Hybrid peacebuilding theory demands consideration of the inherent
complexity of social systems and inclusivity of all relevant stakeholders.
The scope should therefore not be fragmented by limiting it to individual
elements of system. It is important to pay attention to the micro rela-
tionships among actors in a local context, and the macro field of these
actors and their environment. Conflict-affected societies should not be
seen as static structures. Rather, they are dynamic possesses and constantly
emerging relationships, highlighting that outsiders can only be relevant if
they remain open and responsive to such changes in the environment of
intervention.
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This volume tackled the question of how to connect the altruistic
motives of external interveners to both national elites and grassroots
actors through engaging with mid-space actors. It is the contention
of this book that external interveners can assist the emergence of a
hybrid peace based on locally grounded legitimacy by engaging with
grassroots stakeholders alongside the national elite. This in turn can be
achieved through the mobilisation of mid-space actors who themselves
have legitimacy grounded in their interactions with local constituencies.
These mid-space actors can provide access points for wider society, acting
as bridges between the international community, national governments,
grassroots organisations and local communities. These mid-space actors
can be sourced from a plethora of locations. They may be cultural leaders,
religious leaders, of NGO members. The Bangsamoro People’s Consulta-
tive Assembly (BPCA) and the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA),
discussed in Chapters 6 and 8 respectively, are some good examples of a
mid-space agency introduced in this book. Both institutions were estab-
lished by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) as a forum for
discussion and a site of engagement with local populations. The BPCA
was instrumental in providing inputs and evaluating policies regarding
the negotiated autonomy between MILF and the Philippine government.
The BDA offered a venue for international actors to engage with sub-
national communities and the beneficiaries on the ground to formulate
responsive development plans. Mid-space actors such as the BPCA and
the BDA provide the essential function of network-creation, acting as
an entry-point and mediator between international or national bodies
and those communities most affected by conflict. The relationships built
by mid-space actors are able to be utilised to build trust within local
communities for peacebuilding efforts and confer commitment down-
stream from top-level to bottom-level participants. Collaboration between
local, national and international actors creates deeper understanding,
streamlines communication and aids in information-sharing and norm
diffusion. This means that national-level efforts are going to be more
amenable to local conceptions of peace and justice, while simultaneously
managing expectations to strengthen against spoiling.
Conclusively, this study demonstrated that mid-space actors could
provide a viable focal point for encouraging the establishment of self-
resilient social institutions from within without dictating the content
of such emergences. It also showed that the conceptual framework of
hybridity could improve current models of peacebuilding. Ultimately, this
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volume highlighted the need for an understanding of local peace narra-
tives in the context of complex post-conflict societies. It also emphasised
the need for a commitment to responsiveness and trust-building from
outside actors to their insider counterparts. Overall, it contributes to the
growing literature on peacebuilding by underlining the significance of
awareness for change from within, which would lead to sustainable and
resilient institutions of peace.
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